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GLOSSARY
AML REPORTING
SYSTEM

The combined structure of Reporting Entities, Financial
Intelligence Unit and the Law Enforcement Agency.

AML
PROFESSIONALS

All persons directly related to the activities of an AML
reporting system, for example, anti money laundering
compliance officers of Reporting Entities, analysts of the
FIU and money laundering case investigators of the Law
Enforcement Agency.

AML REPORTS

All AML related reports, including, but not limited to
STRs and CTRs.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine the Anti Money Laundering reporting regime
in Bangladesh. The study scrutinised the activities of the major components of the Anti
Money Laundering reporting system, which is comprised of the reporting entities, the
Financial Intelligence Unit and the law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the study
identified the core concern of the persons involved in the reporting process and how this
concern was continually being handled. Data was collected for this study through
various methods including interviews, literature searches and observations. In order to
study this substantive area where little research had been done, the analyst utilised a
Grounded Theory approach to data collection and conceptualisation. This methodology
emphasises the patterns of behaviour of people that indicate a social process that
revolves around something relevant and problematic for those involved. It was found
that the main concern of the persons engaged in the reporting system was the
information deficiency caused by a poor inter-agency information sharing culture. Since
timely access to useful information is at the centre of an anti money laundering
reporting system, the persons involved, described in this study as anti money laundering
professionals, must find alternative ways to fill the deficiency that hinders their day-today work. As they are part of a system that cannot be changed overnight, they must
improvise. While this improvisation indicated a number of positive things, including the
enthusiasm of the persons concerned to defeat a poorly-functioning system, it was also
revealed that makeshift initiatives taken by inadequately trained personnel can result in
only partial success. At the end, the study proposed a hypothesis that argued that this
phenomenon of a shortage of useful information in the anti money laundering reporting
system was actually a part of a general information deficiency in the overall
bureaucracy. There was a shortage of both supply of and demand for good quality
information. This situation could be comparable to the ‘vicious circle of poverty’ and
‘problem of capital formation’ in developing countries. Therefore, it will be interesting
to see if a synchronised increase in the both demand for and supply of information using
existing resources could provide an escape from the deadlock.

xv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis marks the end of my journey toward a doctoral degree that I began a few
years ago. I received generous support and encouragement from a number of persons
and organisations in this journey. At the end, it is a pleasant task to acknowledge their
contributions without which this journey would certainly have remained incomplete.
I greatly acknowledge the academic, technical and financial support of the Faculty of
Law, University of Wollongong, particularly in the award of International Postgraduate
Research Scholarship, University Postgraduate Award, and International postgraduate
Tuition Award, which have provided the necessary financial support for this research.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor John Broome for his
magnificent guidance and support. His unwavering passion for AML related research
kept me engaged with my research, and his expertise in the AML area improved my
research skills and helped me overcome all difficulties that I faced during data analysis
and thesis writing.
For helpful suggestions received during the initial stage of this research I wish to
express my appreciative thanks to all academic and administrative staff of the Centre for
Transnational Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law. My special thanks to Ms Elaine
Newby for her excellent editorial services.
I am indebted also to all staff members in the library, research services office, research
student centre, and the Information Technology Services helpdesk of UOW for their
friendly and timely assistance.
I would like to acknowledge the debt that is owed to the Bangladesh Financial
Intelligence Unit and the Anti Corruption Commission of Bangladesh who helped me in
every possible ways during the empirical research.
To my family members, whose constant interest has been a source of great
encouragement, I record my deepest gratitude.

xvii

1
1.1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis with an emphasis on its key
components. It first provides some background information about the research project.
This thesis examines the performance of the AML system in Bangladesh against the
requirements the global AML regime, its main features, and the minimum obligations
this regime imposes on the various jurisdictions. Chapter One introduces the FATF
prescribed AML reporting system model that jurisdictions must implement to prevent
and combat money laundering. The thesis identifies a critical issue confronting the
AML system in Bangladesh: the lack of timely and accurate information, an essential
element of an effective AML system. It describes the general problem, identifies the
research question and the purpose and specific aims of the research project along with
the scope and significance of this study.
It explains in Chapter Two that the AML system operates within the broader
bureaucratic environment of Bangladesh and argues that the bureaucracy in Bangladesh
has unfavourable traditional and cultural elements which actually render the system
incompatible with the efforts of implementing global AML standards. In particular, this
discussion identifies the variables that strongly affect the relationship between the
bureaucracy, the general people, and the various organisations responsible for
implementing the national AML goals.
Chapter Three describes the Grounded Theory methodology and describes each stage in
the application of that methodology from the initial data collection to the emergence of
the core variable. It explains the data collection process, the coding process, the constant
comparison of incidents, the use of theoretical sampling, and the emergence of a core
category that expresses or explains the main concerns of the participants in the research.
Chapter Four argues that there is a shortage of useful information in the AML reporting
system of Bangladesh which actually is a part of a general information deficiency in the
overall bureaucracy. As a result the major components of the AML reporting system
(REs, FIU and the ACC) are affected by both the low quality and low quantity of
information. In response, the actors within the major components of the AML reporting
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system have developed a range of improvisations — informal, partial and makeshift
solutions — to handle this situation.
Chapter Five explains the behaviour of participants and identifies links between
varieties of behaviours of the participants so that a hypothesis could be generated. It
presents a brief introduction as to how improvisation is generally understood, its use in
human society and its probable connection with AML initiatives. It also describes how
the various features of improvisation may link with AML compliance and how a
particular AML reporting system could benefit from different improvised information
collection techniques.
Most importantly, this chapter argues that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ improvisations and
that AML professionals must have enough experience and training to achieve the
maximum success in applying improvised techniques to handle the information
deficiency. Finally, the thesis identifies ways in which this strategic deficit may be
addressed.
1.1.1

Background of the Thesis

Money laundering is a crime to conceal a crime. As it is a process of converting
‘potential purchasing power into actual purchasing power’,1 the illicit funds must pass
through the formal financial system at one stage or another of this process. The very
nature of the laundering process brings both problems and opportunities. Money
laundering makes financial institutions constantly subject to risks of various types and
yet at the same time allows law enforcement agencies to track down even hidden or
previously undetected crimes. Therefore, for ‘reducing crime, protecting the integrity of
the core financial system, and controlling three types of global “public bads” —
terrorism, corruption, and failed states’2 the global AML regime provides several
prevention and enforcement mechanisms against money laundering. As part of this
arrangement, ‘the international community has reached a remarkable consensus about

1

Donato Masciandaro, Elod Takats and Brigitte Unger, Black Finance, The Economics of Money
Laundering (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007) 2.
2
Peter Reuter and Edwin M Truman, Chasing Dirty Money (Institute for International Economics, 2004)
2.

2

the importance of developing money laundering laws that include suspicious transaction
reporting duties …’.3
1.1.2

The Global AML Regime and Its Key Functions

The foundation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by the G-7 Summit that was
held in Paris in 19894 was the most significant action taken against money laundering.
Its Forty Recommendations to prevent money laundering are now globally endorsed
AML standards.5 These Recommendations are a comprehensive set of AML procedures
that outline both a legislative and strategic framework against money laundering at the
domestic level and provide necessary guidelines regarding international co-operation.6
In addition to the Recommendations, FATF published various guidelines in the form of
interpretative notes to the Recommendations, and some reports (for example, the
Financial Investigations Guidance)7 in order to assist member jurisdictions’ compliance
initiatives. This information elaborates on specific objectives and the scope of the FATF
Recommendations and helps members understand the exact requirements of each
Recommendation. FATF has three main tasks — monitoring members’ progress in
terms of compliance with its Recommendations, reviewing money laundering trends,
techniques and counter-measures, and promoting FATF standards among non-member
jurisdictions.8
1.1.2.1 Monitoring the Progress of Its Members
It has been said that, ‘The FATF Recommendations are meant to be minimum standards
that enable countries to implement the requirements according to their particular
circumstances and constitutional frameworks’.9 That is to say, jurisdictions are left with

3

Matthew R Hall, ‘An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the
Suspicious Activity Report’ (1995–96) 84 Kentucky Law Journal 643, 673.
4
FATF, History of the FATF (2012) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/>.
5
Toby Graham, Evan Bell and Nicholas Elliott, Money Laundering (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003) 30.
6
Jackie Johnson, ‘Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT Prepared?’ (2008) 15(1) Journal of
Financial Crime 7, 11.
7
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Operational Issues, Financial Investigations Guidance (June
2012) 3 <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Operational%20Issues_Financial%20
investigations%20Guidance.pdf>.
8
Graham, Bell and Elliott, above n 5, 30–1.
9
Neil Jensen and Cheong-Ann Png, ‘Implementation of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations: A
Perspective from Developing Countries’ (2011) 14(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 110, 113.
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very limited options to choose from when it comes to complying with global AML
standards. FATF uses both yearly self-assessment and periodic mutual assessment
procedures for monitoring member jurisdictions’ level of compliance with its
Recommendations.10
The self-assessment procedure requires member jurisdictions to complete a standard
evaluation questionnaire supplied by FATF. FATF then reviews the information so
provided and decides on the level of compliance of the jurisdiction concerned. Mutual
evaluation is, however, a rather thorough process. Initially, the jurisdiction under
assessment completes a Mutual Evaluation Questionnaire and provides it to the
evaluation team consisting of members with legal, financial and law enforcement
related expertise. Next, the evaluation team visits the jurisdiction, engages in a series of
face-to-face meeting with the representatives of that jurisdiction and obtains necessary
information. During this visit experts make an assessment with regard to the degree of
improvement in AML/CFT issues the country has already made and areas where it still
fails to satisfy global standards.11 The evaluating team and the evaluated members adopt
the evaluation report through mutual discussion and feedback.12 FATF’s third round of
mutual assessment began in 2005 based on a revised 2003 version of the 40+9
Recommendations.13
1.1.2.2 Reviewing ML Trends and Counter-Measures
FATF issued its first set of Forty Recommendations in 1990 as a comprehensive
measure against money laundering offences. After an initial review in 1996,14 the Forty
Recommendations underwent a major revision in 2003. Substantial changes in money
laundering techniques and the surfacing of evidence concerning the involvement of
even non-financial institutions in money laundering activity mainly spurred this
revision.15 Following the September 11 incident in the United States, FATF adopted a
10

Jackie Johnson, ‘Third Round FATF Mutual Evaluations Indicate Declining Compliance’ (2008) 11(1)
Journal of Money Laundering Control 47, 48.
11
Ibid.
12
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML), Mutual Evaluations, APGML Documents (2012)
<http://www.apgml.org/documents/selfassessment.aspx>.
13
Johnson, ‘Third Round FATF Mutual Evaluations Indicate Declining Compliance’, above n 10, 48.
This round of mutual evaluation concluded in 2011.
14
Johnson, ‘Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT Prepared?’, above n 6, 8.
15
Ibid 11.
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further nine Special Recommendations on Countering the Financing of Terrorism to the
previous Forty Recommendations.16 Following extensive international consultation in
February 2012, FATF published a further revision of its Recommendations which
included corruption and tax crimes as new priority areas.17
1.1.2.3 Promoting FATF Standards among Non-Member Jurisdictions
FATF Associate members are responsible for the implementation of its standards
among non-member jurisdictions. Currently there are eight such regional AML/CFT
organisations across the world, including the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
(APG).18 Established in 1997, APG is a non-political multi-jurisdiction organisation that
recognises FATF’s Forty Recommendations as the accepted AML standard for its own
members.19 These organisations ‘typically tailor their own AML/CFT recommendations
to suit their local environment’.20 They evaluate their member jurisdictions against
FATF Recommendations.
Responding to the Special Needs of Low Capacity Countries
Another way of promoting FATF standards among non-member countries is to
recognise the unique features of developing economies. Although it took quite a long
time for FATF to understand the special circumstances of countries in the developing
world, eventually they acknowledged that some countries’ risk profile and resource
limitations place them in a separate and different group to other nations.
In 2008, FATF published the Guidance on Capacity Building for Mutual Evaluation and
Implementation of the FATF Standards within Low Capacity Countries. This formally
recognised the particular problems encountered by low capacity jurisdictions in
implementing global AML standards. This Guidance suggested a number of policies
16

Ibid 8.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation – The FATF Recommendations (16 February 2012)
(‘2012 FATF Recommendations’) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/
internationalstandardsoncombatingmoneylaunderingandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-thefatf
recommendations.html>.
18
Johnson, ‘Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT Prepared?’, above n 6, 9.
19
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML), APG Terms of Reference 2012 (17 July 2012)
APGML Documents, 3 <http://www.apgml.org/documents/docs/12/FINAL%20APG%20Terms%20of
%20Reference%2017%20July%202012%20Adopted%20at%20AM%202012.pdf>.
20
Johnson, ‘Is the Global Financial System AML/CFT Prepared?’, above n 6, 10.
17

5

and procedures to prioritise and implement global AML standards in low capacity
countries. This was an important initiative because one of FATF’s primary objectives
was the successful roll-out of its standards in all jurisdictions.21
The Guidance identified criminalisation of money laundering, detection of the financing
of terrorism, requirements for customer due diligence, record keeping and suspicious
transaction reporting as five core AML standards and stressed that, irrespective of their
capacity, all countries should implement these standards on a priority basis. The
Guidance further mentioned that the low capacity countries’ unique structural
characteristics and type of money laundering risk should be taken into consideration in
defining the sequence of implementation of these core standards. For example, in a
cash-based economy the informal financial sector may require more attention than the
formal sectors.22
1.1.3

Annual Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Reports

Failure to comply with FATF Recommendations may trigger a series of actions against
non-complying jurisdictions or territories, which may range from an obligation to
submit periodic reports, suspension of membership and even ‘black listing’. FATF
requires that a jurisdiction must not only have a legislative framework against money
laundering but that they should support that framework by the implementation of strong
financial sector regulations.23
In this connection, another important function of FATF was the publication of annual
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) reports. In February 2000, FATF
began the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) initiative24 and surveyed
47 jurisdictions in two rounds in regard to an extensive list of 25 ‘detrimental practices’.
Over the period of this NCCT process, the survey came up with a ‘black list’ of 15
jurisdictions in 2000 and 8 in 2001 and labelled them as ‘non-cooperative countries and
21

Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Guidance on Capacity Building for Mutual Evaluation and
Implementation of the FATF Standards within Low Capacity Countries (29 February 2008) 3
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Capacity%20building%20LCC.pdf>.
22
Ibid 5.
23
Graham, Bell and Elliott, above n 5, 31.
24
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), High-risk and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions: About the NonCooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative (23 August 2012) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncc
tinitiative.html>.
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territories’.25 Due to the high number of negative practices in those jurisdictions, FATF
was convinced that their motivation and aptitude to cooperate in the global fight against
money laundering was inadequate.26 FATF set specific objectives for those jurisdictions
to achieve. As they fulfilled those objectives and made significant progress in their fight
against money laundering, FATF removed their names from the list. This process
continued until October 2006 when last country was de-listed on the basis of the actions
that they had taken to remedy the deficiencies previously identified.27
Some scholars are often sceptical about the de-listing process. They argue that many
jurisdictions (including FATF member states) would actually fail to pass the test if
FATF properly applied the NCCT criteria for assessing the jurisdictions and countries.
Having abandoned the original NCCT process, FATF actually ‘reinvented’ the process
under a new label and continued the review process so that jurisdictions could be
included in the list if they continued to fail to meet FATF standards. 28 On 22 February
2013, as a part of its ongoing review of compliance with global AML and CFT
standards, FATF published a public statement on high-risk and non-cooperative
jurisdictions.29 It is the current vehicle to force compliance.
1.2

Requirements of the Effective Implementation of Global AML Standards

For the effective implementation of global AML standards jurisdictions need to meet
certain specific requirements. These requirements are interconnected and can bring
maximum success only when implemented collectively. A jurisdiction must criminalise
money laundering and place adequate power in the hands of law enforcement and
prosecution authorities so that they can investigate and prosecute money-laundering
offences. At the same time, they must adequately train and equip the relevant agencies
and their personnel with the necessary legal authority and other requisite resources to
25

Ibid.
Guy Stessens, ‘The FATF “Black List” of Non-cooperative Countries or Territories’ (2001) 14(1)
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perform their duties properly. In addition, there should also be in place an efficient
‘freezing’, seizure and confiscation mechanism to deprive criminals of the proceeds of
their crimes.30
In addition to the criminalisation of money laundering and the adequate empowering of
the authorities, another important requirement is the establishment of adequate measures
to detect and prevent money-laundering attempts. FATF recommended that the
jurisdictions require their financial institutions to have Customer Due Diligence
practices in place to prevent criminals from operating anonymously or under false
identities. Jurisdictions should further strengthen this initiative through thorough
adequate record keeping and the updating of customer details. Accurate and updated
customer data is crucial for any AML regime. It helps financial institutions to monitor
customer behaviour, and then report suspicious activities, if any, to the financial
intelligence unit (FIU) for further analysis and dissemination.31
This monitoring, detection, reporting and then analysis and dissemination of suspicious
activities/transactions are anything but a ‘self-guided tour’. It requires jurisdictions to
fulfil a variety of other conditions for these steps to move forward. A strong internal
enforcement mechanism against non-compliant reporting entities is an important
prerequisite for the implementation of reporting obligations. At the same time, it is also
crucial that the appropriate authorities have access to accurate and current information
about legal persons and their arrangements.32
‘Access to information’ has a wider meaning in an AML regime. Often launderers use
multiple jurisdictions to scatter any evidence of criminal activity and for such activity to
be detected investigators frequently need to access a variety of foreign information
sources, not only for the initial detection of an instance of such activity but also for an
indication of its penetration across any number of jurisdictions. Therefore, mutual
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cooperation by jurisdictions through intelligence sharing and legal assistance in a timely
manner is critical so that no jurisdiction ever becomes a safe haven for criminals.33
It appears that FATF recommended the above requirements to accomplish two primary
tasks — firstly, to facilitate the ‘collection’ of financial information, and, secondly, to
ensure its proper ‘use’. Combined, these two broad tasks propose the concept of an
institutional arrangement that runs on the free exchange of useful information about the
financial activities of individuals and businesses. The FATF Recommendations put
forward a number of essential elements for the construction of a reporting regime. The
following sections will further elaborate on those matters.
1.3

Key Features of the Global AML Reporting Regime

FATF puts much emphasis on preventive measures. Its standards lay down a detailed
framework for Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and record keeping (R 10 and 11).
FATF also sets out additional measures for specific customers and activities. For
example, it puts special emphasis on politically exposed persons and their financial
activities (R 12–16), provisions on reliance, controls and financial groups (R 17–19),
reporting of suspicious transactions (R 20–21), and provisions on Designated Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions (R 22–23).34
In order to support preventive measures, FATF requires jurisdictions to criminalise
money laundering (R 3) and to have in place the necessary enforcement mechanism,
including rules regarding confiscation and provisional measures (R 4). At the same
time, FATF sets forth detailed guidelines about powers and responsibilities of
competent AML authorities, including regulation and supervision of financial
institutions (R 26–28), law enforcement and the Financial Intelligence Unit (R 29–32),
statistics, guidance and feedback (R 33–34), and sanctions (R 35). Global AML
standards also provide detailed guidelines about international cooperation, mutual legal
assistance including freezing of assets, their confiscation, and the extradition of relevant
parties (R 36–40).35 In brief, ‘[t]he Recommendations cover the criminal justice system
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and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and international cooperation’36 as a comprehensive set of measures against money laundering offences.
The above-mentioned measures are applied under a multi-step institutional arrangement
where data is generated and then used in law enforcement and related investigatory
activities. The information travels through this multi-step process from collection to
dissemination, grows gradually, acquires due attributes from each stage of its growth
and gains maximum usefulness as it arrives at the final stage of use (Figure 1). In the
subsequent sections, we will see how this evolution of information occurs in an AML
reporting regime context and the key issues concerning that process.

Note: Recommendation numbers correspond to those in the 2012 version of FATF Recommendations.

Figure 1: AML Reporting System Model
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1.3.1

AML Reporting System

The process presented in Figure 1 is a simple model of a suspicious
transaction/activities reporting regime. Close observation of this model reveals two
important things — the institutional shape of an AML reporting regime and the
potential sources of information for this regime.
Institutional Shape of the AML Regime
The institutional shape of the AML reporting regime indicates that besides lobbying the
governments for criminalising money laundering, another key aim of the global AML
regime is to align itself with the core concept of the information age, that is, it
reintroduces individuals and organisations concerned to the culture of easy access to
knowledge and the free transfer of information. This emphasis on information sharing
has resulted in the foundation of a social information-sharing network in the AML
context. In this study, the analyst referred to this ‘AML reporting system’ as one where
Reporting Entities (REs), the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the law enforcement
agency are its major components.
Probable Sources of Information
An AML reporting system relies on both internal and external sources of information.
Externally, the AML system components interact with a number of information sources,
for instance, customers of financial service providers and various public, private,
autonomous and international organisations. Some common examples are: tax
authorities, various licensing authorities, immigration and passport authorities, and the
like, all of which are sources of information for the AML reporting system. These
various components also interact with each other and exchange information.
Information is also passed internally within each of the component organisations.
1.3.2

Functioning of the AML Reporting System

An important purpose of the AML reporting system is to introduce a process through
which its components will be motivated to combine their diversified efforts in achieving
a specific objective — the control of money laundering. While international standards
outline the broad roles of these components, the domestic AML legislation defines
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specific roles that they adopt. Depending on each jurisdiction’s judicial and
administrative system and the type of money laundering risk they encounter, the role
and responsibilities of the FIU and the law enforcement agency may differ.
The AML reporting system works in steps. Initially, REs assemble information about
known or suspected violations of AML laws from customers’ transaction records and
also from external sources where possible and report them as suspicious transaction
reports (STRs). The FIU receives, analyses and disseminates these reports. They
analyse reports ‘by looking at financial transactions involving identified parties, linking
that information to other available information concerning the identified individuals or
organisations, inter-relationships between them or third parties’37 before forwarding
them to the relevant law enforcement agency. At the final stage, the law enforcement
agency also plays its role by investigating those cases from a prosecutorial point of
view. They conduct further investigation based on the FIU forwarded report (that may
establish possible criminal conduct), uncover more evidence, and in some cases,
eventually produce a case for prosecution.
1.3.2.1 Collection and Verification Steps
The most vulnerable moment for money launderers is when they enter into business
with reporting entities because the chance of detection of a potential money laundering
case is at its highest at the ‘placement stage’ when there is typically direct contact
between the banking sector or other financial service provider and the customer.38
Therefore, it is very important that financial service providers gather adequate
knowledge about customers and their business in order to be able to establish a logical
connection between the value of transaction services and known sources of income.
FATF recommends that financial institutions should identify and verify the identity of
their customers before or during the course of establishing business relations. They
should do it using reliable and independent sources of documents and information so
that the process works as a preliminary screening against false identity and forged
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documents. If this screening process is not (or cannot be) properly directed, the number
of suspicious activity reports lodged with FIUs related to apparent identity fraud may
increase. Australian experience has indicated that such reporting may deflect the AML
reporting from its primary focus upon major crimes.39
The Problem of False Documents
Due to the ineffective reference checking facilities in some low capacity countries, it
may be easy to obtain forged identification documents and use them with a minimum
risk of detection. In fact, studies revealed that forgery could present a significant risk
even in a developed country context. In a report on ‘identity related economic crime’,
the Australian Institute of Criminology indicated that 95 per cent of financial crimes in
the United States involve stolen identities.40 The report further mentioned that:
In February 1999, KPMG carried out a survey of over 1800 of Australia’s largest
businesses. Of the 367 replies received, some 7280 incidents of fraud were reported
in the two years preceding the survey, with 57 per cent of respondents reporting at
least one incident during that period.41

The Challenges of Verification
‘[A]n important constituent of reliability stems from verifiability’;42 however, FATF
does not suggest any specific verification style or standard for the purposes of an AML
reporting system. How a jurisdiction will impose Customer Due Diligence obligations
on their reporting entities and upon what standard requirements would the method of
verification be based rest with the jurisdictions concerned to decide. However, finding
‘reliable, independent source documents, data or information’ for verification, as
suggested in Recommendation 10, could be challenging.
In its simplest terms, as Bohm and Mason mentioned, ‘identity’ is actually a
relationship between a person and some standard identifiers, for example, name,
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address, date of birth and the like. If a person knows all this information about himself,
then he is able to identify himself as a certain person. From this point of view,
verification of identity would mean collecting some evidence in order to be sure that the
person in question bears a certain name, has that date of birth, address and some other
social characteristics. But in reality, an electricity bill, for example, that supports
someone’s claim about his address could be deceptive because it is not impossible to
purchase such products/services without even establishing one’s true identity as a
customer. Besides, such an identifier, even if it was correct when initially recorded,
could become irrelevant if that person had moved to a new address.43 Such documents
could then be provided by another party as a fraudulent ‘verification’ of that party’s
identity in terms of both name and address.
The above examples raise a series of questions with regard to the general standard of
identification and verification that FATF Recommendation 10 suggests. The very first
question could be related to the reliability of this method of matching individual and
identifier for verification purpose when we know that identifiers could change or
otherwise lose their credibility quite easily. The next question could be about the parties
to this process. When it comes to verification of a person’s identity with the use of
certain documents, it may not be clear exactly who the other party in this exercise is, nor
what would be the nature of the service provider’s responsibility if that provider failed
to verify the documents correctly. It would be very hard to answer these questions in the
context of those jurisdictions where there is no citizen database (or the database is
inaccessible for any reason), institutional accountability is relatively weak,
administration is mostly paper-based, and culture of interagency cooperation is not as
good as in many other countries.
1.3.2.2 Reporting Steps
FATF suggests that jurisdictions require financial institutions to file STRs if they have
reason to believe that funds are the proceeds of crime or related to financing of
terrorism (R 13). In addition, there are some examples provided as to when a reporting
entity may lodge an STR. If a reporting entity is unable to identify a customer or
43
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beneficial owner during Customer Due Diligence (CDD), or is unable to verify their
identity against reliable independent sources of documents or information, the financial
institution concerned can consider lodging an STR (R 5).44 Beyond this, it remained
largely open-ended for member jurisdictions in regards to what constitutes ‘suspicion’,
though this is not the sole basis of reporting.
When it comes to reporting transactions, it is not necessary for the reporting entities to
lodge a report based only on a genuine suspicion. National laws require the reporting
entities to report cash transactions even if they did not feel the funds had any real
connection with crime or financing of terrorism. This objective model of reporting
requires reporting of transactions beyond a threshold amount. While this type of
reporting promotes consistency and uniformity, it also results in reporting transactions
that have no connection with crime.45 It should be noted here, however, that the purpose
of such ‘threshold reporting’ is to facilitate the identification of patterns which might
not otherwise be identifiable, by a single reporting agency. Often a number of deposits
come from different accounts in another jurisdiction, therefore, only the FIU is in a
position to see this pattern. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental requirement that reporting
entities shall report suspicious transactions/activities based on ‘reasonable suspicion’.
Then, what factors will reporting entities look for to make a decision about filing
suspicious transactions/activities reports?
Challenges in Identifying Elements of Suspicion
An incident is distinguished as ‘suspicious’ based on contextual detail. That is to say, a
reporting entity of a jurisdiction may view the suspicious activity of another jurisdiction
as completely trustworthy. Therefore, anti money laundering professionals exercise
discretion alongside the use of objective rules (which ideally should also be formulated
based on particular context) to separate elements of suspicion from apparently
trustworthy behaviours. Then again, use of discretion could be challenging for
inexperienced persons and/or if there is inadequate contextual detail available to support
decision making.
44
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Some scholars questioned the very fitness of the private organisations’ officials for this
purpose as they are untrained in wider law enforcement techniques. They argued that
where ‘suspicious’ is thought to be indicated by a person’s apparent ‘indecision’ in
responding to legitimate queries or in that person’s appearance of ‘discomfort’ before
the employee, for instance, an expert launderer may always be able to appear normal
and cloak such behaviours with apparent ease and confidence.46 While this argument as
to the lack of training and therefore the fitness of private employees to undertake a role
more akin to that of an investigating law enforcement officer has some basis in that the
global AML regime imposed additional levels of reporting obligations on various
entities to report suspected crimes, it is neither a sudden arrangement for them nor does
it require mastering skills irrelevant to their core business. Reporting entities are not
supposed to act as law enforcement agencies. They do not investigate possible crimes,
but merely indicate transactions which are suspicious or unusual in the context of the
financial relationship and the known features of the client.
One scholar also mentioned that the appearance of members of a certain class or race in
a country may seem to ‘look’ more ‘suspicious’ to reporting entity staff than other
characteristics or those characteristics or races in other jurisdictions.47 For instance, in
Britain ‘it has been found that a disproportionate share of STRs are filed about
transactions made by visible minorities, even though, in the final analysis, they show a
lower “hit rate” than those filed on Anglo-Saxons’.48 This reflects a certain level of
disconnect between actual objective indicators and those perhaps more socially driven.
One simple example perhaps can be found in the misapprehension of aversion of the
eyes, for example, as ‘shifty’ rather than a mark of respect. Another indicator of
‘suspicious behaviour’ — hesitation in answering even simple questions — may be due
to a language difficulty rather than fraudulent misrepresentation of identity, and so on.
Less charitable explanations would veer towards suspicions of staff operating on a basis
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of racial stereotyping, even racism, and the like. Cash dealings that are more frequently
involved in some types of businesses than others may also attract attention.
Nevertheless, it could be hard, even in an ideal situation, to detect suspicion correctly.
Some Belgian experiences have shown that it was difficult for the officials to decide —
based on limited information — which case to investigate and which investigated case
should be reported to the FIU. But this is only part of the problem. Non-reporting may
result in various types of sanctions;49 therefore, reporting must continue. Michael Levi
stressed the difficulties involved in this issue and argued that at times it could be really
difficult to identify suspicious transaction as sometimes ‘it is very difficult to verify the
genuineness of the levels of trade that correspond to the currency deposits’. 50 Now, what
are the factors that reporting entities will rely on to conclude that there are elements of
suspicion?
An answer could be found in the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre’s
(AUSTRAC) public legal interpretation series, which provides a legal interpretation of
certain AML principles. In an interpretation supplied on ‘suspicious matter’ and
‘suspect transaction reports’, AUSTRAC mentioned that there must be ‘reasonable
grounds’ to suspect that the person or their agent is not who they purport to be, or that
the information that the entity has may be relevant in relation to tax evasion or another
offence against State, Territory or Commonwealth law (including the Proceeds of
Crimes Act 2002 (Cth)), or that the act is preparation for a money laundering or
financing of terrorism offence; and a reporting entity must have a ‘real suspicion of the
relevant matters and the suspicion must be based on matters or evidence that support the
truth of the suspicion’.51 Citing a leading case in the Supreme Court of Western
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Australia, AUSTRAC further stressed that ‘the Supreme Court is to be satisfied that
facts exist which are sufficient to have induced that belief in a reasonable person’.52
It is important to note, however, that laws are different in different jurisdictions as are
the tests of what constitutes ‘suspicious’. Some jurisdictions may impose, in place of
‘reasonable belief’, a lower threshold to detect suspicion. They might require only ‘mere
suspicion’. There could also be an issue with the use of legal language. ‘Suspicion’ in
English might only mean ‘doubt’ but in other languages, suspicion might need a higher
level of satisfaction.
As mentioned before, suspicion is contextual; yet, some common examples of
subjective models of reporting may include judging customers by their behaviours,
which may include unusual service requests, abnormal patterns in transactions and a
combination of other unusual behaviours that one judges under particular
circumstances. This style of reporting may be a difficult task for AML professionals
who do not have enough experience and training in the detection of suspicious
transactions/activities.53
1.3.2.3 Analysis and Dissemination Steps
As part of FATF’s institutional measures against money laundering, jurisdictions are
required to establish a central authority that will receive and analyse AML related
reports and then disseminate them to law enforcement agencies. Beside regular STRs
and cash transaction reports (CTRs), an FIU needs the authority to collect additional
information to facilitate their analysis. In order to accomplish this task, they must have
timely access to any financial, administrative and law enforcement related
information.54
Once the FIU decides to disseminate a report, it is the responsibility of the law
enforcement and investigative authorities to investigate the cases forwarded to them and
collect the necessary evidence for prosecution if such a course is indicated. FATF
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suggests that the investigative authorities should have adequate powers, including the
ability to implement measures to compel the production of documents, information or
records in any form held by financial institutions, relevant non-financial entities,
individuals or incorporated bodies.55
As Zerzan observes, ‘Certainly the most sweeping institutional shift established under
the FATF regime is the Financial Intelligence Unit’,56 and the AML reporting system
that rings it. Key features of the global AML initiative suggest that it is a highly datadriven regime which requires an appropriate institutional body that can collect, store,
evaluate and share data and information across numerous agencies. Criminals abuse the
complexity of financial system for their illicit business operations and scatter their
activities across various organisational and geographical locations. As a central
repository, the FIU and its institutional arrangement within the framework of AML
reporting system can connect those dots and assist investigation and prosecution of
money laundering related offence.57 The FIUs and the law enforcement agencies of the
various countries are able to further exchange information.
1.4

Contextualising the Study: AML Compliance and Low Capacity Countries

The features of AML reporting systems (as detailed in 1.3.2 to 1.3.2.3 above) indicate
that their successful implementation would require very efficient mobilisation of
domestic resources. Along with availability of adequate resources, a jurisdiction must
have the willingness and capability to use such resources to accomplish AML goals.
A 2011 IMF report maintains that when it comes to compliance with AML regime ‘[a]
higher degree of compliance appears to be associated with a higher level of economic
development’.58 However, a 2008 comparative study between compliance levels of pre
and post the 2003 version of the FATF Recommendations showed that compliance
55
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levels had actually fallen, even in FATF member countries59 who were ‘better prepared
given their experience, expertise, and years of commitment to their AML/CFT
programs’.60 Nevertheless, studies have found that problems of noncompliance are more
severe in low capacity countries.
Studies subsequent to the 2011 IMF report also suggested that economically
underdeveloped countries maintain a poorer compliance record than that of their
developed counterparts. A survey of FATF and World Bank data concerning 24
developed and 43 developing countries concluded that developing countries have a
lower level of compliance in AML preventive measures, FIU and other institutional
measures and compliance with cross-border cooperation obligations, among others.61
The same study identified five common challenges that developing nations face in
complying with FAFT standards. It suggested that a country’s compliance with global
AML standards has a strong connection with its ‘institutional capacity’. Developing
nations’ lack of experience, training and budgetary resources act as significant deterrent
to founding specialised public agencies that many developed nations often have. This
problem is intensified due to a lack of synchronisation among various government
agencies within each country. Absence of regular dialogues among agencies on national
AML issues and underrepresented national AML committees are two vital reasons why
coordination could be poor.62 In this connection, the Report further maintained that:
[M]any developing countries are cited in their assessments as lacking formalized
protocols for coordination even though they may have broad laws that permit or
encourage it. For example, the 2009 Bangladesh assessment notes that there are no
MOUs between domestic agencies to share information so information sharing is
ineffective.63

Another challenge for developing nations is difficulties in problem ‘prioritisation’.
Often AML is not on their priority list, given that various delicate as well as pronounced
social and economic issues require more attention than money laundering. This lower
priority may result in poorer implementation of AML standards even after enactment of
59
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the necessary legislation. The Report identified problems relating to ‘governance’ as
another vital challenge that many developing nations face. In this study, Transparency
International’s corruption perceptions and 67 FATF assessments were compared and
analysis indicated a correlation between corruption and AML compliance ratings.
Countries with a higher corruption level demonstrated a lower degree of compliance and
vice versa. The study also stated that corruption is a serious obstruction to coordination
in public sector.64
The fifth challenge, as the study highlighted, is the ‘overall strategy’ that developing
nations employ to comply with global AML standards. The entire AML regime is
heavily reliant on data and this is the area where a vital disconnect could be observed.
Data must be collected and then verified to be useful for future reference. However, the
reality is, in many developing nations members of a large segment of the society either
do not have any identity documents at all or they have but such documents are not
verifiable against any reliable sources.65 This reality may render strategic AML
approaches futile in the developing country context.
The above discussion on the background of this research project points to certain
specific issues related to the global implementation of the FATF Recommendations. It
indicates that all jurisdictions must implement the core FATF Recommendations with
equal effect in order to protect the integrity of the financial system worldwide.
However, many developing countries do not have the required experience, training,
institutional capacity, resources and adequate political will (among other things) to
effectively implement these standards.
The descriptions and analysis presented in the preceding sections present a general
background to the research project under study. The following sections shall briefly
describe, among others matters — the substantive area of research, outline the problem,
the purpose of the study, and the specific aims of this research project.
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1.5

Substantive Area: The Emergent Research Problem and the Research
Question(s)

The broader objective of this research project is to generate a grounded theory through
conceptualisation of data systematically collected from a substantive area. A grounded
theory ‘emerges to explain the preponderance of behaviour in that area, which
behaviour is the continual resolving of the participants’ main concern’.66 For the
purpose of this research project, the analyst chose the AML reporting system of
Bangladesh as the substantive area for three main reasons. First, this area was
comparatively new which makes it an ideal setting for applying grounded theory
methodology (to be elaborated in Chapter Three). Second, the analyst had easy access to
research data (participants and their organisations) that was necessary for extensive
grounded theory study, and third, it was an important and un-researched area.
1.5.1

Substantive Area: The AML Reporting Regime in Bangladesh

Bangladesh became a member of Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) in
199767 and criminalised money laundering in 2002.68 In 2009, the APG Mutual
Evaluation Report indicated that Bangladesh was a low achieving jurisdiction with an
average rating below the level of a ‘partially compliant’ jurisdiction.69 Views reflected
in this evaluation were further strengthened with the Transparency International
(Bangladesh) report indicating alleged widespread corruption in the public sector of
Bangladesh.70 These findings indicate some serious ‘disconnects’ in regard to the effort
involved in and the results of the implementation of the AML regime of Bangladesh.
Located within the Central Bank, the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit has an
administrative model whose main task is to implement domestic AML policies with the
help of the Anti Corruption Commission (founded in 2004). The FIU educates reporting
66
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entities (REs) on AML issues, supervises compliance and receives AML reports (STRs
and CTRs). Empowered by law, the Anti Corruption Commission is the AML partner
agency responsible for the investigation of all AML related cases.71
1.5.2

Research Problem and Questions

The analyst initially approached the research based on the assumption that the problem
confronting the AML regime of Bangladesh was that the quality of reports being
produced by the reporting entities and the FIU was not adequate, because this was one
of the major issues that the APG Mutual Evaluation Report identified and repeatedly
mentioned.72 Therefore, initially the idea was to examine why the quality of the reports
was poor. In the course of undertaking this examination, it became apparent that there
were more deep-seated and fundamental issues that APG Mutual Evaluation Report did
not adequately address. The closer the analyst approached the problem, the more it
became apparent that there were a number of underlying issues. Therefore, the analyst
decided to apply a methodology (elaborated in section 3.5 of Chapter 3 below) which
suited the substantive area. Finally, the analyst chose the Grounded Theory (GT)
approach. A GT approach allows researchers to identify the core problem of a
substantive area and the process that the people involved continually apply to resolve
that problem.
As a key requirement for the systematic generation of a ‘grounded theory’ using classic
GT methodology (as will be elaborated in Chapter Three), this research project began
with no specific predetermined problem. However, the APG Mutual Evaluation Report
on Bangladesh (elaborated in Chapter Two), which concluded that this jurisdiction
required a major overhaul of its AML regime, was an important reason for choosing this
substantive area. In addition, the literature review also suggested that the low capacity
jurisdictions suffer from a set of problems unique to their own context.
Nevertheless, the analyst entered the ‘research setting with as few predetermined ideas
as possible — especially logically deducted [sic], a prior [sic] hypotheses’.73 The
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research began with the selection of an area of interest, that is, the ‘AML reporting
system of Bangladesh’ and a general research topic — the ‘Assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of the Anti Money Laundering reporting system of Bangladesh’ As
data collection and analysis continued, the problem and research questions began to
emerge. In other words, the analyst entered the general problem area with a simple
question — ‘What is happening in the data?’.
Through this study, the analyst has attempted to understand the activities undertaken in
the Anti Money Laundering reporting system in a particular jurisdiction from the point
of view of the AML professionals involved by analysing their ‘pattern of behavior’. 74
This understanding involves the conceptualisation of the actions of the participants in
order to identify what their main concern is and how they continually resolve this main
concern. This core variable is the centre of most of the behaviours (actions, reactions
and inactions) observed in the substantive area under research.75
Through this process, the analyst identified the main research problem — interagency
information sharing deficiency, which was the ‘[problem] of concern to informants’76 of
this research project. After the identification of the main concern of the participants, the
analyst reshaped the initial broad research query as more specific research questions
began to emerge.77 For example, the methods AML professionals applied to collect vital
information from external sources, the process they followed to ensure minimum
compliance when collection efforts failed, the initiatives they took to manage the burden
of subsequent queries about reported cases that they had limited information, and the
like.
The Anti Money Laundering reporting system is primarily responsible for generating
information and an audit trail for the AML regime. The major components of the
reporting system are engaged in a continuous course of processing and using
information collected from each other and/or external sources. These exercises help by
74
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adding informational value to the collected data at different stages as it passes through
the reporting system. The better the reporting system works, the higher the quality of
information it generates, and the higher the chance is of controlling money laundering.
The substantive area chosen for this investigation is an important area. The analyst has
chosen this area in order to discover the main concern(s) of the subjects and the core
process that continually resolves this concern(s). This finding may help to identify what
the current system is lacking and exactly what needs to be done to fix it, or what criteria
the reporting system must fulfil in order to meet domestic requirements and
international compliance standards and make the system more effective thereby.
Another important reason behind the selection of the AML reporting system of
Bangladesh is that the organisations concerned in Bangladesh are easily accessible to
the analyst for interview and data collection.
The choice of GT methodology for this research came with another challenge. Although
GT methodology is capable of using virtually any data, 78 for the purpose of this
particular research the analyst relied mainly on human participants, that is, the primary
source of the data were ‘person to person’ interviews as there was very little relevant
literature available that covered the AML regime of Bangladesh. Therefore, ethical
considerations with regard to human participants emerged as an important issue.
1.6

Ethical Considerations

The concept of research ethics — and thereby the protection of the human subjects —
began to develop in the post Second World War period following the disclosure of some
extremely unethical research practices involving human subjects that had been utilised
in Germany during the war. These precipitated the examination of existing research
practices in the United States where some ethical concerns, including concerns
regarding the risk of deception (in regard, for example, to the nature of research being
undertaken on participants) as well as issues of consent were revealed. Subsequently,
many authors stressed the need for the protection of human subjects against unethical
research practices such as exposure to dangerous procedures, infringement of privacy
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and the use of deceptive practices, and advocated that participants must give informed
consent.79
Informed consent as well as privacy and confidentiality are important ethical issues,
especially in social research, which may pose a material risk for a research participant if
the required safeguards are not adequately observed. Social research involves asking
questions, which may reveal sensitive information about participants’ beliefs,
knowledge, and views in regard to any particular phenomenon. This may expose human
subjects to numerous unwanted situations and violate their privacy. 80 Ethical research is
concerned to preserve both the privacy of the informants and the confidentiality of the
information that they provide; and hence these two issues need to be addressed
individually and collectively.
Graziano and Raulin defined ‘privacy’ as ‘the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others’.81 Privacy can involve voluntary withdrawal —
physical or psychological — from social participation. This could be a decision of an
individual or group with regard to their staying away from being part of a certain group
or larger group, as the case may be, and also their choice to remain anonymous.82 On the
other hand, confidentiality as another form of privacy relates to the information
individuals or groups divulge. The degree of confidentiality maintained determines how
the information so divulged can be shared and used,83 and on the basis of an agreement
regarding confidentiality of the data and its subsequent use, participants may make
decisions with regard to revealing certain information which could be linked to them.84
Maintaining anonymity means that identifying information is removed from data so that
it cannot be linked to the individual. This is generally to minimise the possibility of
unwanted social effects of or repercussions from their participation in a research project.
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An important aspect in ensuring the protection of participants’ privacy and
confidentiality is that such protection directly relates to the nature of the research
design;85 it also has implications in terms of data quality. 86 Absence of such an
assurance — or the presence of a fear in the respondents that such an assurance was
inadequate or poorly based and that there could be a breach of privacy — could result in
reduced participation and divulging of a greater proportion of invalid data.87 In order to
ensure participants’ cooperation — not only in terms of participating but in terms of
participating and responding honestly — a strong and reliable promise of privacy and
confidentiality protection is crucial.88
In this research, the analyst obtained approval from the relevant authorities prior to
collecting data from the participants. The analyst obtained approval at two phases. First,
the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of Wollongong
(UOW) reviewed the application to undertake research involving human participants
and approved it, on condition that prior approval would be obtained from the authorities
concerned. Accordingly, in the second phase, the analyst contacted each authority in
writing for approval. Upon receipt of such approval, he approached the potential
participants.
1.6.1

Voluntary Informed Consent

The participants went through an informed consent process before they participated in
the research. It was not possible to get all potential participants together for a number of
practical reasons, including the nature of theoretical sampling process. In most cases,
participants met the analyst individually in a thorough informed consent session. In this
session, he explained what the research was all about, why the analyst approached the
particular participant, the types of questions he was going to ask, how the data
collection would proceed, how the collected data would subsequently be processed,
used, and preserved. Participants learned through this session about potential risks from
and/or benefits to be derived from the information that they would provide. Included in
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the information session was material as to their rights, especially the right to withdraw,
and contact information for the analyst, his supervisor and the HREC of UOW. The
analyst communicated all these issues to potential participants both orally and through a
written Participant Information Sheet.
Interested participants contacted the analyst at a later stage and fixed a convenient date,
venue and time for the interviews. With the permission of the participants, the analyst
used an audio tape recorder in addition to written notes for recording data. In the
beginning, the analyst informed the interviewees that if they felt their responses to some
of the questions would be different if there were no audio recording they should so
indicate, which many did. Therefore, the analyst recorded some of the responses only in
writing. At the end of the interview, the participants signed a consent form granting
permission to use their data for the purpose of this research.
1.6.2

Privacy and Confidentiality

According to the requirements of the HREC of UOW, the analyst took all reasonable
care to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of the interviewees. Participants were
given the liberty to choose the interview venue and schedule so that they could keep
their participation secret from colleagues, if they so wished. After the interview, all field
notes and transcripts subsequently made from audio recordings were completely deidentified by removing any personally identifiable information. Information sheets were
then coded with numbers and letters, the meaning of which is known only to the analyst
and his supervisor. After the study, the analyst stored all documents in the repository of
the Faculty of Law.
1.7

Purpose of the Research

In order to identify a broader purpose for this research project, the core research
questions were revised to make the purpose of the research a declarative statement — to
identify, describe and analyse the basic social psychological process or social structural
process that are involved in processing the interagency information sharing deficiency
in the AML reporting system of89 Bangladesh.
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1.7.1

Specific Aim of the Research

Once the analyst had properly identified the main purpose of the research, he prepared a
set of aims to achieve this purpose.90 For this research project, the particular aims were
to describe the context under which the AML professionals were working and to
identify and explain various alternative information collection methods utilised by the
AML professionals. Other aims were to identify and explain techniques that helped
them to reduce the pressure created by the information deficiency and to identify and
explain practices that helped them to maintain minimum compliance standards.
1.8

Literature Review

The analyst divided the literature review into two parts. After choosing the substantive
area, the preliminary literature review began. This was a wide literature review on the
general problem area in order to gain a theoretical sensitivity to data. This approach
kept the analyst’s mind open to wide range of possibilities91 about the core concern of
the area under study. The description of the background of the thesis together with a
brief introduction to the substantive area in Chapter One and a broader analysis of
substantive area in Chapter Two form part of the preliminary literature review.
A more highly focused final literature review began when the core concern of the
substantive area began to emerge. This phase of the literature review was guided by the
emerging research problem and associated research questions. There is no separate
chapter or sections where this literature review is presented; rather, it is integrated into
the body of the thesis, for at this stage, that researchers ‘review the literature in the field
and relate the theory to it through integration of ideas’.92 Thus, for instance, the
literature surveyed is used in the chapter on the emerging grounded theory (Chapter
Four) and in chapter that comprises the discussion (Chapter Five).

90

W Carole Chenitz, ‘Getting Started: The Research Proposal for a Grounded Theory Study’ in W Carole
Chenitz and Janice M Swanson (eds), From Practice to Grounded Theory (Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1986) 39, 41.
91
Barney G Glaser, Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory, Theoretical Sensitivity (Sociology
Press, 1978) 31, cited in Heatha and Cowley, above n 76, 143.
92
Barney G Glaser, Advances in the Methodology of Grounded Theory, Theoretical Sensitivity (Sociology
Press, 1978) 31.

29

1.9

Scope and Delimitation

This research project is focused on the FATF 40 Recommendations that have set global
anti money laundering standards but the FATF’s Special Recommendations on
Countering the Financing of Terrorism (the Plus 9 of the 40+9 Recommendations) are
not reviewed in this study. Again, when it comes to implementing global AML
standards at a national level, this study examines the functioning of the AML reporting
system only. To make the research project manageable, other AML issues, for example,
analysis of AML legislation, the financial system regulations and various strategic
initiatives concerning money laundering that, although contributing equally to the AML
regime, have not been elaborated upon.
1.10 Significance of the Study
Although the issue of global AML is one of the heavily researched areas, only a limited
number of scholarly works relate to the core AML challenges for developing nations.
Apart from a few studies dealing in general with the situation relateding to AML
compliance and a limited policy analysis on implementing FATF standards, there was
inadequate study with regard to exact nature of the problems that a developing country
may face in implementing global AML norms.
As mentioned before (section 1.4), studies have identified several common challenges
developing countries encounter while implementing global AML standards; however,
careful observation suggests that developing nations face those general impediments in
complying with any international standard. Besides, those findings mainly represent the
views of the international standard setters and related assessors on the nature of the
problems that developing nations face. They do not provide sufficient material as to
how AML initiatives are perceived within those countries themselves, nor what the
main concerns of the AML professionals there are, or how they manage those problems
in their particular context, and the extent to which those measures are effective, as well
as what exactly might be done to address all of those issues.
The analyst argues that in order to understand the core AML concerns of developing
nations, it is important to look into the substantive area from the point of view of those
who are directly involved in the process. That is to say, instead of assessing the situation
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under an existing theoretical framework, it may be equally interesting to identify
variables in a particular context and then integrate them into appropriate theories. This
approach could be particularly useful studying an area where a serious dearth of
literature exists, for example in regard to the AML regime of Bangladesh. Therefore,
this research project aims to contribute to the body of existing knowledge concerning
the domestic implementation of the global AML norms as it identifies a number of
important variables logically connected with one core variable that fits the realities
under study in the eye of the persons93 who are involved in the implementation process.
1.11 Thesis Structure
This thesis has five chapters. The first chapter presents a background to the research. It
identifies key functions of the global AML regime, its main features, and the minimum
obligations this regime imposes on the various jurisdictions. It also explains what
strategic approaches they must take in order to comply with those responsibilities. This
chapter introduces the FATF prescribed compulsory AML reporting system model that
jurisdictions must implement as part of a compulsory prevention and enforcement
mechanism against money laundering. This chapter shows how Bangladesh (as one of
the member jurisdictions of an FATF associate member) assumes its global obligations
to fight against money laundering offences. The chapter also describes the general
problem, the research question, the purpose, and specific aims of the research project
along with the scope and significance of this study.
Chapter Two provides a clearer and more elaborate description of the substantive area
of this research. It presents some critical views of the bureaucratic environment of
Bangladesh that is initially responsible for implementing any international standards,
including the global AML standards, at the national level. Using some historic evidence
and socio-political analysis, the analyst portrays the current context of Bangladesh that
hosts AML regime. The analyst argues that the bureaucracy in Bangladesh has such
unfavourable traditional and cultural elements which actually render the system
incompatible with the efforts of implementing global AML standards. Some specific
examples, among others, that have been used to strengthen this argument are the
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unwritten rivalry among the public agencies, over-politicisation of the bureaucracy and
lack of (information) sharing culture among various agencies.
The discussion presented in this chapter mainly represents the preliminary literature
review. However, a significant part of the literature presented in this chapter was
reviewed after the emergence of grounded theory (elaborated in Chapter Four). This
chapter presents, among other things, the strategic arrangements, availability of
resources, and common challenges to and achievements of the AML regime of
Bangladesh. In particular, this discussion identifies the variables that strongly affect the
relationship between the bureaucracy, the general people, and the various organisations
responsible for implementing the national AML goals.
Chapter Three describes the Grounded Theory methodology. It provides a general
introduction to Grounded Theory, its nature and its origins, and the divergencies
between its two co-founders, as well as the rationale of applying this methodology to
the chosen substantive area. This chapter describes each stage, from the initial data
collection to the emergence of the core variable. It explains the data collection process,
the coding process, the constant comparison of incidents, the use of theoretical
sampling, and the emergence of a core category that expresses or explains the main
concerns of the participants in the research.
Chapter Four is the chapter on Grounded Theory — ‘Improvising: A process of
overcoming interagency information sharing deficiency in an AML regime’. In this
chapter the analyst argues that there is a shortage of useful information in the AML
reporting system of Bangladesh which actually is a part of a general information
deficiency in the overall bureaucracy. As a result the major components of the AML
reporting system (REs, FIU and the ACC) are affected by both the low quality and low
quantity of information. In response, the actors within the major components of the
AML reporting system have developed a range of improvisations — informal, partial
and makeshift solutions — to handle this situation. ‘Improvising’ represent the core
process by which the participants of this research continuously resolve their main
concerns. It explains the different approaches that AML professionals initiate and the
level of success that they achieved in the fight against a general information deficiency.
This chapter identifies and explains the relationship between the core variable and other
near core variables.
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Chapter Five is a discussion on the material contained in Chapter Four. This chapter
further explains the behaviour of participants as mentioned in the Grounded Theory.
The purpose of this discussion is to explain such behaviour and identify links between
varieties of behaviours of the participants so that a hypothesis could be generated. It
presents a brief introduction as to how improvisation is generally understood, its use in
human society and its probable connection with AML initiatives. It also describes how
the various features of improvisation may link with AML compliance and how a
particular AML reporting system could benefit from different improvised information
collection techniques.
Most importantly, this chapter argues that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ improvisations.
AML professionals must have enough experience and training to achieve the maximum
success in applying improvised techniques to handle the information deficiency. Since
the actors of the AML reporting system in Bangladesh lacks necessary training and
experiences, their repertoire of improvisations remain largely ineffective in resolving
the core problem — the general information deficiency. Although these improvised
temporary initiatives do not appear to be a long- solution to the actual problem, this,
however, prevents the system from collapsing completely.
Finally, the anaysts stressed that the general deficiency of information is not only a
result of shortage of supply of information but also a lack of demand of the same; and
the problem could be resolved if both supply and demand of the information could be
raised simultenously.
1.12 Limitations of the Study
This research project could not benefit from the participation of indirect AML partners.
They are the officials of various bureaucratic organisations in Bangladesh who are
known to be key furnishers of information to AML reporting system users. There were
several reasons for their exclusion from the research sample. First, they are excluded so
that the perimeter of investigation can be kept focused on the core issues related to the
AML reporting system; and second, they were excluded due to the existence of
inadequate access to those public agencies. The process of obtaining permission to
conduct interviews among public agency officials was a lengthy and complex task
unachievable within the approved period of fieldwork.
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Another limitation of the research was a serious dearth of literature on the AML regime
of Bangladesh. Although Grounded Theory methodology works well in the context of
an under-researched area, some relevant literature on the background of substantive area
is still required. In the absence of independent scholarly publications, the analyst had to
rely on the APG mutual evaluation reports for Bangladesh, a range of unrelated
literature and personal observations to sketch the context of the AML regime in
Bangladesh.
1.13 Conclusion
FATF introduced global standards for responses to be adopted in the battle against
money laundering. Jurisdictions must adopt these responses in order to protect the
integrity of the global financial system. The core Forty Recommendations of FATF are
effectively obligatory for all nations, regardless of their capacity to implement these
norms or the level of money laundering risk that their financial systems actually face.
They suggest among other things that all jurisdictions must have an effective AML
reporting system that would act as both a preventive and enforcement mechanism
against money laundering. The establishment of such a system requires a wellsynchronised method and the maximum utilisation of available resources.
Studies concluded that in many jurisdictions where an understanding about money
laundering control is limited, the institutional capacity is weaker; pressing social issues
demand greater attention, and hence compliance with international AML standards is
lower. Despite the relevance of these findings in terms of the real problem at hand, there
are large gaps in our understanding of the true nature of the compliance challenges that
developing nations face. This entails an in-depth investigation in order to perceive the
problems from the point of view of those who are responsible for implementing the
global AML standards at national levels.
The substantive area of this research project, the AML reporting system of Bangladesh,
is that of a low capacity country. A preliminary literature search suggested that there
was a serious scarcity of relevant literature with regard to this particular jurisdiction.
Therefore, the analyst chose Grounded Theory methodology to identify the core concern
in the area under investigation. Through this study, the analyst attempted to understand
the core concerns of the AML reporting system of Bangladesh from the point of view of
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the AML professionals directly involved in the reporting process. This way, the study
contributes to this little known area by generating a detailed theoretical analysis of the
functioning of an AML reporting system in a low capacity jurisdiction.
The following chapter, presents a detailed description and some analysis of the
bureaucratic and political environment of Bangladesh. In fact, any international policy
must go through the local processes for domestic implementation. In order to
understand the research method and the purpose of this research, a prior understanding
of the research perspective is necessary. The Chapter Two will provide this opportunity
by relating ongoing discussion on global AML standards to the particular national
setting of Bangladesh.
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2
2.1

DESCRIPTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AREA

Introduction

Like any public policies, the Anti Money Laundering initiatives are also implemented
through a bureaucracy — an indispensable part of modern public administration. A
national AML regime thus reflects ‘government policies and programmes as well as the
behaviour of officials (usually non-elected)’94 which reveal the nature of bureaucracy of
which they are part. Since the character of a bureaucratic organisation is determined by
a nation’s enduring culture that derives from certain political, economic and social
structures, each bureaucracy carries a degree of uniqueness owing to its ties with the
historical background of that particular nation.
When it comes to implementing the global regime to control money laundering, the
local authorities need to adapt it to the bureaucratic reality of their country. This
experience is always a mixed one. Some jurisdictions are assessed as compliant in terms
of their initiatives and some are identified as jurisdictions that ‘have not made sufficient
progress in addressing [their strategic AML] … deficiencies’.95 This failure to comply
with international AML norms has raised the question of the general efficiency of
bureaucratic organisations in some jurisdictions. This can ultimately cast doubt on a
government’s political commitment to the establishment of an efficient AML system,
that is, one that actually works.
This chapter contributes to the current discussion on the administrative preparedness of
jurisdictions when it comes to implementing the global AML norms in their domestic
reality. It analyses the FATF Recommendations and their interactions with the
bureaucratic environment of a low capacity country where there are many pressing
issues (other than money laundering) which require immediate attention.
In the preceding chapter, we have already described the motivation behind the selection
of the Bangladeshi AML regime for the purpose of this study (sections 1.5, 1.5.1, and
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1.5.2). Although traditionally it is a country with a backward economy and marked by
ongoing political unrest, in recent decades the world community has praised this
country for its rapid and consistent economic growth along with its significant progress
in terms of social development indicators.96 Many of these successes, however, fail to
obtain appropriate approval due to a serious lack of reliability and competence within
the country’s bureaucracy. Major development partners and donor agencies have
pointed to this extremely centralised bureaucracy and the increasingly demanding
administrative requirements in Bangladesh. They have identified these issues as the key
reasons why implementation of a number of development projects took much longer
time than expected, incurring a huge increase in total project costs.97 Like these
development partners, FATF is equally concerned about the wasteful bureaucratic
processes that exist in Bangladesh. In their evaluation report on Bangladesh, FTAF
mentioned that a lack of coordination among public agencies undermined effective
AML implementation.98
These organisations are important development partners who provide both financial and
strategic support to many development initiatives in Bangladesh. Therefore, it is often
hard for a government to avoid their advice.99 In particular, their concerns with regard to
bureaucratic inefficiency are especially important in AML implementation, because the
global AML standard-setter stressed that without a sound civil administration system
AML initiatives would remain ineffective.100
This chapter highlights the fact that the bureaucracy in Bangladesh suffers from a
number of cultural factors that prevent it from being a cooperative, proactive, and
customer-oriented operation in most cases. For a robust AML regime, it is important to
ensure that the public agencies concerned renounce the exploitation of loopholes in the
96

Wahiduddin Mahmud, Sadiq Ahmed and Sandeep Mahajan, ‘Economic Reforms, Growth, and
Governance: The Political Economy Aspects of Bangladesh’s Development Surprise’ (Working Paper No
22, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2008) v.
97
Roger J. Robinson, Bangladesh: Progress through Partnership: Country Assistance Review (World
Bank, 1999) 2.
98
APGML, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism Bangladesh, above n 67, 12.
99
Khandaker Nayeemul Islam, ‘Good Governance and Bureaucratic Leadership: Can “Builders and
Titans” Approach be Applicable in Public Agency Leadership? A Case of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh’
(2010) 1(1) Studies on Asia 132, 133.
100
APGML, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism Bangladesh, above n 67, 12.

38

administrative system and focus on sharing their resources and ensuring the best use of
opportunities already provided within the legal framework. The ongoing discussion
emphasises that the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the AML regime is not an ‘independent
variable’ but rather only a symptom of many core problems that prevail in the
bureaucracy and politics. These include, for example, the perpetuation of the oldfashioned paper-based office, the existence of widespread corruption, the posting of
public servants to profitable and important positions based on their party loyalty rather
than their skills and suitability, and the absence of a workable memorandum of
understanding between public agencies — all of which are an integral part of the
traditional bureaucracy of Bangladesh.
2.1.1

Methodology

This chapter explains the bureaucracy of Bangladesh in its historical context so that it is
easier to understand why some of its characteristics are as they are. Before entering the
democratic era, the country long existed under colonial rule and military administration
in various forms, and the bureaucracy that exists today evolved through a long and
eventful process. In the post-liberation period, society felt the necessity for a major
overhaul of the civil administrative system101 in order to overcome a number of negative
factors, including corruption, political interference, inefficiency, mismanagement and
the inexperience of the new government.102 This encouraged the government to take
several initiatives in regard to administrative reforms.
In the subsequent sections, the analyst explains the AML regime of Bangladesh in the
existing bureaucratic context, and identifies some important areas where the AML
regime interacts with the civil administration. After that, he contrasts the discussion
with the general findings of the APG Mutual Evaluation Report on Bangladesh’s
compliance with international AML norms. Finally, he discusses some established
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cultural theories so that the reader is able ‘to comprehend the consequences of [the]
prevailing dominant culture on Bangladesh society and [the] body politic’.103
2.1.2

Historical Background of the Bureaucracy of Bangladesh

The history of government institutions and the civil service system of Bangladesh (as
part of Indian subcontinent) dates back to the thirteenth century or even earlier when a
similar system began to develop in many Western countries. This well-structured
bureaucracy was divided into several departments and was staffed by officials of
various classes who formed the central part of the Hindu Kingdom. Officials were
recruited based on their knowledge and high ethical standards and received
remuneration through regular salaries or other forms of benefits. 104 However, ‘[a]ll
public officials were virtually servants of the rulers [rather] than of the State and they
served at the pleasure of their masters’.105
Although the Muslim conquests in the thirteenth century brought significant changes in
the civil administration system of the Indian subcontinent, it was not until the early
sixteenth century that the Muslim emperors formulated service rules for public officials.
Like the earlier Hindu rulers, initially the Muslim emperors kept civil servants under
their strict control. For a period, the emperors allowed only Muslims to join the civil
service until they adopted a policy of non-discrimination which opened opportunities to
non-Muslims.106 However, some parts of the Indian subcontinent managed to avoid such
‘bureaucratic conversion’ in regard to a single particular religion. Despite being part of
the large Indian subcontinent, a secular attitude was evident in society and in the civil
service in the area where present-day Bangladesh is situated.107
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Initiatives taken during the period of Muslim rule (the Mogul empire) led to a number
of adjustments in the civil administration of Bengal (present day Bangladesh). Most of
those changes bore a resemblance to modern bureaucracy. For example, administration
had several quasi-autonomous layers each assigned their own specific functions. The
civil servants were given the status of ‘State servant’ and divided into many (66) grades.
In addition, there were set selection criteria for higher officials. The emperor would
consider the candidates’ experience, capabilities, honesty, diligence and, of course,
loyalty before employing them as civil servants. In the same way too, promotion to a
higher post would depend on the respective officers’ merit and loyalty instead of
seniority. The Moghul civil service accommodated a significant number of Hindu
officials in important positions although it was a Muslim empire.108 Scholars have
argued that the main purpose of such appointments was to achieve political gain109 in a
country where the vast majority of the population was Hindu.
As Mishra (1989) observes, ‘The advent and consolidation of British rule in India
coincided with the decline of the Mogul empire’,110 and consequently the British Indian
civil service laid its foundation on an already established organisational framework. In
the early stage, civil service positions were preserved exclusively for British expatriates
but in 1853 a new law came in force and introduced a system of open competition
which allowed local Indians to join the civil service. Nevertheless, this initiative
remained merely symbolic, as it was rarely possible for local people to take advantage
of this opportunity. Indeed, the only way to participate in this civil service entrance
competition (and thereby possibly qualify) was for the young aspiring Indian applicants
(aged 19 to 22) to travel to London to attend the entrance examination which, in a
further obstacle, was on subjects unfamiliar to those Indians who might sit the
examination.111

108

Zafarullah, Khan and Rahman, above n 104, 27, citing Hare Krishna Mishra, Bureaucracy under the
Mughals, 1556 A.D. to 1707 A.D. (Amar Prakashan, 1989) 36, 40–1, 47, 52, 73–4, 78.
109
Zafarullah, Khan and Rahman, above n 104, 26, citing Hare Krishna Mishra, Bureaucracy under the
Mughals, 1556 A.D. to 1707 A.D. (Amar Prakashan, 1989) 20–3.
110
Zafarullah, Khan and Rahman, above n 104, 27.
111
Ibid 27–8, citing B B Misra, The Bureaucracy in India, An Historical Analysis of Development up to
1947 (Oxford University Press, 1977) 38–90,. See also Ramesh Kumar Arora and Rajni Goyal, Indian
Public Administration: Institutions and Issues (New Age International, 1995) 37–8.

41

Scholars have mixed views toward the input of British rule in the development of the
modern bureaucracy in the Indian subcontinent. Misra (1977) mentioned that some of
the negative practices that the British Crown nurtured and which prevented most
Indians from being part of the central civil service were patronage, a rigidity in the
recruitment process and the preference for ‘seniority’ as the key benchmark for
promotion.112 Zafarullah, Khan and Rahman, however, mentioned that British rule had
made some constructive contributions to the organisational framework of the Indian
bureaucracy. When British rule ended in 1947, the Indian subcontinent had one of the
most developed civil service systems in the world as it passed through a steady
transition from a personalised service to State service and then public service.113
However, some of these positive contributions lost their significance, largely because in
general the bureaucratic system of British India was hardly aimed at the public benefit.
As M V Pylee indicated, the exiting government was unfavourable to indigenous social
institutions and industries. The Government set the administration policy for the
provinces without taking into account the unique cultural and racial factors of those
regions. In addition, they neglected pressing social problems, denied people the most
basic political rights while at the same time raising taxation and public (including
military) expenditure to serve the interests of the Crown.114
Historically, as a part of the Indian sub-continent, present-day Bangladesh had been a
part of British India for around two centuries. Because the British rulers developed most
of its administrative structures, a colonial legacy is evident across its entire public
administration.115 In 1947, India gained independence and was divided into two nations:
Hindu dominant India and Muslim dominant Pakistan (originally in two parts — West
Pakistan, which is present day Pakistan, and East Pakistan, present day Bangladesh).116
The British colonial heritage heavily influenced Pakistan’s bureaucracy and political
culture. While still under the strict rule of the British government, the rulers gradually
introduced representative public institutions, although their functions were only to serve
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as an adviser to the government or as an overseer of local administrative matters instead
of making policy decisions. As Washbrook observed, the key purpose for establishing
those institutions was to ‘help legitimize and strengthen the authority of the bureaucratic
state’117 but not to transfer power to the people’s representatives. He indicated that this
process ensured a powerful bureaucracy under weaker democratic institutions,
ultimately creating a power imbalance in public administration. This persisted even in
the postcolonial period as a second colonial legacy and continued to influence the
political culture118 in both geographic ‘wings’ of Pakistan.
These two ‘wings’ of Pakistan — which were 1600 kilometres away from each other119
— had nothing in common in terms of language, social culture or political ideology,
except religion. West Pakistan deprived the more populous East of genuine power
sharing and kept the region underrepresented in every sphere of civil and military
administration as well as in terms of the allocation of economic aid and the institution of
development initiatives.120 Decades passed by of continued suppression of the East by
the West and the denial of any genuine sharing of political power with the East (even
after their leaders had won a clear majority in a free and fair election in 1970). Tensions
mounted between the two wings. This awkward arrangement lasted until 1971 when
Bangladesh finally gained independence121 through a war, which was extremely
expensive in terms of human lives.
During the ‘Pakistan period’ (1947 to 1971), Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) was a
province of federal Pakistan and administratively was practically a copy of the central
government as it had a central secretariat divided into several departments headed by
ministers. Yet, the features that distinguished it from the central bureaucracy was the
structure of the field level administration which was divided hierarchically — divisions,
sub-divisions, districts and Police Stations — on a geographical basis. Naturally, a
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serious challenge that Bangladesh faced immediately after independence was the task of
transforming the existing provincial structure of government into a national
government. A newly-established reform committee found that is was truly challenging
to attempt to absorb Bengali officials of the central government into a national
government and also to integrate the offices of the central government with their
equivalent departments in the Government of Bangladesh which had thus far been a part
of a provincial government. Accordingly, except for some minor changes in the centre,
field level administration remained almost the same after independence as before.122
Thus, ‘Bangladesh … inherited the British Indian system of administration, which
Pakistan [had] carried on with some minor modifications for over twenty-four years’.123
Nevertheless, some authors have viewed Bangladesh’s separation from Pakistan as an
opportunity to free its bureaucracy from unwanted elements such as elitism,
conservatism, and internal antagonism, among other elements that had been handed
down over the centuries. Zafarullah and Huque mentioned that despite the obstacles
Bangladesh stumbled over as war-torn country, it really didn’t have to reinvent the
wheel for every sector. Bangladesh had inherited an already established administrative
infrastructure and a group of experienced and well-trained bureaucrats who could
contribute significantly to the state-building initiatives to be undertaken in war-ravaged
Bangladesh. The government could utilise their skills and experiences, particularly in
infrastructure building, policy development, and to introduce professionalism and a
notion of ethics among civil servants that would make it a responsive bureaucracy.124
However, post-independence Bangladesh apparently failed to take maximum advantage
of these resources.
In the independent Bangladesh, international donors and development-partners
‘identified a number of bureaucratic dysfunctions as the major problem in pursuing
good governance’.125 They mentioned that the public administration system was highly
centralised and it followed an excessively hierarchical and overly bureaucratic process
to deliver services, which virtually ensured its lack of responsiveness. Due to a lack of
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accountability and transparency, the system grew into an inflexible and wasteful one.
Donors and development partners had also condemned the over-politicisation of the
bureaucracy. They advocated a proactive, accountable, transparent and customeroriented public administrative leadership in Bangladesh.126
2.1.3

Government and Public Administration

Government
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy with the Prime Minister as its Chief
Executive of the Government and its President as the Head of State (the latter a largely
ceremonial figure with some ceremonial duties).127 This form of government was first
adopted in post-liberation Bangladesh. Subsequently, the structure changed into a oneparty rule with a President at the apex of state power. This continued until a group of
military officers ousted the then President in August 1975. In the subsequent period,
various forms of military regimes ruled the country until the people ousted the military
regime and restored a multi-party democracy at the end of 1991.128
Public Administration
Public administration in Bangladesh has two tiers.129 Centrally, there are 41 ministries
each headed by a Cabinet Minister who is appointed by the Prime Minister but who are
collectively accountable to the Parliament. Besides this, there are 15 administrative
divisions130 and 52 departments. Ministries that are mainly responsible for policy
formulation for the government are mostly located centrally in the Bangladesh
Secretariat in the Capital (Dhaka). In the second tier, there are various types of
government organisations representing central ministries, divisions and departments.
They operate at the district and sub-district levels. Their main duties are to deliver
general administrative functions, including service delivery and local project
implementation. In addition, there are some autonomous bodies and corporations
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created through a presidential Ordinance or Act of parliament.131 There are some other
organisations established under the Constitution commonly known as ‘Statutory
Bodies’, for example, the Election Commission, Bangladesh Public Service
Commission and Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General.132
2.2

Bureaucracy

Although today ‘bureaucracy’ is commonly perceived in its negative sense as a
synonym for ‘rule-encumbered inefficiency’ (for example, as ‘red tape’ or the presence
of rigid rules and excessive formalities in public agencies which ultimately result in
inefficient service deliveries), originally it was intended to be used ‘neutrally’ to mean
the management structure of a government.133 An example of such use can be found in
the theory of bureaucracy suggested by the German sociologist Max Weber, who
described many ideal types of civil administration in a number of his essays collected in
the volume, Economy and Society. According to Weber, ‘[i]n the sphere of the state …
three elements constitute a bureaucratic agency, in the sphere of the private economy
they constitute a bureaucratic enterprise.’134 These elements are:
1) The regular activities required for the purpose of the bureaucratically governed
structure are assigned as official duties.
(2) The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is
distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive
means, physical … or otherwise, which may be displaced at the disposal of
officials.
(3) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfilment of these
duties and for the exercise of the corresponding rights; only persons who qualify
under general rules are employed.135

In his theory, Weber described bureaucracy as the most rational way that human activity
can be organised and as an efficient mechanism for the government of a modern state.
He argued that it was the most justified form of organisation, and indispensable to
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modern administration.136 There are certain vital characteristics of a bureaucracy, which
makes it fit for modern society. This includes, for instance, ‘the tendency in
bureaucracies to separate the means of administration from those who work with
them’.137 As Weber mentioned:
In principle, the modern organisation of the civil service separates the bureau from
the private domicile of the official and, in general, segregates official activity from
the sphere of private life. Public monies and equipment are divorced from the
private property of the official.138

Therefore, bureaucracy means ‘without regard for persons’,139 which could further be
described as sine ira et studio, without anger or passion (fondness or partiality).140
Therefore, a bureaucrat
performs his duty best when he acts without regard to the person in question, …,
without hate and without love, without personal predilection and therefore without
grace, but sheerly in accordance with the impersonal duty imposed by his calling,
and not as a result of any concrete personal relationship.141

As the bureaucratic arena refers to and includes all public agencies that formulate and
implement public policies, regulate other public or private agencies, and deliver
services. It is often viewed as an extremely influential element, if not the most crucial
one, that strongly affects a country’s social and economic progress. 142 That is, as some
scholars have argued, a country’s society or economy is likely to benefit more from a
bureaucracy that more closely approximates its ideal type than the one further from it.143
Before we investigate further into this hypothesis, which in fact the researchers tested
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among 35 developing countries, we need to explore the Weberian perspective of this
concept.
Instead of viewing bureaucracy as just a common and collective name for state officials
Weber used this term to indicate to a particular type of organisational structure in
contrast with patrimonial, which is the traditional top-down structure of monarchy, for
instance, and prebendal feudalism, a type of patron-client relationship.144 As Schluchter
indicated, prebends were utilised for fiscal purposes, to be precise, for tax collection, 145
for securing tax payments for the royal treasury, as Weber described. That means,
primarily there was no contract of personal loyalty but the relationship would be valued
based on the income it could yield for the patron.146
2.2.1

Bureaucracy and Economic Growth

Now, going back to the hypothesis that we mentioned above, we will examine some of
the common features of bureaucracies to identify the connection of such features with
economic growth. When Weber contrasted the ‘bureaucracy’ with earlier forms of
administration or structures of organisation, he indicated a number of features of a
bureaucracy. Evans and Rauch in Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis
of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on Economic Growth emphasised two
simple yet important features — the importance of ‘meritocratic recruitment’ and of a
‘predictable career ladder’. In their investigation to see if the Weberian ideal of the
bureaucracy had an effect on the economic growth of certain developing countries, they
chose these two particular features from among others for a number of reasons. First,
these two features had been widely used in the relevant literature; and, secondly, they
were comparatively easier to interpret using certain measures which facilitated
empirical testing.147
Meritocratic recruitment increases the incidence of competence and the level of unity
among the officials in an organisation, which ultimately may contribute to the provision
of a highly motivational environment for individual officers. It is expected that officials
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who join an organisation through an equally competitive and fair process are more
likely to show respect toward shared institutional norms and adhere to them than those
who obtained their position through unfair patronage. Being part of an organisation with
equally qualified colleagues and adherence to certain norms also helps individuals
understand the risk and cost of corruption or similar practices that may ultimately
undermine institutional goals.148
The promise of a long-term career could also help increase competence and strengthen
unity within a bureaucratic organisation. This is especially so if the officials are
confident that the demonstration of professional competence would eventually result in
their being rewarded with a long, successful and prestigious career; and it is less
probable that they would pursue corrupt ways for quicker personal success at the cost of
institutional norms and goals. Promises — which could include a competitive salary
package, a clear path of promotion, a posting in an important and prestigious position
based on professional aptitude — may act as deterrent to such corrupt behaviour.
Furthermore, the potential high cost of corruption — for example, loss of office,
demotion, fines and so on — may also equally contribute to motivating officials to
avoid corrupt practices.149
These two features could help individual officers to realise both short and long-term
career objectives, which ultimately help the organisation to achieve its own goals. It
may be noted here that ‘meritocratic recruitment’ and a ‘predictable career ladder’ are
not the only structural features that could enhance organisational performance, and the
best result could be realised if these Weberian features were jointly pursued, as Evans
and Rauch said, with a ‘dense systematic set of ties to the entrepreneurial class’. They
stated that if those two Weberian features of a bureaucracy contribute toward
organisational coherence and the enhancement of professional competency, then this
may have a positive effect on economic growth. Promise of a long-career path with the
promise of rewards for competency would also encourage investment in public-sector
infrastructure and this may then help bureaucrats to be cautious with regard to public
expenditure. This will increase the efficiency of the bureaucracy and make it more
effective. Evans and Rauch predicted that if the corruption remains under control and
148
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the bureaucrats stay away from maximising their own private wealth and advantage, this
would help to reduce implied tax on private sector.150
Another probable impact of an efficient bureaucracy could be the increase in private
investment in the economy. Any investment would be seriously discouraged if investors
need to start and run their business in a system dominated by a corrupt, unpredictable
bureaucracy. That is, a dependable, predictable and skilled bureaucracy will appear less
risky for long term investment. Such a bureaucracy could reduce coordination
challenges among individual entrepreneurs and encourage new investment. In addition,
a good bureaucracy may help to turn informational resources into public goods, which
may further increase confidence among investors and prompt investment in the upgrading of existing businesses. To be more precise, the bureaucracy itself could collect
information and then offer an informational service to help local businesses grow in a
changing global market.151
Evans and Rauch hypothesised that those countries which had Weberian features
present in their bureaucracy would experience a more rapid economic growth over the
20 years between 1970 and 1990 (the range they chose for data sampling) than those
where such features were only partially incorporated. The researchers used data that
referred primarily to the core economic agencies of the bureaucracies they sampled, and
concluded that their findings supported the hypothesis. That is, they found that
‘meritocratic recruitment’ and a ‘predictable career ladder' are connected with higher
economic growth rates. The investigation also concluded that for higher economic
growth having Weberian features in some strategic core agencies might be sufficient
instead of organising the entire bureaucracy along this line. The findings also revealed
high East Asian growth where competent and organised bureaucracies are prevalent,
and low African growth rate where governance is a serious concern.152
Despite many notable contributions by the modern bureaucracy, its strengths and
weaknesses have always been under scrutiny. This is partly because a bureaucracy has
its own inherent limitations, and partly because of the growing demands society
150
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continually places on bureaucratic organisations, which is to be expected in a constantly
changing society. Therefore, extensive scholarly research and numerous reform
movements in the public sector around the globe have highlighted the need for a new
public managerial era. Some specific issues, for example, performance of the public
servants and citizens’ satisfaction, among others, have attracted greater attention in
discussion and debates for decades.
Recently there has been a growing demand that the public sector be modernised and
more effective. Accordingly, ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) has been the centre of
attention for last few decades.153 It is a new theory on public sector governance that
emphasises managing public provision of services in different ways to ensure effective
service delivery. NPM proposes theories about how the public sector is to be governed,
and goes beyond the traditional public institutions like bureaux and public enterprises.
However, it does not entirely replace the older framework of bureaucratic institutions
but proposes a new approach imitating the market institutions. It includes contracting
out public services and adopting a customer-oriented approach where bureaucrats are
considered as managers and citizens as customers.154
Regardless of NPM’s huge potential to address many of the pressing issues that
bureaucracies face today, scholars expressed careful optimism about its suitability in
some contexts. Zafarullah and Huque stated that the NPM philosophy has increasingly
become essential for developing countries as their traditional public administration has
become largely unreliable over the last few decades. However, they warned that it may
not be possible to implement NPM to its full extent in countries where state interference
in economic and social issues is widespread, as seen in many developing countries.155
Sarker insisted that some elements, like the clientelist politics evident in a developing
country such as Bangladesh, also act as a deterrent to NPM style reform.156
NPM is a rather broad concept that is aimed at an overall increase of services that public
organisations could provide through the best use of limited resources. Therefore, the
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core issue that NPM focuses on is the output of the bureaucracy, with an emphasis
placed on performance measurements of the public officials.157 Then again, the
usefulness of conventional public sector performance management and ‘merit pay’ in
order to increase organisational effectiveness are not beyond debate. For instance,
performance appraisal and merit pay in the public sector could be politically motivated;
and then budgetary limitation on merit pay may force an organisation either to exclude a
large number of high-performers from the list or distribute financial incentive to all
eligible candidates in an insufficient quantity, which would not serve any meaningful
purpose. Accordingly, instead of appraising individuals, the new policy could aim at
setting appropriate targets for an entire organisation and then measure performance
based on such an organisation’s collective achievements.158
Based on the above discussion, we can say that a modern bureaucracy may have the
following features. It is an organisation, which has specific goals and a set of rules to
achieve those goals. The bureaucrats shall be recruited based on their merit, through a
fair and competitive assessment process. There shall be the promise of a long career
where reward for the bureaucrat is based on the authority’s assessment of the merit,
efficiency and performance instead of loyalty to a particular patron. There shall be clear
division of labour and each bureaucrat will know the specific description for their job,
the rights and obligations they have and the level of authority that they are entitled to
exercise. A specific set of written rules of business and a code of conduct will govern
both individuals and the organisation. As Max Weber stated, such a bureaucracy will be
competent and cohesive in nature and an indispensable part of the modern
administrative system.159
2.2.2

Money Laundering and Bureaucracy

In this age of globalisation, for a number of reasons governments and organisations are
frequently adhering to international standards to organise their societies and economies.
As Herrera correctly observed, ‘While some high-profile events, such as signing
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treaties, attract attention, the real work of implementing international rules actually
takes place lower down inside state bureaucracies’.160 Moreover, it is not surprising that
often there is resistance against international norms at national levels, as ‘some …
organisations, and bureaucrats repudiate rules, drag their feet, adapt rules to fit their
own interests, subvert the intention of rules, or just plain ignore them’, 161 often in direct
or indirect collaboration with politicians.162
Then again, a bureaucracy works in a political environment surrounded by the elected
people’s representatives who, unlike bureaucrats, occupy their office for a much shorter
period and with a specific political ideology and development agenda in mind.
Likewise, as the IMF noted, ‘there is a question whether the least developed economies
… will have the capacity to meet the higher regulatory standards’. 163 That is, beside the
nature of the bureaucracy itself, there could be other variables which are associated with
attaining effective compliance with international AML standards in any country.
Researchers often say that ‘policies and legislation aimed at combating money
laundering have … been designed mainly on the needs of the developed countries’.164
Hence, it may not be totally wrong to infer that many developing nations will not have
the necessary structures — robust financial supervision, stock market oversight and
effective risk management in the financial market, among other factors — to deal with
many of the regulatory requirements. Nevertheless, what is most important here is that
countries must assess their AML system to know its strengths and weaknesses and
respond appropriately to enhance level of compliance, because,
If they do not or cannot, there is a risk of their exclusion form the major financial
markets and segmentation in financial markets between the wealthier jurisdictions
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and institutions that can comply with international standards and the weaker
jurisdictions and institutions that cannot.165

In the following section, we look into some common features of the bureaucracy in
Bangladesh.
2.3

Bureaucracy in Bangladesh

Irrespective of their socio-political systems, economic conditions or geographic
location, today almost every nation faces more intense challenges of globalisation than
ever before. Beside globalisation, some other powerful forces — such as, economic
competition, continuing socio-political turmoil, environmental issues, technological
advancement, the changing labour market,166 money laundering and the financing of
terrorism — have presented huge challenges to the nations of the world. In this section,
we explore the nature of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. The discussion includes a
combined approach to understanding the bureaucracy in light of historical references,
the system of government, public service commission reform, and the cultural
background of Bangladeshi society.
2.3.1

Civil Administration

As mentioned earlier (section 2.1.3), Bangladesh has a two-tier civil administrative
system. At the top of this system is the Bangladesh Secretariat where all ministries and
departments are based and public policies are formulated. In the second tier there are
other ‘line’ departments under each ministry that are mainly responsible for carrying out
general administration as instructed by their reporting authorities. A Minister is the
political head of a Ministry. The Minister administers his functions as Minister through
a ‘Secretary’ who is the administrative head for that ministry. Normally, there could be
several divisions under one ministry, a number of wings under a division, several
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branches within a wing, and sections below a wing. The Secretary receives assistance
from an adequate number of officers of different ranks as prescribed by law.167
There are four ‘classes’ of public servants in a ministry and their role is determined by
law. For instance, an Assistant Secretary, who is a Class I officer, leads a section (with
the help of other office personnel) and performs his or her duties according to clear
rules and precedents. While every officer above this position is a first class ‘gazetted’
officer, there are also some Class II ‘gazetted’ officers too. In addition, there are Class
III and Class IV office personnel.168 While the Secretary (normally the administrative
head of a ministry, and also of a division in some cases) is the one who directly advises
the Minister on policy and administrative matters, the Joint Secretary (the head of a
wing) of a ministry may also present a case directly to the Minister. However, the
normal practice is to place it before the Secretary or Additional Secretary (the head of a
division) first.169
The Bangladesh Public Service Commission (PSC), which is a Constitutional body,
established under Article 137 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, conducts government
recruitment. The honourable President appoints the Commission’s Chairman and the
members170 for a specific period. The PSC’s main function is to administer the
examination to select suitable persons for appointment to the civil service of the
Republic. The President may consult the Commission with respect to matters relating to
qualifications for, and methods of recruitment to, the public service of the Republic; and
also the terms and conditions (including pension rights) of that service, promotions and
transfers.171
2.3.1.1 Lower Public Satisfaction in Citizen Oriented Services
The post-independence Government of Bangladesh adopted an interventionist, statecentred model of development, which, with some modifications, continued until the end
of 1990. In the subsequent years, the government began to relax its control on
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education, health, transport, communication and other major socio-economic sectors
and adopted a more market-led approach.172 The Government began to ‘emulate
business ethics such as effectiveness, decentralization, competition, efficiency, valuefor-money, and partnership in public services’173 and made people believe that to a great
extent public agencies would now assume the role of a catalyst for private business
enterprises and citizens would be treated as customers.174 When Bangladesh began this
shift from an ‘interventionist’ model to the notion of a ‘customer’ service model under
the pressure of the World Bank, many countries in the world (including a number of
developing countries) had already accepted this style.175 This notion was ‘based on the
rationales that the public service [was] expansive and inefficient, that its public image or
perception [was] largely negative, and that its performance [was] disappointing’.176
In subsequent years, despite several development and reform initiatives by the
government, the citizen satisfaction level remained low.177 A number of researchers
have indicated that the nation’s ‘citizens consider the public service as “over
centralized, unaccountable, inefficient, overpaid, coercive, unethical, and rent
seeking”’.178
2.3.1.2 Reform Initiatives: What to Reform ?
As mentioned in the immediately preceding section, post independence Bangladesh
faced serious criticism due to the interventionist nature of the state. The large size of the
government, the wastage of resources, the government’s involvement in too many
activities, the growing inflation rate and excessive bureaucracy were some of the
outcomes of an interventionist state that immediately attracted attention. Critics also
targeted the process that the public agencies followed in administering their business.179
The ‘model of administration was rejected as being inefficient, costly, rigid, corrupt,
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unaccountable, and unsuitable to an age seeking more dynamic model of social and
economic development’.180
Failure of Reform Initiatives
In response to growing citizen demands and pressure from its international development
partners, Bangladesh initiated several reform projects to reorganise its civil
administration, because ‘[t]he delivery system for public services [had] ... reached an
unprecedented level of inefficiency, which require[d] devising new ways of providing
services to the people’.181 The demands were that the existing civil administration
system should be reorganised so that it would become efficient, accountable and
responsive. Despite a clear understanding of the importance of these issues, the reform
schemes remained largely unimplemented.182 Sarker indicated that there were several
reasons why reform initiatives generally failed in Bangladesh.
The new administrative system that was being proposed was known by different names,
including ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) and ‘market-based public administration’.
Scholars have noted a number of reasons behind the failure by Bangladesh to adopt the
system more broadly. For instance, Allen Schick mentioned that the market economy in
developing countries has some features, such as, the prevalence of corruption in the
extensive informal economy, the inadequate access to capital, and the existence of many
formal processes for regulating economic activities, which altogether might make a
system unsuitable for NPM style reform.183 In addition there were other forces that
prevented the implementation of such reforms in developing countries. The weaker state
capacity in developing countries was ‘manifested in the institutional, technical,
administrative, and political arenas’,184 and militated against the adoption of such
reforms in these economies.
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Specifically in terms of Bangladesh, as Sarker has identified, there were several wellknown reasons that hindered reform in the public administration. He indicated that a
lack of political commitment had been a major issue as political leaders were never
serious about overhauling the bureaucratic system. Elected for five years, political
leaders prioritised their short-term political agendas (by rewarding supporters through
new procurements and contrcats) and often overturning the previous reform agendas of
their predecessors. The result was the continual abandoning of long-term administrative
reform initiatives. In addition, as Khan mentioned, often reforms were politically
motivated and aimed to serve individual interests rather than national concerns.185
Another issue was limited state capacity. Sarker observed that clientelist groups had
been so powerful that they could influence state decisions and prevent reform proposals
that might otherwise adversely affect their interests. The clientelist nature of politics is a
serious problem in Bangladesh. Another serious concern is bureaucratic resistance.
Sarker indicated that most civil servants viewed reform attempts as a kind of demotion
in power and status, took a protectionist attitude towards the status quo and opposed
change. In addition, there is the complexities posed by factionalism in the public service
sector which has multiple dimensions, including competition between different political
groups and loyalties, rivalry between generalists and specialists, between freedom
fighters and non-freedom fighters, and between those from a military background and
those of a civilian background, and so on.186
On top of that, there was corruption and politicisation of the administration. Various
groups and actors who benefited from different forms of corrupt practices — for
instance, bribery, abuse of authority, nepotism, favouritism, and patronage — often
actively impeded reform. Due to over-politicisation of the system and pervasive
corruption, promotion, transfer and postings in important or (illegally) profitable
positions are often awarded to party loyalists.187
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2.3.1.3 Bureaucracy’s Relationship with Politics
Although we have referred to the ‘politicisation’ of bureaucracy/administration several
times in this discussion, it should be noted that it is not an entirely negative
phenomenon. From one standpoint, this link between the bureaucracy and the political
machinery may be viewed as an opportunity to utilise the bureaucrats’ expertise to help
achieve development targets, bring about desired social changes and thereby materialise
the political goals of a government.188 In addition, politicisation in civil administration
could be desirable as long as it is used by the government in the democratisation
process189 and as long as it is ‘affordable and profitable’.190 Then again questions
remain: ‘What are the boundaries within which the politicisation process is politically
affordable and profitable? And for whom?’.191 Jahan and Shahan replied that ‘the
discussion on [the] politicization of [the] bureaucracy mainly aims to identify the
effective line of interaction between the politicians and the bureaucrats’.192
Another dimension of politicisation may refer to the politicians’ attempts to employ
bureaucrats in order to serve the interests of the political party or parties in power. In
this situation, the ‘appointment, transfer, promotion and other career decisions of civil
servants are dependent on the will of their political master’. 193 While this type of
partisan appointment may be seen as normal in some contexts, especially in regard to
the appointment of loyal servants in strategic senior positions, but this is in fact a type
of politicisation where jobs are ‘handed out’ to loyal friends of the particular political
parties in power,194 and it is thus a form of negative politicisation.
Political Interference in PSC
It has been alleged that the Bangladesh Public Service Commission (PSC) (section
2.3.1) has always been under some form of political interference, irrespective of the
nature of the government, whether it is democratic or autocratic. During the democratic
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period, the civil society criticised the PSC for its failure to conduct fair competitive
recruitment tests, and for the political affiliation of its Members. Even in the British
colonial era the Chairman of the PSC, Sir Ross Barker, mentioned in his memorandum
to the Simon Commission (1927) that he faced many problems due to government
control over the recruitment process. During Pakistan period under the 1962
Constitution, the PSC enjoyed a certain degree of liberty in recruitment, promotion,
transfer and disciplinary matters. However, the PSC’s power was virtually very limited,
because the President could take those liberties away at any time by the use of a
Presidential order.195
The PCS and the Ministry of Public Administration (formerly known as the Ministry of
Establishment) are two important agencies that carry out the administration related to
public personnel in Bangladesh. As described earlier (section 2.3.1), the PSC is
responsible for conducting recruitment tests and the selection of personnel. In recent
years, however, several allegations of corruption and politicisation have emerged
against PSC. It has been at the centre of controversy for a long time, especially after the
authority had cancelled the viva voce for the 27th Bangladesh Civil Service examination
(2006) because of suspected corruption and politicisation, and had earlier cancelled the
preliminary selection test for the 24th Bangladesh Civil Service examination due to an
alleged leak of the question paper.196
Executive Interference in the PSC
There is a lack of clarity about the relationship between the PCS and the government’s
executive branch, which has always resulted in some confusion. During the colonial era,
the PSC was attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs which hindered the
Commission’s functioning.197 Similarly, it was under the Establishment Division of
President’s Secretariat during the Pakistan period,198 ignoring the question of the
independence it might require for its statutory functioning. This practice continued in
post liberation Bangladesh.199 As Jahan and Shahan indicated, ‘the independence of the
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PSC from the Ministry of [Public Administration] is determined by the ability and status
of the PSC Chair’.200 They further continued that:
...being a career bureaucrat had always been an added advantage in case of
discharging duties. It has been noticed that it is easier for a civil servant to muddle
through the executive control, the [Ministry of Public Administration]’s hindrances
and obstacles because being a career bureaucrat enables him/her to realize the
deeply set values of the administrative arena and to get the job done accordingly. If
s/he is an ex-civil servant, he/she will be able to manage his office well, but to an
“intruder” in the administrative realm, the story is quite different.201

Their study further indicated that the PSC’s dependence on the executive, especially the
Ministry of Public Administration, could be explained by two things: the Ministry’s
control of the PSC though ministry personnel working in the PSC on deputation, and the
PSC’s lack of administrative knowledge.202
Researchers often say that the colonial legacy is a dominant feature in the bureaucracy
of many developing countries, even after these countries have gone through several
post-colonial administrative reform programmes.203 Studies that analysed some of these
issues (as mentioned above) have identified several problems in the bureaucracy of
Bangladesh that have an historical legacy from the British colonial period. In the case of
Bangladesh, it was not only the colonial era but also the subsequent autocratic regimes
in the post-colonial period and even some elements in the democratic governments that
have contributed to this malfunction. The researchers have argued that how an
institution like the PSC would operate in a country would depend on the ‘type’ and
‘nature’ of the government in power.204
2.3.2

Legacy of Malfunction in Civil Administration

The British Indian government designed its bureaucracy in India, where the political
environment was fundamentally different from Britain, mainly to serve the interests of
the British imperial power in this colony and not to ensure good governance for the
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people of the sub-continent.205 The bureaucracy was designed to ‘rule’ or ‘govern’ the
people using a handful of administrators loyal to the British Crown. 206 As Khan and
Zafarullah have mentioned, even the Government of India Act1935 that introduced the
provision of Indian ministers paradoxically allowed the civil servants to bypass the
ministers, which ultimately restrained the development of local political institutions.207
During the Pakistan period, however, the bureaucracy exercised enormous power over
politics. Until 1958, due to continuing political disorder in the country, the bureaucracy
was involved in political decision-making and a civil-military partnership developed.208
This excessive demonstration of power and involvement in politics was later criticised
by the subsequent martial law regime in 1958, which put the Civil Service of Pakistan
(CSP) in an uneasy situation. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy once again gained its strong
hold on civil administration back when the military government of Ayub Khan took the
initiative to implement the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 and was desperately in
need of efficient bureaucratic machinery. This initiative received enormous support
from the CSP because the system of Basic Democracy came with a strong promise to
put an end to the declining power of the bureaucracy and return it to its position as the
strongest local community.209
The CSP’s continuing domination during Pakistan period made the bureaucracy a target
of fierce political criticism in Pakistan (and this legacy continued in independent
Bangladesh) as they carefully safeguarded their colonial image to ensure maximum
enjoyment of state position and power.210 As Khan and Zafarullah observed, ‘they
manifested a negative attitude toward politicians, on the one hand, and a paternalistic
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attitude towards the common man, on the other’,211 earning the disregard of both. This
subsequently encouraged political parties in power to create a civil administration,
which would be free from such an ‘elite’ mind-set. Consequently, in newborn
Bangladesh, the bureaucracy would be heavily criticised by prominent politicians for its
malfunctioning212 but this would hardly improve the image of politicians to the general
populace. Political turmoil struck Bangladesh again in 1975 when a military authority
came into power after the assassination of the President of the independent Bangladesh
along with almost his entire family in a military coup just four years after the country’s
independence.213 In the post 75 period, ‘due to the colonial heritage, distrust towards
political leaders and paternalistic attitude to the citizen on the part of the bureaucracy,
an effective partnership was built’214 and bureaucracy quickly became allied with the
martial law administrator. This continued in subsequent martial law regimes too.
The military–bureaucracy relationship has been mutually advantageous for both
groups. The bureaucrats have all along manifested an aversion for politicians. They
seem to be allergic to political control and accountability. On the other hand, they
are comfortable in a work environment that is impersonal, formal, and legalrational and where the value system of political structures does not impede
bureaucratic norms.215

When finally democracy was restored in 1990, this rivalry between the political forces
and the bureaucracy entered an expected, yet interesting, phase. Governments began to
increase their executive control over the bureaucracy by centralising decision-making
powers. A centralised decision-making power means almost unrestricted control over
public expenditure, which would ultimately allow politicians to maintain a patron-client
relationship with their loyal followers.216 Politicians can use public resources and other
facilities to ‘encourage’ people to be loyal to them. Persons to whom patronage is
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extended in return extend their support to the political party or politicians; this is the
very ground that the political power of politicians is based upon. Generally, this
patronage means ‘the instrumental use of positions of power to distribute jobs, goods,
and other public decisions to partisan supporters’217 that is, the illicit practice of
directing public resources to friends and followers.218
When the politicians started to cultivate this relationship with their clients, they soon
engaged in ‘state-capture’ in the form of the extreme abuse of public resources.
Markowitz warned that this practice might have serious consequences. 219 The political
elites who have the position of ‘client’ in this case may start viewing political
‘patronage a “problem-solving network” from which information, resources, and social
mobility can be obtained’.220 This may ultimately make them heavily reliant on political
patronage and encourage them to create pressure on their patron to bring such changes
in state institutions as would suit their political ideology. 221 In the case of Bangladesh,
one study indicated that ‘[p]artisan politics seemed to permeate all aspects of public life
and this penetration of politics had an adverse impact on the structure and operation of
the public institutions’.222
This position of the politicians in Bangladesh made them the ‘immediate beneficiary’ of
the system that brought changes in the system not for the public interest but only to
ensure their return to power (that is, winning next election).223 They even politicised the
bureaucracy by recruiting, posting and promoting party loyalists in important positions
in order to ensure administrative support for their political agenda and also to weaken
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the cycle of the ‘elitist mode of operation’ of the bureaucracy which, of course, was also
contrary to any systematic change in the administration.224
2.3.3

A Cultural Explanation

Even after an historic account of the bureaucracy of Bangladesh and its relationship
with politics, it might be interesting to see how some well-known cultural theories view
these issues. Taiabur Rahman explored the established cultural theories proposed by
Thompson225 and Hofstede226 in a bid to explain how the dominant culture of
Bangladesh influences social interaction and the body politic.227
2.3.3.1 The Cultural Landscape of Bangladesh Society
Kochanek indicated that Bangladesh appeared to be an hierarchical society despite the
fact that it is a homogenous community in terms of race, religion, and language. 228 That
means, the society could be characterised by high grid values which were originally
shaped by a Hindu religious culture and its inherent caste system as well as colonial
heritage based on a master-slave relationship, and high group values, influenced by
Islam — the major religion of the country — that (by way of contrast) advocates
classlessness and fraternity, for instance.229
The high grid values of Bangladeshi society are largely based on ‘inequality’, where the
relationship between elites and commoners is governed by detailed implicit rules that
ensure that a social distance between these two groups is carefully maintained. On the
other hand, Islam stresses ‘group value’, which has received general acceptance by the
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masses irrespective of their religious belief.230 Some research has identified that
‘uncertainty avoidance’ is high in this society where ‘collective norms’ are dominant.
That is to say, only a low level of trust is placed on people who are not member of the
family or group. This ‘low trust’ is often a dominant cause of why society places so
much importance on consolidation of the hierarchy and the formulation of formal rules
in organisations and political institutions.231
Jamil has said that many of the features that we observed in the organisational context
are also present in smaller social units, such as families. The head of the family holds
the superior position and the rest of the members are subordinates who generally feel
comfortable working under the head’s command and supervision rather than enjoy
equal privileges. The superior will provide patronage and favour while subordinates will
show loyalty and respect. Generally, questioning a superior’s orders or decision or
confronting them openly is not common practice and is viewed as ill mannered. 232
Hofstede’s cross-cultural study which involved comparing societies against the
hierarchical one proposed by Thompson233 maintained that Bangladesh principally
belongs to the ‘hierarchical society’234 and as a result, the society manifests the
following features (among others).
Patron-client Relations
This is an important feature of Bangladeshi society. People with higher rank and power
have maximum control over the production and supply of resources, which puts them in
the position of patron and forces the rest of the society to assume the position of client.
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This system creates a higher dependency of vulnerable groups on the stronger.235 People
of lower rank depend on the higher rank for various types of material benefits since the
latter controls the labour and services.236
Factionalism
While Bangladeshi society has not many major socio-economic splits, yet, group
conflict is prevalent with its own unique features. Often a political alliance secures
power but soon falls apart due to an insufficiency of resources that prevents meaningful
sharing of resources among the members of the alliance, a phenomenon that Lewis has
called the ‘paradox of success’.237 Rivalry among political parties, their student wings,
NGOs, various professional bodies (of lawyers and physicians, for instance) and
associations is common.238
Favouritism
Rahman stated that people in power often engage in corrupt practice in the form of
preferential treatment of their friends, families, or clients. Often people view the public
agencies as the central place of favouritism and bribery.239 Transparency International
(Bangladesh) reported that a small group of people in powerful positions are heavily
engaged in putting undue influence on the civil administration, particularly in regard to
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public procurement, and the misuse of development funds, as well as various other
types of negative activities.240
Siddqui indicated that Tadbir (the process of persuasion and personal lobbying) is very
common in Bangladesh. People often use Tadbir to circumvent normal bureaucratic
processes at public agencies. For example, when it is almost impossible for a normal
person to reach a certain public servant with regard to any public service, they can solve
the problem by approaching them through their ‘near and dear’ ones whom they cannot
easily refuse. While Tadbir is often a common harmless practice that people use only to
evade a cumbersome bureaucracy, it may also involve bribery. Bureaucrats themselves
may also use it in order to pursue politicians to ensure political interference to guarantee
a desired transfer and posting to select places or agencies,241 or employ another (to
pursue other bureaucrat) to gain the cooperation of their counterparts in other public
agencies (section 2.3.1.3).
Lack of Trust
Generally, the people of Bangladesh place a low level of trust in their politicians.
Recent research has shown that the degree of people’s satisfaction with regard to the
performance of the Members of Parliaments is low. In a Transparency International
(Bangladesh) study, the average score of performance of the MPs was 4.18 on a 1 to 10
scale, with 1 being the least and 10 being the most satisfactory.242 Generally, people at
large do not believe that anyone involved in politics in Bangladesh has any motive
stemming from a desire to enhance the development of the society. 243 This lack of trust
may have important implications for the poor development of self-regulatory activities.
As Peters (1995) argued, low social trust is a serious impediment to the development of
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non-government alternatives to civil administration.244 As Rahman similarly observed,
‘Reliance on formal rules and regulations [in public agencies] also results from low
trustworthiness. Low trust is a manifestation of both high power distance and
uncertainty avoidance’.245
Relaxed Accountability Mechanism for the Privileged
Rahman stated that one of the notable features of social relationships and interaction in
Bangladesh has its base on the notion of the roles of the ‘senior’ and the ‘junior’, where
the former enjoys relaxed accountability. The relationship between parents and children,
teachers and students, husband and wife, housewife and maid-servant, ministers and
public servants, Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet are all governed by the
unwritten concept of ‘superiority-inferiority’. While interacting with seniors, usually
juniors are under more stringent accountability than are the seniors.246
Control over Information
As Jamil noted, ‘bureaucratic decisions in Bangladesh are mostly available from
internal sources such as superiors, colleagues, juniors, official circulars and gazettes
rather than external sources. This […] evinces bureaucrats’ stronghold over
information.’247 In Bangladesh, bureaucracy essentially means ‘fundamentally
domination through knowledge’248 by highly experienced bureaucrats who have
undergone extensive training and hold higher degrees often from renowned foreign
universities.249
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As indicated in section 2.1, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the
bureaucratic environment of Bangladesh through which the AML initiatives must be
implemented. Understanding this environment, especially its historical development and
some important cultural features, will help the reader contextualise the unique features
of the AML regime and its major issues. Based on the APG mutual evaluation report of
Bangladesh (2009), the subsequent sections will provide a synopsis of the AML strategy
in Bangladesh and briefly outline the major issues.
2.4

AML Regime in Bangladesh

Bangladesh was the first country in the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC)250 region to criminalise money laundering through the enactment
of Money Laundering Prevention Act 2002. This Act was repealed as the Money
Laundering Prevention Ordinance (MLPO) was promulgated in 2008. Currently,
Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2012 is in force.251
2.4.1

General Situation of Money Laundering

Risks of Money Laundering
Bangladesh faces serious threats of money laundering due to a number of factors
currently prevailing in its socio-economic context. Among these, corruption is the most
prevalent. Under the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012 (s 2) corruption and
bribery are on the top of the list of predicate offences, and proceeds of crime is defined
as any property directly or otherwise obtained from a predicate offence (s 2). So much
so that Iftekharuzzaman several years ago observed: ‘What is striking about Bangladesh
is that corruption affects almost everyone and it is hardly ever punished’. 252 It is a
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comment that unfortunately appears no less applicable today. It is not hard to imagine a
direct link between corruption and money laundering when corruption is commonly
known as the abuse of public office for ‘private economic gains’, 253 (such as the receipt
of funds in bribes and the misappropriation of public funds to which the person has
access in their role) and money laundering, a concealment process. Indeed a form of
laundering is necessary to ensure that the personal gains from syphoning public monies
into private coffers or secreted for private use may go largely undetected. This can
include funds from bribes received to expedite projects or allocate funding in a
particular direction or kickbacks received as a reward for doing so, while at a lower
level small but repeated bribes may be received to ensure non-prosecution for minor and
even not so minor offences or to encourage prosecution for that same offence, as well as
simply to ‘short cut’ or be prioritised amid otherwise lengthy bureaucratic procedures
(as alluded to earlier). In such an environment, corruption is pervasive. Money
laundering plays an encouraging ‘role in the development of any crime that generates
revenues’.254 The ease with which it can be accomplished can have a direct impact on
the further extension of corruption in public office as well as in private business.
Besides corruption, drug and human trafficking are two other common crimes that make
Bangladesh vulnerable to money laundering in that they create demand for money
laundering services. Bangladesh is a trans-shipment point for illegal drugs, and often
smugglers use it as a transit country for heroin shipments through its airport and
seaport.255 As far as human trafficking is concerned, Bangladesh has been marked by its
role as a country of origin256 for the trafficking of men, women, and children for
purposes of forced labour and commercial sexual exploitation. A total of 407 traffickers
had been arrested in the period from 15 June 2004 to 15 February 2007 and 373 human
trafficking cases were instituted across the country.257
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Methods, Techniques, and Trends of Money Laundering
Since much of the economic activity in Bangladesh is cash-based, bulk cash smuggling
is a common method of laundering along with structuring formal bank transactions. The
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) indicated in their 2009 mutual
evaluation report on Bangladesh that ‘Alternative Fund Transfer’, or in their terms, the
‘Alternative Remittance System’ is a common observable part of the Bangladesh
economy, especially in regard to transnational financial transactions. APG stated that
people use this method to both send illegally obtained money abroad and to receive
legal inward remittances from migrant workers.258 In regard to the latter, according to
the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment statistics, as of
December 2012, more than 8.4 million Bangladeshi migrant workers were working
across the world.259 In 2012, the value of inward remittances through formal channels
was approximately USD 12.84 billion,260 but it is widely believed that the actual figures
are far higher than official figures.261 For instance, there is a common belief that over 50
per cent of remittances comes through informal channels like Hundi or Hawala.262
Based on community trust and local culture, Hundi and Hawala provide a quick, cheap,
and convenient alternative to dealing with banks and filling out forms to an open
account for migrants who have a limited education level and literacy. On top of that,
most migrant workers come from rural Bangladesh where a banking service is
extremely rare and due to the conservative social structures, the women especially do
not establish a relationship with institutions such as traditional banks. Instead, they will
trust a Hawaladar/Hundi operator in their community who is well aware of customary
258
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social codes.263 However, some of the characteristics of these informal systems, such as
‘anonymity’ and ‘lack of transparency’, may make these informal funds transfer
systems an attractive choice for money laundering and the financing of terrorism.264
2.4.2

Economic Growth and Money Laundering

The negative effects of money laundering on the economy have been thoroughly
researched, in both academia and by industry. Top international organisations have
published a number of papers on the consequences of ML and financial crimes in terms
of economic growth. In a paper published by the International Centre for Criminal Law
Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, Castle and Broomhall stated that money laundering
‘facilitates activities which are themselves intrinsically damaging: drug trafficking,
corruption, embezzlement and tax evasion’.265 The World Bank has indicated that while
harbouring large-scale criminal organisations and their illegal financial activity may
appear both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the beginning (with upsides including increased
employment, business activity, construction, cash flows), in the end the economic
principle of Gresham’s law comes into operation and the ‘bad money drives out [the]
good’. The region then faces the serious risk of being ruled by corrupt financiers and
losing the integrity of its financial infrastructure,266 to the ultimate detriment of the
entire economy as reputable sources of funding avoid the region, preferring to invest
elsewhere.
In an ADB paper on the economic impact of money laundering, Brent Bartlett reiterated
the risk to which the World Bank had also drawn attention, and warned that money
laundering results in slow economic growth. It diverts national resources and promotes
corruption, which ultimately reduce output in the economy’s real sector and distort the
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economy’s external sector.267 FATF in their ‘Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption’
report mentioned that corruption-related money laundering remains a problem in many
countries. Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) are at very high risk of ML due to the
very nature of the political positions they hold in a country. PEPs have access to and
control over government budgets, public companies and public procurement, which
they may exploit for personal gain. In those countries where this occurs, corruption
hurts economic performance by discouraging private investment, damaging public
infrastructure and by reducing human capital formation.268
The phenomenon of money laundering may have rather a severe impact in developing
economies due to certain inherent weaknesses that they have. Some recent research
revealed that the informal cash-based economy in Nigeria offered an environment
where the basic level of transparency in financial operations was absent, which
ultimately contributed to economic digression and political instability. This research
also indicated that ML may infiltrate the core of the financial and political structure
resulting in investment instability, a loss of control over national economic policy, as
well as undermine the growth of the legitimate private sector.269
Starting from the early 1970s, Bangladesh’s economy is increasingly dependent on the
privately owned garment manufacturing (or ‘ready made garment’) industry, which earn
the largest chunk of its foreign currency (some USD 12.5 billion in 2009–10).270 From
only 1.1 per cent during 1981–2 by 2008–9 this industry accounted for about 80 per
cent of country’s total foreign exports.271 Considering some of the potential threats that
ML may pose to the formal financial sector and the private investment environment of
Bangladesh, the proliferation of ML is worth responding to with appropriate measures.
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2.4.3

An Overview of the Financial Sector:

Banking Sector
Although there are various types of banks, insurance companies and non-bank financial
institutions, the bank-based financial system dominates in Bangladesh. Until 1982, only
state-owned commercial banks dominated banking sector. This monopoly resulted in
poor customer service in and performance by the financial institutions. However, under
intense internal and external criticism, eventually the Government had to introduce a
reform plan to allow privatisation and decentralisation of banking services.272
In recent years, the banking system has greatly changed. The Government has allowed
the creation of commercial and investment banks in the private sector. Now there are
only 4 fully or majority state owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and 4 specialised
banks (SDBs) (which are also fully or majority state owned), but 30 private commercial
banks (PCBs) which are comprised of 23 conventional PCBs and 7 Islamic Shar’iāh
based PCBs. There are also 9 Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs) operating in
Bangladesh.273 Among these groups of banks, the 4 state owned commercial banks hold
only 28.5 per cent of the industry’s assets but have the largest geographic coverage.
With 3447 branches, they reach almost all districts and sub-districts of Bangladesh. In
contrast, the 30 PCBs and 9 FCBs, mainly located in big cities and district headquarters,
have altogether only 2900 branches although they hold 65.4 per cent of the industry’s
assets.274
Other Institutions in the Finance Sector
Some other financial institutions in Bangladesh provide non-banking services with
some specialised banking facilities. The insurance sector is relatively small and
government policies allowed both public and private investment in this area to ensure
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healthy competition.275 Similarly, there are 29 investment, finance, and leasing
companies operating under the licence issued by the Bangladesh Bank (the country’s
central bank)276 but this sector has a very insignificant market share compared to the
banking sector.277 One sector that is emerging rapidly in Bangladesh is the Capital
Market. It is regulated under the Securities and Exchange Commission, and currently
there are two stock exchanges in Bangladesh, one in Dhaka and the other in Chittagong.
As of June 2011, the total number of listings on these exchanges was 705. 278 In addition
to this, some specialised banks and NGOs operate member-based micro-finance
institutions, which are also growing rapidly. Money-changers also provide money
exchange services to travellers within prescribed limits.279
Foreign Exchange Controls
Non-residents need to follow a strict foreign exchange rule in Bangladesh. They may
open a bank account only with the prior approval of the central bank, and in the case of
a proposed investment in the securities market, they need to use a freely convertible
foreign currency that they must remit from abroad through a formal banking channel. 280
For foreign tourists, money-changers can release foreign exchange of up to USD 5000
and in the case of incoming passengers holding more than USD 5000, there is an
obligation to make a declaration to the Customs Authority.281
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs)
Since gambling (a common means of laundering funds elsewhere) is strictly illegal,
there are no legal casinos in Bangladesh; however, there are approximately 1000 real
estate companies operating in Bangladesh but only about 400 of them are registered
275
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under the appropriate government-approved industry body.282 It is easy to invest money
in this sector and then use it as a means of layering in the laundering process.
Among other DNFBPs, there are several hundred jewellery stores. These are located all
across Bangladesh but this business is not well developed. The jewellery business in
Bangladesh is mainly involved in the retail of precious metal and stones. The
Bangladesh Bar Council is the professional body for the advocates, but there is no
official record about the exact number of legal professionals providing financial advices
to their commercial clients. In addition, notaries in Bangladesh generally have very
limited role with regard to activities of DNFBPs as indicated in the FATF standards.283
2.4.4

Overview of AML Strategy

The domestic AML strategy means the adoption of international AML standards at a
national level. Such standards come primarily from two major sources. Firstly, several
United Nations conventions are involved in the development of global AML/CFT
standards. These include, for example, the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (2000), the UN Convention against Corruption (2003),
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(1999). Secondly, there is a major initiative outside the UN that has been taken by
FATF through the adoption by many nations of its Recommendations. Although the
FATF Recommendations lack the status of international legal instrument,284 they have
enjoyed broad acceptance as global standards for several reasons.
The relevant UN resolutions and the FATF Recommendations have fundamental
connections when it comes to their core issues and policies. The FATF
Recommendations require jurisdictions to take a number of preventive measures and in
case of violation react with such punitive action as is stated by UN conventions. In
addition, the executive boards of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank have accepted the FATF Recommendations as the global AML standard. These
organisations even cooperate in the mutual evaluation and assessment of state parties on
282
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AML compliance issues.285 Therefore, state parties or members of these organisations,
including the FATF Associate member parties that implement FATF recommendation
at a regional level, are under pressure to implement the FATF Recommendations at a
national level.
The FATF Recommendations mainly cover core three areas of a jurisdiction as far as
their AML initiatives are concerned: the criminal justice system and law enforcement,
the financial system and its regulations, and international cooperation,286 as well as some
selected aspects of the non-financial sector.287 Below is a description of the AML
strategy adopted by Bangladesh in line with the FATF recommendations.
Since banking is the core of the financial sector, the Bangladesh Government has taken
initiatives to implement AML measures in the banking sector on a priority basis, and
then to implement similar measures subsequently in the non-bank financial institutions,
the money exchange houses, and the insurance sector.288 In September 2010, all stock
dealers and stockbrokers also came under reporting obligations.289 However, designated
non-financial professionals — such as accountants, lawyers, real estate developers, and
dealers in precious metals and stones — had no reporting obligations until they were
finally included as ‘reporting organisation’ under section 2(w) of the Money Laundering
Prevention Act 2012.
2.4.4.1 Criminal Justice System and Law Enforcement
Legal Framework
The highest court of Bangladesh is the Supreme Court. It is has two divisions, the High
Court Division and the Appellate Division. The Supreme Court is independent in its
exercise of judicial functions.290 In addition, there are subordinate courts, tribunals, and
285
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special courts at the district levels. The relevant law establishes the various subordinate
courts and allocates their various responsibilities to them. For example, the Special
Court was established under the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009 for trying
money laundering offences.291 This Act has criminalised money laundering and
designated the Anti Corruption Commission as the investigating authority for ML
related offences,292 and declared certain offences as predicate offence.293
Anti Corruption Commission (ACC)
In addition to numerous social and political problems, the issue of corruption in all
spheres of life is a serious concern in Bangladesh.294 The Government took the most
significant step against corruption through the enactment of Bangladesh Anti
Corruption Act 1974 and the establishment of the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC).
Later, the Anti Corruption Commission Act 2004 came into force. It provided for the
establishment of the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC).295 The ACC — whose main
function is to fight corruption, through investigation and prosecution along with
measures like prevention, education, and advocacy — is an independent commission,
which answers only to the Parliament.296 The Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009
designated the ACC as the sole agency responsible for the investigation and prosecution
of ML cases.297 Although the ACC gained public confidence through its drive against
corruption during the Caretaker Government of 2007,298 the ACC has also been viewed
(and continues to be so regarded) as the ‘result of [external] pressure and not of utmost
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sincerity …[as] the Act is vague in many respects, for instance, accountability, chain of
commands and so on’.299
Ministry of Home Affairs
The Ministry of Home Affairs is an important ally in the fight against money
laundering. Primarily this ministry is responsible for the maintenance of law and order
in the country through fighting against criminal activities and those who perpetrate
them, investigating criminal cases, controlling smuggling, combating human and drug
trafficking and operating rescue missions. Public agencies like the Bangladesh Police
and its different branches, border security forces (the Border Guard Bangladesh or
BGB), the coastguard, the Department of Narcotics Control, the Department for
Passports and Immigration are among others work under this ministry. There are
specific Acts of the Parliament that have established these agencies. The Acts and rules
concerned clearly set forth each agency’s formation, functioning, and jurisdiction. For
instance, the Department of Narcotics Control and the Border Guard Bangladesh are
formed by and operate under the Narcotics Act 1990 and BGB Act 2010 respectively,
under separate departments within the ministry.300 This ministry also formulates and
implements immigration related policies,301 and handles incoming and outgoing requests
for extradition.302
The Rules of Business 1996 governs the various ministries of the government, their
business, and relationship with each other. These Rules provide definitions of various
public agencies, lays out their basic structures, delineates their authority and allocates
business. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues the necessary instructions
regarding the manner of authentication of international agreements and treaties under
Rule 5(iii), and the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs are authorised
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under Rule 5(iv) to issue instructions with regard to making and execution of contracts
on behalf of the President (Government).303
2.4.4.2 Financial System Regulations
Ministry of Finance
The Finance Division of Ministry of Finance primarily develops AML policies in
collaboration with the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. This includes
preliminary discussion on any proposed relevant bill, drafting of the bill and other
similar activities.304
Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank of Bangladesh)
This is the central Bank of Bangladesh and the apex regulatory body for the country’s
monitory and financial system. It formulates and implements monitory and credit
policies, regulates and supervises banks and non-bank financial institutions, manages
the country’s international reserves, issues currency notes, collects and furnishes credit
information and prevents money laundering (among its numerous responsibilities).305
The Bangladesh Bank is the government entity that is responsible for the administration
of the money laundering prevention legislation.306
Financial Intelligence Unit
Bangladesh has formed an FIU within the Central Bank whose main function is to take
the necessary steps to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It has the legal
authority under the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009 to implement the country’s
AML policies.307 It receives and analyses Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and
Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs). After analysis of the material, if FIU officers have
reason to believe that a report suggests a probable violation of the applicable law, then
303
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they disseminate such reports with their findings to the appropriate investigating
authority. The FIU maintains database of all STRs and CTRs.
The FIU is also responsible for issuing the necessary guidance, notifications, and
clarifications and even the conduct of training to Reporting Entities on AML
compliance matters. FIU staff regularly inspect, monitor, and evaluate the AML
compliance of the Reporting Entities. The FIU’s other important task is to maintain
contact with other FIUs across the globe308 and exchange intelligence under bilateral
agreements.309
2.4.4.3 International Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles requests for international cooperation. On
behalf of the Government of Bangladesh, it formulates and executes foreign policy
based on the guidance provided in the Constitution.310 The policies they formulate have
their basis in the relevant domestic and international laws, and in other customary
sources of international law, including international treaties to which Bangladesh is a
party.311
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs
Apart from acting as the administrative ministry for the subordinate judiciary, the Office
of the Attorney General, the Bar Council, the Office of the Administrator General and
the Official Trustee, the Public Prosecutors and the Notary Public and so on, this
ministry handles all legislative matters, including drafting of statutes and their
amendments. The Government consults them in regard to all proposals for legislation,
legal questions arising out of government cases, the preparation and vetting government
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contracts, international agreements, and the interpretation of law, and whenever the
Government is involved in any civil or criminal proceedings.312
Office of the Attorney General
The President appoints the Attorney-General for Bangladesh. The Office of the
Attorney General deals with legal matters of the state, which includes giving legal
advice to the Government and pleading government cases before any Court. The
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Office of the Attorney General are the central
authorities that deal with any Mutual Legal Assistance issues with foreign countries. 313
2.4.5

AML Regime in Bangladesh: The Issues

The APG in their 2009 Mutual Evaluation Report identified a number of issues with
regard to the AML regime of Bangladesh. The following sections of this chapter draws
on the relevant part of that report and are presented here as background information
with a minimum of critical analysis. It may further be noted that the data used here was
officially published in the Second Evaluation, which was adopted by the APG’s plenary
on 8 July 2009.314 During fieldwork and data collection between July and December
2010, the analyst requested that the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit provide him
with the current data. In response, they advised the analyst that they had not officially
published any such updated data since the evaluation. They further advised the analyst
to consult the website of the Central Bank of Bangladesh, APG, and FATF for latest
updates. However, as of March 2013 no significant updates were available save a
number of FATF news items referred at the end of this chapter. 315 This is indicative a
major problem with the operation of many AML systems in developing nations and in
Bangaldesh in particular. There is simply no practice of regularly publishing even the
most rudimentary data on the operation of the system.
Beginning in 1992, the FATF mutual evaluation system is regarded as one of its cornerstones and a significantly successful initiative. It is a comprehensive and objective
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approach to the assessment of the level of compliance of the jurisdictions with the
FATF Recommendations.316 As Sansonetti has observed, ‘This rigorous scrutiny
through mutual evaluation, public disclosure and its associated peer pressure has
contributed significantly to the development of AML … regimes around the world’.317
In general, this practice contributes in at least in two ways; first, it assesses the extent to
which a certain member has implemented international AML standard, and, secondly, it
identifies some areas of concern where the member’s performance falls short of global
standard.
Before we go more deeply into this discussion, it might be useful to explore what
‘implementation’ and ‘compliance’ mean in a general sense. As Weiss and Jacobson
explained, implementation and compliance are different. For a country, implementation
would refer to such measures that they are required to take at national level to give
effect to the international agreements that they have entered. This may include enacting
a piece of legislation, formulating a new policy, or introducing a new standard for
professional activities and the like. Compliance, however, could be difficult to measure
in the sense that it318 ‘involves assessing the extent to which governments follow
through on the steps that they have taken to implement’319 certain international
agreements. Michael Clarke detailed a number of other elements compliance requires.
He indicated that ‘regulation’ is necessary for compliance as an important step for a
business to be able to participate actively in regulatory practice. This also involves
identifying risks and assigning the appropriate body the responsibility to ensure that the
rules are followed.320
For the level of compliance with each FATF recommendation, a country is rated ‘C’,
compliant, ‘LC’, largely compliant, ‘PC’, partially compliant or ‘NC’, non-compliant.
This rating is done on the basis of certain essential elements that must be present in
order to demonstrate full compliance.321 A rating of ‘C’ means that a recommendation is
316
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fully observed; and ‘LC’ indicates that certain essential criteria are being fully met with
some minor deficiency present. Similarly, ‘PC’ refers a situation where some
substantive actions have been undertaken and where compliance by the member is
observed in relation to some of the essential criteria of a recommendation; and ‘NC’
indicates major shortcomings in meeting essential criteria.322
After the third round of FATF mutual evaluations in 2009, some studies indicated a
decline in the overall compliance level, which can be explained by the FATF members’
unwillingness, inability or even resistance to entertain changes. 323 This finding implied
that ‘there are a lot of holes in the financial framework through which a money
launderer could operate, even with FATF members.’324 When it comes to evaluating the
members of FATF Style Regional Bodies, the result is again disappointing but not
surprising.
Among all 118 countries that have been evaluated on their level of compliance with the
global AML standards from 2004 to 2011, around 24 of them are developing member
countries (DMCs) of the Asian Development Bank. After the mutual evaluation process,
it was found that although some of the DMCs had made commendable progress in the
areas of concern, that level still falls short of the global standard, while the general level
of compliance of these countries was not high. The study showed that around 75 per
cent of the DMCs were rated PC or NC for 18 of the FATF 40 Recommendations.
There is no surprise that some of the main reasons for their lower rating for compliance
were their inadequate infrastructure and resources, a lack of skilled human resources (in
public, private and even in law enforcement agencies) and lower level of technical
expertise of these professionals in comparison with their counterparts in the developed
world.325
In 2009, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering conducted a mutual evaluation
of Bangladesh’s level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations. Bangladesh
has been rated ‘C’ on 1 recommendation and ‘LC’ on 5 recommendations. On 23
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recommendations, they were rated ‘PC’ and on the remainder, 11, ‘NC’. Figure 2 is a
graphical presentation of this rating. For this graph, consider that the ‘FATF’s
description on how assessment levels are measured, ‘NC’ is set to zero, ‘PC’ to 0.33,
‘LC’ to 0.67 and ‘C’ to 1.0. This allows average compliance to be calculated’326 for each
recommendation. With One ‘C’, Five ‘LC’s, 23 ‘PC’s and 11 ‘NC’s, Bangladesh has an
average compliance level of 0.29, which is below the level of level of ‘PC’. This may be
noted here that often ‘PC’ may overstate the level of compliance and thereby give a
distorted view, because in reality ‘PC’ is not far above ‘NC’.

Note: APG’s mutual evolution of 2008 (published in 2009) was based on the 2003 version of the FATF
Recommendations. For the corresponding 2012 FATF Recommendations, please see the International
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Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, the FATF
327
Recommendations, February 2012.

Figure 2: Bangladesh’s Level of Compliance with the FATF 40
Recommendations as of July 2008.
In three major areas of compliance (section 2.4.4), as mentioned earlier, Bangladesh’s
average level of compliance is lower than ‘PC’, means; it has taken only a few
substantive actions in compliance with a few essential criteria, and there are major
shortcomings, as they have not yet met the large majority of the essential criteria.
Below, the analyst summarises the report of the APG Mutual Evaluation 2009 on
Bangladesh.
2.4.5.1 Inadequate Financial System Regulation
In order to control money laundering Bangladesh took a number of preventive measures
in accordance with the international AML standards. Starting from 2002 when the first
Money Laundering Prevention Act was enacted through the enactment of MLPA 2009,
various Bangladesh Bank AML circulars and guidance notes were published in order to
regulate the financial system. The FIU published the circulars under the rule-making
power provided in the MLPA 2002, the MLPO 2008, and other relevant Acts regulating
the financial sector. A focus group prepared the Guidance Notes on the Prevention of
Money Laundering. As an important step toward a preventive approach, the FIU
introduced a Customer Due Diligence programme. The Assessment Team, however,
mentioned that the same standard of CDD applied for all types of reporting entities, and
the exclusion of some financial institutions (like the post office, securities companies,
and various insurance companies) did not reflect a risk-based approach.328
In 2008, a direct prohibition on anonymous accounts was introduced for the first time.
Earlier, in 2003, the Guidance Notes required reporting entities (mainly banks) to
update the Know Your Customer (KYC) information on their customers with accurate
identification data by 31 January 2010. The Assessment Team indicated that the time
327
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allowed for this compliance was too long and thus it was not possible for them to
determine if fictitious or numbered accounts were operating in Bangladesh.329 In
addition, the reporting entities did not have a comprehensive system available to check
the background of Politically Exposed Persons.330 The Assessment Team commented
that the overall implementation of the CDD requirements was weak because of the
existence of a poor culture of compliance.331
2.4.5.2 Poor National and International Cooperation
Another important aspect of the AML Regime is to ensure effective communication
among domestic and international partners. Bangladesh formed a National Committee
on AML in order to coordinate AML policy formulation and its implementation in the
financial sector. The Committee was comprised of high-level officials from different
ministries and the Central Bank. During an onsite visit, the Assessment Team found that
the ACC was outside this coordination committee, which, according to them, was a sign
of significant gap in interagency coordination. The National Committee played a vital
role in suggesting or considering suggested changes in the AML legislation. Therefore,
the ACC’s absence from such a high-level committee appeared to be a serious setback
that might hamper effective AML policy formulation and implementation. Such a lack
of interagency coordination was further evident through the exclusion of other key
agencies in AML control efforts, for example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission.332
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
Bangladesh has taken a number of steps in order to pursue international cooperation on
AML and related issues. For example, Bangladesh has become a member of the Asia
Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and signed the Vienna Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988. It has also acceded
to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
partially adopted some provisions of the Convention against Transnational Organized
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Crime (Palermo Convention). In addition, Bangladesh has become a party to the UN
Convention against Corruption and has taken some steps to implement UN Security
Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 relating to suppression of terrorism financing.333
Although Bangladesh expressed its willingness to cooperate with international agencies
on AML control, there is no comprehensive legal framework in Bangladesh to facilitate
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) to or by Bangladesh, as the Mutual Evaluation Report
indicated. It is, however, possible for Bangladesh to consider an MLA request on a
case-by-case basis relying on the direct application of the international conventions that
the country has ratified.334 During the onsite visit of the Assessment Team in 2008,
Bangladesh was preparing to apply for membership of the Egmont Group of FIUs in
order to benefit from the international network of transnational intelligence sharing
between the FIUs. However, in the absence of such a membership Bangladesh included
some provisions in the existing legislation so that it could sign a Memorandum of
Understanding with other nations and organisations and share information on ML
related cases.335
The MLPA 2009 empowers the Government and, where applicable, the Central Bank,
to enter into bilateral or multilateral legal contracts, conventions or any agreement
approved under international laws, with foreign countries or organisations in order to
achieve the objectives of the AML regime.336 The Act also allows the Government and
the Central Bank to make requests to foreign governments or organisations for ‘relevant
information’ and also to comply with similar requests if such sharing is not contrary to
national interests.337
However, the Assessment Team referred to Criterion 36.1 of the AML/CFT Evaluation
and Assessments Handbook for Countries and Assessors338 and observed that the
provisions contained in the MLPA 2009 falls short of what required by the international
333
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standard. They stressed that they were unable to ensure if Bangladesh would be able to
provide the highest possible range of mutual legal assistance using the existing legal
framework. The Assessment Team also emphasised that the number of predicate
offences under the existing law was inadequate to cover full range of ML matters.339
In Bangladesh, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Office of the Attorney General are
the competent authorities to handle MLA cases. They handle such requests on case-bycase basis. Although the authorities have so far indicated (until 2008) that they had
received from 10 to 12 MLA requests and responded positively to all of them, they
failed to provide records on exactly how many MLA requests they made or that had
been responded to, nor did they indicate the nature of such requests.340
The APG Mutual Evaluation Report asserted that MLA related legislation was
incomplete, which forced Bangladesh to rely on the direct application of UN
conventions. It also mentioned that unless the number of predicate offences was
increased to cover more offences this would continue to impede the effectiveness of the
MLA for money laundering related cases. The Team indicated that although there was a
lack of appropriate procedures to deal with MLA requests, the record did not show that
even the minimum provisions available were being properly implemented. In addition,
the MLPO (2008) had limited provisions to deal with freezing and confiscation orders
outside Bangladesh.341
2.4.5.3 Weaker AML Legal Framework
During the onsite visit of the APG, the AML legal framework in Bangladesh was based
on the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance (MLPO) 2008 (subsequently passed by
Parliament as the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) 2009. The APG indicated
that the MLPO’s list of predicate offences under section 2(q) had considerable
omissions as it failed to include offences like insider trading and market manipulation342
although the Central Bank regarded them as dangerous problem that had in the past led
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to market volatility.343 The list also had failed to include crimes like piracy,
counterfeiting, and piracy of products, sexual exploitation, and smuggling (save
smuggling of currency).344
The Mutual Evaluation Report expressed significant concerns about Bangladesh’s
partial compliance with Recommendation 2 (money laundering offences). It criticised
the provision of punishment for ML offences committed by legal persons as
disproportionate or dissuasive. During the onsite visit, no consolidated statistics relating
to investigation and prosecution were found. The Assessment Team showed concern
about effectiveness of the existing arrangements for the investigation and prosecution of
ML offences.345
2.4.5.4 Inherent Problems of the FIU and the AML Reporting System
The FIU of Bangladesh is empowered under section 23 of the MLPA 2009 to receive
STRs and CTRs from the reporting entities. The FIU received STRs in a paper format
via messengers or facsimiles and CTRs on CD-rom. Subsequently, the FIU’s analysis
wing manually entered this data onto the FIU database. They received CTRs on a
monthly basis. The APG Mutual Evaluation Report stated that in the analysis phase the
FIU sometimes worked in collaboration with the Criminal Investigation section of the
Department of Police in order to access the police database. 346 However, during
interviews participants from the FIU indicated that in general the bureaucratic
environment was very unfavourable to their accessing most law enforcement databases.
The APG Assessment Team found that the FIU’s inadequate access to public databases
seriously impeded their analysis. The FIU indicated that most public agencies preserved
their information in a manual format and any request to access this information would
require a lengthy formal bureaucratic process. The FIU, unfortunately, did not have
direct access to any financial administrative or law enforcement databases, including the
database of of the Police, Customs and Tax departments. After the FIU had made a
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formal request, the response time also varied, and requests for the provision of
information would be handled on a case-by-case basis. Even in a matter of urgency,
there was no specified way to access a database of the law enforcement agencies, which
always delayed the process of analysis.347
The FIU forwarded their analysed STRs and CTRs to law enforcement agencies for
further action. Under section 23(2) of the MLPA 2009, the FIU could disseminate those
reports to the national investigating authority for investigation and prosecution
purposes, and section 12 of the same Act designated the Anti Corruption Commission
as the investigating authority for all ML related cases.348 It was, however, not clear, why
the ACC should be the investigating authority when proceeds could be generated from
offence other than corruption, for instance, smuggling or piracy. In that case, different
types of skills and resources would be necessary to investigate such predicate
offences,349 knowledge, resources and skills that may not be available to anti-corruption
experts.
The Assessment Team noted that the FIU had sufficient operational independence,
autonomy, and apparently had secured office and information resources. They indicated
that the head of the FIU was able to recruit and retain skilled human resources for the
FIU.350 However, the experts argued that:
Policymaking is a knowledge intensive business. Therefore, even the most
competent personnel cannot develop well-informed policies if they do not have
access to sufficient data, methods and analytical tools. From this perspective,
knowledge is a resource that has to be preserved and developed in order to ensure
that the public sector becomes a “learning organization”.351

The Report mentioned the number of AML reports the FIU received, analysed and
finally disseminated had sharply declined (elaborated in section 5.3.1) due to several
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political and legislative constraints and despite Bangladesh’s several important
initiatives to strengthen the FIU’s capacity.352
The APG identified some specific reasons in the Mutual Evaluation Report as to why
the AML reporting system remained so ineffective. One major reason for
Recommendation 26 (competent authorities, their powers and resources) being rated at
the ‘PC’ level was that the FIU did not have free ‘access, directly or indirectly, on a
timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it
required to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STRs’.353 Another
reason given was the poor physical infrastructure of the FIU. This included lack of
proper IT equipment, software, information storage facilities and the absence of an
uninterrupted power supply — these jointly resulted in reducing the effectiveness of the
AML reporting system in Bangladesh over the years.354
An important source of information for AML regulators could be cross border
declarations or disclosures. In order to control physical cross border transactions of
currency, Bangladesh applies the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) 1947
together with similar provisions in the Customs Act 1969. The Customs Act controls
export and import of any goods of a specified description into and out of Bangladesh by
air, sea or land; and FERA controls currency transactions, requiring passengers/bearers
carrying coins, notes, postal notes, money orders, cheques and other forms of ‘currency’
to declare this to the appropriate authority using the specified form.355
However, the Assessment Team found that there was no clear policy to ensure
coordination between border enforcement agencies in general, and, a serious lack of
cooperation between those agencies and the FIU or the ACC regarding the detection and
investigation of ML cases in particular. The Assessment Team concluded that the
absence of any mechanism that could ensure that the FIU would be able to share
information obtained by authorities under FERA was a ‘serious deficiency’.356
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What further alarmed the APG was the slow progress and the low success rate of
investigation and prosecution of ML related cases. Records showed that in 2002 there
had been a good number of investigations in progress. The Assessment Team observed
during onsite visit in August 2008 that all those original cases were still pending. The
FIU further informed the APG Assessment Team that only three cases were being
investigated under the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance 2008. Finally, the
Assessment Team concluded that the criminal justice system of Bangladesh was
affected by a serious court backlog.357
The APG Mutual Evaluation Report 2009 on Bangladesh is a vast report that evaluated
Bangladesh’s level of compliance with all 40 general (AML) and 9 special (Countering
the Financing of Terrorism) recommendations of Financial Action Task Force. Most of
the findings that highlighted non-compliance or partial compliance could be
summarised as citing a serious lack of interagency coordination, bureaucratic sincerity
and political willingness, together with the presence of a strong cultural resistance to
change. In addition, corruption, nepotism, actual and perceived self-interest, a lack of
training, a mostly risk averse culture, poor resources management, poor leadership and a
failure to understand why ML is a problem at all are other major factors as to why
Bangladesh’s level of compliance was rated as poor.
Post Mutual Evaluation Developments
FATF noted that in October 2010, Bangladesh made a high-level commitment to
improve its policy and implementation process in order to deal with the AML related
deficiencies, and since June 2012, Bangladesh has taken a number of the necessary
initiatives to address these matters. Yet a number of issues — including adequately
criminalising terrorist financing, strengthening provisions to identify and freeze terrorist
assets, strengthening the FIU, regulating capital market intermediaries and improving
transnational cooperation — are yet to be addressed.358 On 22 June 2012, FATF
published news with regard to Bangladesh’s enactment of the Mutual Legal Assistance
Act 2012.359 In September 2012, a delegation of Egmont Group visited Bangladesh and
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observed the country’s preparedness to obtain membership to this group. In the Egmont
Working Group and Committee Meetings held from 20 to 25 January 2013, the Legal
Working Group agreed to propose the admission of the FIU of Bangladesh.360
In a developing country like Bangladesh, when it comes to complying with any
international standard, the dearth of resources has always been widely promulgated (but
often largely inaccurately) as an excuse for poor compliance levels. Therefore, the issue
of poor compliance warrants further investigation to discover whether it is the absence
of resources only or some inbuilt inefficiency within the civil administrative system
itself, along with other social factors, which prevent an equal distribution of already
available resources and whether these are the main reasons behind a largely ineffective
AML Regime. The renowned economist and Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen, viewed ‘…
famines as economic disasters, not as just food crises’.361 That is, a social problem could
always be the outcome of multiple factors working together. The analyst has further
elaborated this issue in Chapter Five.
The above discussion on the APG Mutual Evaluation Report on Bangladesh identifies
some important conflicting situations. Although initially the Government excluded the
ACC from the national AML committees, the AML law subsequently conferred on the
ACC the power to investigate money laundering cases. Then again, despite the fact that
the FIU would require easy access for staff to public databases to assist their analyses,
there were hardly any initiatives to ensure their easy access to such facilities. This
probably indicates that the AML regime of Bangladesh is part of a largely dysfunctional
civil administration system operating (or attempting to operate) under poor political
control. Hence, it is important to look into the nature of the civil and political
administrative system of which the AML regime is a part.
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2.5

Conclusion

Like any international standard of compliance, compliance with global AML standards
may present serious challenges for a nation, especially if it is a developing nation. These
challenges may range from a country’s political dilemma in implementing the global
AML norms to the unavailability of material resources. When explored, several
dimensions of these problems emerged. It is not only a lack of political motivation or a
want of resources but the government decision-making process that has appeared as the
real problem for a developing nation. A long colonial background, autocratic regimes
and certain established cultural norms jointly determine what to expect from a country
when it comes to compliance with international norms.
The global standard setter’s evaluation may provide some understanding about the level
of compliance with certain AML standards of a country, but such evaluation reports are
mostly the result of the mechanical application of a set formula for checking
performance against certain previously agreed terms and conditions, something with
which the country in question is supposed to conform. Findings of such evaluations
could be used to pass judgement about the seriousness of a country’s intention to
honour their international obligations as a state, but this hardly explains why a country
may perform in a certain way, and what is the proper or more plausible explanation of a
probable gap, if any, between the accepted standard and the standard that has been
achieved. At the same time, it is also important to see whether the country under
assessment has taken adequate steps to improve its compliance level and then failed
because of some other reasons. Often criticism about poor performance is fair and
founded on justifiable grounds.
It can be said that a country’s performance in complying with any global norm,
including global AML norms, could be properly explained through its historical and
cultural lenses. Any global standard is ultimately implemented through the bureaucratic
machinery of a country, and the bureaucracy and political machinery in many
developing nations preserve an unwritten rivalry; thus, a nation’s international
obligations may not be properly judged without considering its socio-political
environment. Therefore, it is important to understand this relationship from an historical
and cultural context.
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It is also important to understand that a regime may deliberately design an AML system
so that it would not work as an effective AML system but rather serve their own
purposes, especially when that regime is more inclined to pander to its political clients
(and thus guarantee their continued power) than consider the genuine interests of their
people or international community. For instance, the failure to include offences like
insider trading and market manipulation in the list of predicate offences under the
Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) 2009 despite the central bank’s concern that
these offences were responsible for market volatility in the past (section 2.4.5.3) raised
questions about the scope of the MLPA. Secondly, authorising the ACC as the sole
investing authority of ML related offences when only two out of 22 predicate offences
listed in the MLPA were within their investigative jurisdiction created a major problem.
Section 17 (a) of the Anti Corruption Commission Act 2004 (Bangladesh) clearly limits
the jurisdiction of the ACC to those matters identified in the schedule of offences
included in the Act (section 4.2.1. B). By ensuring that the ACC was the sole
investigator of money laundering offences while investigation of most of these offences
was outside their jurisdiction created a major hiatus in the investigative regime. This
raises questions as to the real intention of successive governments with regard to the
AML regime. Were such ‘errors’ or ‘mistakes’ the result of poor advice, a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the ACC under its
statute or a deliberate and cynical attempt by government to create an investigative
lacuna? While this jurisdiction problem was corrected in the 2012 legislation it was a
problem which should never have existed.
Understanding not only what problems exist with the legislation and administrative
framework but also why those probles exist helps us to explain a country’s gaps in its
level of compliance. It also assists us to formulate the appropriate plan to minimise the
gap between compliance and non-compliance.
In order to study the AML reporting regime of Bangladesh, the analyst chose to apply
the Grounded Theory approach. This approach is useful in generating a grounded theory
that explains the core problem of the persons involved in the substantive area under
study and examine how that problem is continually being managed. The next chapter
presents an overview of the Grounded Theory approach, including what Grounded
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Theory methodology is and why the analyst chose this particular approach for this
study.
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3
3.1

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter describes the research methodology used in order to develop the Grounded
Theory (GT) presented in Chapters Four and Five. It begins with some background
information on the GT method and its principles, and then takes the reader through the
process of theoretical sampling, data collection, analysis and the final emergence of the
theory.
In the beginning, a thorough discussion on the background of Grounded Theory brings
out some popularly debated issues about this method and simultaneously provides
insights into some basic tenets of Grounded Theory. The first part of the discussion is
about the roots of GT methodology and what academics think about it, including the
points on which they agree or disagree. Knowledge of the very roots of this method is
helpful in understanding its nature and principles. The next phase of discussion includes
the ongoing debate between the two co-founders of Grounded Theory — Glaser and
Strauss. This discussion, again, helps the reader to understand the real nature of
classical Grounded Theory, its development, and the divergence that subsequently grew.
Academic arguments between Glaser and Strauss not only resulted in a divergence of
their thoughts on Grounded Theory and their then choosing to write separately, it
successfully attracted many scholars to this discussion which enriched the GT methods
enormously. A number of grounded theorists and critics generously contributed to this
discussion with their scholarly views, which helped new users of Grounded Theory to
understand not only the procedures of its classical method but also the two different
views which the co-founders subsequently developed. This discussion established that
there could be more than one way of generating an inductive Grounded Theory, and that
the choice ultimately rests with the researcher concerned to decide which method to
follow. In this study, the reasons why the analyst chose GT methodology in the first
place, and then the motivation behind selecting one particular style from two established
styles, are set out at the conclusion of this discussion.
Next, the discussion will present the elaborate procedures of classical GT methodology.
This will include the course of theoretical sampling, data collection, and analysis for
generating the particular grounded theory for this study. The process will systematically
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illustrate how sampling, data collection, coding, and analysis ran concurrently, and then
further data was collected from different sources in order to develop the theory as it
emerged.
For this study, the analyst chose a substantive area, which is comparatively new, one
about which relatively very little has been written, and which provides easier access to
data sources than other possible areas. For the theoretical sampling, the analyst
conceptualised the data through constantly comparing incident with incident (to
generate a concept) and then incident to concept for the purpose of coding. Based on the
codes the analyst theoretically sampled subsequent data sources and explored them until
the point of saturation was reached, that is to say, no new properties of the code or
categories were emerging. Constant comparative analysis enhanced the codes initially
by adding more properties and dimensions to them, and then by theoretically linking
them with other categories.362
The initial constant comparative analysis and open coding included any data that the
analyst came across. However, after the initial phase of coding, a core variable (along
with other near core variables) emerged when open coding ceased and selective coding
began, that is, a ‘coding [conducted] ... to delimit coding to only those variables that
relate to the core variable [or category], in sufficiently significant ways to be used in a
parsimonious theory’.363
3.2

Grounded Theory and its Discovery

Founded by Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss in 1967, the Grounded Theory
method (GT) is designed to generate an inductive theory from data through an organised
and comparative procedure.364 With its inherently extremely structured and equally
flexible character, what a GT methodology produces is a set of integrated conceptual
hypotheses about a substantive area which ultimately lead to the generation of the
inductive theory.365 Capable of using any data with any theoretical perspective for

362

See especially Glaser, Emergence vs Forcing, above n 77, 101–2.
Ibid 75.
364
See generally Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies
for Qualitative Research (Aldine Publishing Company, 1967) 1–3.
365
See especially Barney G Glaser and Judith Holton, ‘Remodeling Grounded Theory’ (2007) 19(32)
Historical Social Research, Supplement 47, 48.
363

100

generating a theory, Grounded Theory is a general methodology independent of other
Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) methods. Due to its general nature, Grounded Theory
can easily be used by researchers from any field or department irrespective of the type
of data they are working with.366
Glaser and Strauss stressed that in social research, the generation of a theory from
scientifically collected and analysed data is just as important as the use of various
sociological methods to gather accurate facts for testing an existing hypothesis. They
also said that a grounded theory emerging from data has a broader applicability as it
corresponds to practical situations and is easily comprehensible to both experts and nonexperts.367
3.3

Origin and Divergences

Despite its broad popularity and frequent recognition as the world’s most used
qualitative research method in diverse fields of scholarship,368 substantial disagreements
among the scholars about various aspects of Grounded Theory made it a ‘contested
concept.369 Primarily, the disagreements concern different scholarly viewpoints with
regard to the roots of Grounded Theory and then much of the debate centred on the
accurate application of the various procedures of GT methodology used to generate
inductive theory. This part of the ongoing debate attracted scholarly contributions from
the opposing scholastic views of Glaser and Strauss as a split occurred between them
after they began writing separately on Grounded Theory.
3.3.1

Roots of Grounded Theory

The concept of ‘ontology’ refers to ‘the science or study of being’ and ‘from a social
sciences’ point of view’, as Blaikie describes it, this also includes an assertion regarding
what exists, its nature, the social elements of which it is composed, and their ways of
366
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interacting. That is to say, ontology explains our observations of the nature and structure
of reality.370 Here, knowing something ‘exists’ logically leads us to a related concept of
epistemology, which is concerned with how we may go about inquiring into the nature
of reality.371
‘Epistemology’ is ‘the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge’ that
deals with some claims with regard to procedures that researchers may use to discover
some reality they believe can be known.372 The procedure may include identifying such
elements that distinguishes knowledge from mere belief, that is to say, identifying the
essential conditions that knowledge must fulfil, and identify a hypothesis about the
methodology one can use to gain such knowledge about reality.373 In brief, as Hatch and
Cunliffe put it, it is all about ‘knowing how you can know’.374
Grounded Theory (GT) has been influenced by both the interactionist approach and the
constructivist inquiry approach developed by Herbert Blumer, who coined the term
‘symbolic interactionism’ (SI).375 He argued against the acceptance of natural science as
a model for sociological research, that is, he opposed relying only on experimental
forms of inquiry, which concern quantifying, for instance, measuring, weighing or
assessing of factors. He contested the concept that the quantitative method could
address the complexity of human action properly, because, people ‘live in a meaningful
social world’.376 Blumer ‘stressed the role of concepts that are sensitising rather than
definitive, that gain their utility and significance from patterned relationships rather than
quantifiable correlations’.377
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Often scholars assume that there is a natural correlation between Symbolic
Interactionism and Grounded Theory. Blumer posited that symbolic interactionism rests
on three simple premises. First, human beings act toward things based on the meanings
that the things have for them. Secondly, the meaning of such things is derived from the
social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. Third, these meanings are handled in
and modified through an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the
things s/he encounters.378 Therefore, Symbolic Interactionism ‘views meanings as
arising in the process of interaction between people’.379 From this view point, some
scholars have stressed that ‘[f]or both symbolic interactionism and grounded theory, the
researcher and research participants are assumed to be interactively linked in a mutual
relationship in the natural field to investigate their behavior’.380
The co-founder of classical Grounded Theory, Barney G Glaser, however, countered
this assertion381 and said that Grounded Theory ‘is not underlined by symbolic
interaction, nor constructed data. GT uses “all as data,” of which these are just one kind
of data’.382 He argued that much Grounded Theory to date, in nursing and management,
seemed to use qualitative data, which tended to be SI oriented.383 A further description
on interactional research area involving human group life and its relationship with GT
has been presented in Appendix D (Roots of Grounded Theory).

3.3.2

Divergences between Glaser and Strauss

A researcher using Grounded Theory for the first time may easily become confused
regarding the differences that exist between the diverse styles adopted by its cofounders. After the initial joint work of Glaser and Strauss in 1967, significant
disagreement grew between them on the methods of achieving a grounded theory. The
disagreement became obvious when Strauss separated from Glaser and published
378
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Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists in 1987 and Basics of Qualitative Research
with Juliet Corbin in 1990. Glaser, however, ‘remained true to his commitment’.384
From the subsequent publications of Glaser and Strauss, it is apparent that most of their
disagreements focused on the method of data analysis385 that ultimately leads to the
emergence of categories, the core category, and the theory.
In 1990, Strauss with co-author Corbin came up with a rather user-friendly version of
the GT method for novice researchers which Glaser branded as ‘no longer grounded
theory’ or just ‘conceptual description’,386 and Keddy, Sims and Stern observed that it
introduced a rigidity that was not intended in the original Grounded Theory.
Consequently, they continued, researchers often produce theories, which are premature
and thin.387 Glaser, however, remained committed to his original thoughts and ideas and
wrote extensively to explain some of the basic concepts involved in the original version
of Grounded Theory, for example, memos, coding and theoretical sampling.388
’However’, as Heath and Cowley have observed, ‘it is methodological rather than
ontological and epistemological aspects that have been cited as the main source of
divergence’.389
3.4

The Study

GT researchers ‘seek to understand a situation from the subject’s own frame of
reference’.390 The purpose of this study is to understand the AML professionals’ 391
perception and their experience of information collection for the AML reporting regime
in Bangladesh, the issues that affect their collection procedure, and how they process
those issues in everyday life.
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3.5

Use of GT Methodology

After choosing a substantive area for this research (as elaborated in 1.5.1), the analyst
searched relevant literature for a considerable period and discovered that only a very
limited amount of partially relevant literature was available, none of which clearly
indicated any core issues of current concern with the AML reporting system of
Bangladesh. The analyst also reviewed some international policy documents, for
instance, the general evaluation reports produced on the AML regime of Bangladesh392
(as elaborated in Chapter Two and Chapter Five). Produced by international policy
makers, those reports are merely a range of unfocused superficial appraisals with regard
to what is happening in the AML regime, what is ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ with the AML
reporting system, and what may be done to improve it. Apparently there is a serious
dearth of acceptable general theories or specific hypotheses on any particular relevant
issue. As the investigation continued, it was apparent that the real nature of the problem
of the substantive area could be far different from that which appeared in the available
literature (as detailed in 1.5.2).
In view of this, the analyst chose GT methodology because ‘like most forms of
qualitative research, grounded theory makes its greatest contribution in the areas in
which little research has been done’.393 A definition of what actually is meant by an area
‘in which little research has been done’ could be borrowed from Stern (1980), who
stated that either there is no theory, which means a serious vacuum of variables, or there
are theories but the analysts have attempted to investigate such a ‘complex area of
behavioral problems where salient variables have not been identified’.394
Besides, as Holloway and Todres note, Grounded Theory is useful in investigating
human actions and interactions.395 It emphasises people’s patterns of behaviour, which
indicate a social process which revolves around something ‘relevant and problematic for
392
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those involved’,396 and this method is ‘particularly helpful when investigating social
problems or situations to which people must adapt’.397 Bangladesh has no other option
that to meet the strict global AML compliance requirements and face their obvious
implementation challenges. Therefore, their AML professionals must resort to some
‘improvised’ techniques to overcome the challenges they face working as part of the
AML regime (which will be elaborated upon in Chapter Four).
The GT method was a good fit for this study, which examined how AML professionals
deal with their information providers, the processes they use to deal with this situation
and their social interaction with other information sources, for instance, public agencies.
This study also examined the perceptions of the AML professional with regard to their
‘social world’ inside and outside the virtual AML reporting system, which is comprised
of the reporting entities, the Financial Intelligence Unit and the AML law enforcing
agency (the Anti Corruption Commission of Bangladesh).
3.5.1

Choice between Glaser and Strauss

The natural connection between money laundering and illicit profits has made the global
AML regime one of the top areas of scholarly investigation today, and, as expected,
there is an abundance of relevant literature. Yet, jurisdiction specific research on AML
matters appeared to have received less attention, as many of the great scholarly works in
this area have shown a greater inclination toward addressing the generic AML issues
raised by the global policy documents. While this inclination often fails to focus on the
jurisdiction specific AML problems, there is no doubt that it forms the basis of any
scholarly discussions on the global AML initiatives. Furthermore, in the area of AML
research these generic discussions can be an effective means of identifying such
common AML issues, which may remain undetected through a focused study on any
particular jurisdiction.
The contrary is also true. Many of the ML related concepts are actually context specific;
for example, some economies rely more on cash transaction than do others. Naturally,
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some jurisdictions may face AML challenges which are so unique in character
(requiring equally distinctive responses) that they may remain hidden unless there is a
context specific investigation. After an initial survey of the literature, the analyst found
that the AML regime of Bangladesh is one such area, namely one that has not
undergone thorough and independent scholarly research.
Almost of all the AML issues that Bangladesh faces today have been identified by the
relevant global standard setting entities during their evaluation or subsequent follow-up
visits. The Mutual Evaluation Report (referred to earlier) was general in nature, in that
while it superficially touched upon many problems, it did not make a thorough analysis
of any particular one. Besides, hardly any academic publications categorically focused
on any of the specific issues identified by the Report. In order to fill the vacuum, the
analyst attempted to study this substantive area and discover what specific issues this
particular jurisdiction was concerned about at the time of this investigation. With the
aim of accomplishing this task, the analyst chose a GT methodology and employed the
advantages that this particular methodology offers to those who wish to investigate new
areas of research (as described above).
For this research the analyst chose Glaser’s classic GT methodology. The rationale for
this decision was based on the following criteria:
Classic (Glaser) Grounded Theory requires researchers to begin investigation without a
predefined theoretical framework — gaps or hypothesis — which is generally created
based on variables identified through an extensive literature review. As far as the
current substantive area of research is concerned, it involves a situation where there is a
dearth of specific literature on Bangladesh’s AML regime on one hand and an
abundance of relevant literature on general AML issues on the other. As emphasised by
Strauss398 this latter abundance might pose a problem in that it might ‘contaminate…,
inhibit, stifle or otherwise impede the [analyst’s] effort to generate’ 399 an inductive
theory if the study began with an extensive literature review on a substantive area. This
is because ‘[i]t is hard enough to generate one’s own concepts, without the added
burden of contending with the “rich” derailments provided by the related literature in
398
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the form of conscious or unrecognized assumptions of what ought to be found in the
data’.400 Therefore, the analyst chose to adopt the classic Grounded Theory
methodology of Glaser so that his mind would remain open and prepared for generating
an inductive theory from the collected data that ‘fit the realities under study’.401
3.6

Recruitment, Sampling and Logic of Ongoing Inclusion

The following sections will provide an overview of the methods the analyst adopted for
the recruitment of participants, a discussion on the sampling process and the process of
the ongoing inclusion that continued throughout the course of data collection and the
process of conceptualisation.

3.6.1

Recruitment

The analyst identified the participants with the assistance of management and officials
of the organisations concerned. These organisations received letters with detailed
information with regard to the purpose of this research, the interviewee selection
criteria, the research ethics adopted, and the treatment of confidentiality issues. After
obtaining written approval from the authorities concerned, the analyst circulated
Participant Information Sheets, Consent Forms and his contact details among potential
participants, with a request that such persons contact the researcher if they were
interested. The analyst recruited only those who volunteered to provide information.
3.6.2

Sampling

Initially the analyst approached a small group of AML professionals for interviews.
After that, the analyst used a constant comparisons method to continue data collection
from each source of information until a category was saturated.402 When the research to
discover a theory is in progress, the exact number of participants and their type will
remain unknown until the research ends,403 because ‘the actual number and type of
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sample depend[s] on the point at which theoretical saturation occur[s]’.404 That is to say,
the analyst interviewed new groups of participants for specific information based on
what the previous groups provided, and continued exploring a source until the data
subject stopped providing information on any new category or on properties to existing
categories.
The application of grounded theory usually takes place in an environment where there
are large numbers of potential participants, for example in a health care system or even
a large corporation. This means that the size of the eventual participant sample is
unknown at the outset.
In the case of the AML system in Bangladesh there was an important factor which
limited the potential size of the participant group. While the designated AML officers
often had had no special skill sets or training and were chosen in many cases without
any AML related selection criteria (a serious flaw in the whole AML system which may
well have been intended in some institutions to ensure problems were not discovered)
the number of such staff across the AML system was still relatively small.
During the fieldwork, as mentioned earlier (recruitment), participants were contacted
through their respective managements. Only a certain group of officials who were
allowed by their respective authorities attended the briefing session in order to collect
the Participant Information Sheets and the Consent Forms. Among them only a limited
number of AML professionals (directly involved in AML related issues) and other
officials (who had somewhat indirect involvement in AML issues, for instance, one FIU
official responsible for international correspondence and an ACC officer who acted as
the coordinator between FIU and the ACC, see section 3.7.3, Profile of the Participants)
finally contacted the analyst and participated in the interviews.
3.6.3

Logic of Ongoing Inclusion

During the inclusion of participants, the analyst guided his focus on groups or
individuals based on a simple point, the purpose of the research, that is, the generation
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of a theory based on collected data. In doing so, the analyst must identify a core
category and as many properties of such a category as possible. The analyst, thus, must
concentrate on the data and its continuing conceptualisation in order to discover a
uniformity, a situation where the data is able to fit into or create some pattern.
Accordingly, the selection of interviewees based on comparable variables was not the
leading motivation for the analyst. In The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Glaser and
Strauss wrote:
Our logic of ongoing inclusion of groups must be differentiated from the logic used
in comparative analyses that are focused mainly on accurate evidence for
description and verification. That logic, one of pre-planned inclusion and
exclusion, warns the analyst away from comparing “non-comparable” groups. To
be included in the planned set, a group must have ‘enough features in common’
with the other groups. To be excluded, it must show a “fundamental difference”
from the others.405

Now the question is, how rational would it be to rely on such a ‘purified group’ and
deem that inauthentic factors will not taint the research outcome? Glaser and Strauss
warned that in order to qualify and disqualify a group, researchers (who are not trying
GT methodology) actually attempt to hold a few ‘strategic factor[s]’ constant and then
qualify or disqualify groups depending on these factors’ presence or absence. 406
However, they reminded readers that ‘[t]his effort of purification is made for a result
impossible to achieve, since one never really knows what has and has not been held
constant’.407
For instance, during the field research the analyst found that reporting entities did not
establish a specific skill-set or terms of references for the position when recruiting AML
compliance officers. Rather, they randomly chose them from existing staff members and
assigned them with AML related tasks. Sometimes a person in charge of a branch
(manager) who was already in charge of general banking acted as an AML compliance
officer in addition to his regular office duties. Frequent staff movement, both
horizontally and vertically, also made is even harder for those part-time compliance
officers to grow professionally towards the required skill-set of an AML compliance
officer. This means that in Bangladesh an AML compliance officer’s position is not as a
405
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member of an established profession whose primary responsibility will be to oversee
and manage AML compliance issues within an organisation. Therefore, it would be an
unsound decision to attribute any criterion on the group as the most ‘sensitive’ to AML
issues, for example, the AML compliance (officers of the REs), and then include only
members of this particular group for interview and data collection. Instead, participants
(although a small number) were recruited also from such groups of officials who did not
have the official designation of AML compliance officer but had adequate knowledge
on the categories and properties to the categories (see section 3.8

Data

Management

and Analysis) the analyst were collecting information on.
Nothing is constant here. Therefore, no potential participants had been ignored only
because they did not have the official designation of an AML compliance officer and
vice versa. Glaser and Strauss further stressed that:
[T]hese rules of comparability are important when accurate evidence is the goal,
but they hinder the generation of theory, in which “non-comparability” is
irrelevant. They prevent the use of a much wider range of groups for developing
properties of categories. Such a range, necessary for the categories’ fullest possible
development, is achieved by comparing any groups, irrespective of differences or
similarities, as long as the data apply to a similar category or property.408

They add that, ‘It is theoretically important to note to what degree the properties of
categories are varied by diverse conditions’.409 For example, properties of the code
‘improvising informal communication’410 in the interactions between reporting entity
officials and their customers in a bank, for instance, can be usefully developed by
making comparisons with the same situation in some public agencies where both FIU
and ACC officials visit and communicate informally to build rapport for the collection
of additional documents on STRs. The similarities and differences in these conditions
can be used to explain the similar and diverse properties of interaction between AML
information collectors and informants.411
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3.7

Data Collection, Recording, and Analysis

The actual fieldwork for data collection, recording, analysis and ‘memoing’ ran
simultaneously, as required by the GT methodology. Yet, for ease in understanding of
the entire process, these are presented as separately as possible.
3.7.1

Collection

Initially, the analyst contacted the participants through their respective management,
met them in person and engaged them in an informed consent session. Later, the
participants who volunteered contacted the analyst by telephone and expressed their
interest in taking part. On the scheduled date, the analyst collected the data using a
combination of both semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Each interview lasted
for about 40 to 80 minutes.
The analyst had always been aware of some inherent limitations of interviewing. For
example, as indicated by Mark Hughes, in an interview the cultural differences between
the interviewer and the interviewee may result in a misinterpretation of data. Often the
interviewer may become overly dependent on a certain group, which has strong
knowledge on any particular issue. This may also lead to bias and wilful dishonesty in
the provision of information. Therefore, the success of the interviews often depends on
the researchers’ personal knowledge about the subject matter, their organised attitude,
and ability to stay away from ‘predispositions’.412 The analyst took the necessary steps
to overcome these limitations using the inbuilt strengths of the interviewing process. In
doing so, he adopted a style, which was an adaptation of some general interview
processes, and that was particularly applicable in the unique cultural context of
Bangladesh.
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Preparation
Introductions
Kane stated that ‘the closer the interviewer is to the respondent in class, sex, age and
interests, the greater chance the interviewer has of being successful’.413 In the
Bangladeshi social context, selection of words, style of talking and body gesture of the
greeting would be significantly different depending on participants’ age, sex, belief, and
also the rank they held in their organisation in particular and in the society in general.
Since the analyst shared the same cultural background as the participants, it was easier
for him to address these issues and help the participants form an impression about the
analyst beyond the impression they had formed during the first meeting at their
respective organisation in a formal environment. This assisted the participants to relax
and feel more confident about sharing what they felt about what was going on in the
substantive area of research.
The analyst prepared separately for each interview. This included collecting some
background information about the person, their profession and the organisation that he
or she was working with, arranging the necessary logistic support for the interview and
always arriving at the venue a little earlier than he had previously agreed and greeted
the participants upon their entrance.. The entire interview process was planned based on
the level of eagerness that a participant had expressed when that person had called to
schedule the interview.
If the participants indicated that the interview was a new experience for them, the
analyst asked them to suggest their own format, if any. 414 As a result, when most of the
respondents gave oral interviews, some of them requested for additional time and
answered a few specific questions in writing.
Actual Holding of the Interview
The language of interview was Bangla, the national language of Bangladesh, with very
frequent uses of English. Howard and Peter suggested that ‘the most important thing a
413
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researcher should remember to do in an interview is to listen. Interviews are primarily a
way to gather information, not a conversational exchange of views’. 415 The analyst
asked a question and then let the participants speak freely without interruption and as
long as s/he was giving relevant information. However, instead of remaining silent or
being too enthusiastic about the responses, the analyst adopted the role of an active
listener, and expressed his interest, attention and agreement through the occasional ‘yes’
or nodding of head and through eye contact.
Ending
In most cases, the analyst developed some kind of rapport with the participants both
before and during the interview in order to make them feel comfortable and provide the
information without any concern for the possibility of any violation of privacy or
confidentiality. Therefore, ending of the interviews was not hasty or formal. In all cases,
the interviews ended with kind of informal greetings and exchange of personal contact
— a common gesture of appreciation in Bangladeshi culture. After that, the analyst
asked if they had anything they wanted to know or any further comment to make.
3.7.2

Literature as Source of Information

Besides the interviews, the analyst used literature as a source of data from the very
beginning of the research. However, considering the main aim of a GT methodology,
which is generation, not verification of theory, the analyst divided the literature review
in two phases postponing the in-depth literature search on substantive area until a theory
began to emerge. As Glaser rightly said, ‘if a grounded theory researcher does a
literature review first, he/she does not really know which literature will fit in the
substantive area. The researcher does not know what he is going to discover’.416 In
Grounded Theory, ‘the literature is discovered just as the theory’.417 Thus, the analyst
delayed the review of most relevant literature until the core category began to be
generated; however, preliminary literature review continued from the onset of the
research.
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Once the decision to apply a GT approach was made (section 1.5.2), the analyst divided
the preliminary literature review into three major areas. In the beginning, the analyst
reviewed literature in the substantive area avoiding extensive search for any particular
topic or problem identified by other research. The idea was to ensure ‘avoidance of preempting, preconceived concepts which may easily detract from the full freedom to
generate concepts that fit and are relevant when initially coding and analyzing the data
as it is collected’.418 Next, the analyst carried out an extensive literature review on GT
methods and read them as ‘manuals’419 to learn more about GT methodology and how to
apply them directly in practical field of research. Subsequently, in order to understand
how to conduct and write a grounded theory, the analyst reviewed a number of model
grounded theories other GT researchers had generated using either the Classical
(Glaser) and Straussian methodology. He read ‘many pieces of the same range of style
so he [understood] the variations of the norms he [would] have to deal with, such as the
ratio of theory to illustrations which varies greatly’.420
Finally, at the stage when the theory appeared to be adequately grounded and a core
variable has emerged, the analyst began to review literature on areas relevant to the core
category and its properties. This way the analyst integrated the literature into the newly
developed theory.421
3.7.3

Profile of the Participants

In the beginning, three Branch Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Officers
(BAMLCOs) of private commercial bank gave interviews. Following the findings from
those interviews, the analyst interviewed another three officers of commercial banks,
including one from a reputable foreign bank operating in Bangladesh. This process
helped identify certain common issues those reporting entities (REs) were facing with
regard to their reporting obligations under the AML regime. For further clarification of
those issues, the analyst approached two Chief Anti Money Laundering Compliance
Officers (CAMLCOs) of private commercial banks and one member from the Financial
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Intelligence Unit. They provided very useful and elaborate information on the categories
identified in the previous interviews.
After that another two Chief Compliance Officers, two FIU officials (one analyst and
one officer responsible for international correspondence) and two AML case
investigators from the Anti Corruption Commission gave interviews. At this stage of
data collection, the core problem and process slowly began to emerge, and information
collection only on those issues became necessary. Accordingly, the analyst interviewed
two CAMLCOs and one AML case investigator of the ACC again. At the final stage,
two AML case investigators, one BAMLCO, one CAMLCO and one FIU analyst
provided information on the core variable. A total number of 23 interviewees gave
interview, among them 14 representatives of the REs, four FIU officials, and five
investigators from the Anti Corruption Commission.
3.8

Data Management and Analysis

Classical Grounded Theory suggests two different types of coding — substantive and
theoretical coding.422 Substantive coding is the initial phase of data analysis, when a
researcher deals with the collected data directly in order to discover categories and
properties of those categories.423 First, open coding helps to produce an ‘emergent set of
categories’ relevant to the substantive area of research by asking simple questions, for
instance, ‘what is this data a study of’,424 and then selective coding (immediately after
open coding) which delimits data collection and coding only to those categories that are
indicative of the core variable.425
The constant comparative method is the fundamental operation of Grounded Theory.
During the initial coding, data is broken up and one incident is compared with another
to find similarities and differences. Once the data is conceptualised, that is, once
concepts are generated, new incidents will be constantly compared with these concepts
to see if they fit a particular context. Constant comparison looks for a pattern in data so
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that similar incidents could be named as a category and differing incidents could be
named as the property of a category. Emerging categories and their properties indicate
toward new incidents that need to be compared and the probable sources of data that
need to be consulted. This leads to theoretical sampling. When ongoing comparisons of
incidents do not give way to any new properties of a category, saturation is achieved.426
This is the time when analysts collect data, analyse, and compare incidents with
categories, which have not reached saturation. The researcher gradually progresses
towards theoretical completeness as more and more categories and their properties
become saturated.427
Theoretical coding is the subsequent phase, when substantive codes are integrated into a
theory,428 in other words, ‘[t]heoretical codes implicitly conceptualize how the
substantive codes will relate to each other as interrelated, multivariate hypotheses ….
They are emergent, and weave the fractured story turned into concepts back to an
organized whole theory’.429 This way Grounded Theory passes through different stages
of conceptualisation, that is to say, data, coding (conceptualisation) of data, and their
integration into a theory.430 Holton described the process as one where ‘[t]he coding of
data in grounded theory occurs in conjunction with analysis through a process of
conceptual memoing, capturing the theorist’s ideation of the emerging theory’.431 The
final stage of the achieving a grounded theory is the sorting of memos and the writing of
the thesis. The writing process is also a part of GT method.
3.8.1

The Coding Process

Travers has noted that, ‘An important principle of GT is that the analyst should use a
codified procedure for analyzing data … which allows readers to understand how the
analyst obtained his theory from the data’.432 Glaser described ‘codes’ as ‘very
important’ in the generation of theory and ideational codes as its ‘building blocks’.433
Coding gives an abstract view of data and thereby frees the researcher from usual
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bondage of the empirical nature of data. It helps researchers explain what is happening
in data as they conceptualise basic patterns of human behaviour.434 In Grounded Theory,
it is important to understand the differences between the various types of coding and to
take the time to engage them in data analysis.

Appendix D provides

further

information about the application of the GT process.
3.8.2

Substantive Coding

Glaser noted that ‘[s]ubstantial codes conceptualize the empirical substance of the area
of research’.435 A theory is actually grounded on data. During the initial phase of
fieldwork, the analyst found all data as a set of descriptive incidents with no underlying
pattern. By using the substantive coding method, incidents described by the participants
or collected through other means were conceptualised, that is, the underlying meaning
of data was discovered.436
3.8.2.1 Emergence of Core Category
The core category emerges through a constant comparison process. As the analyst
continued coding, he remained alert for a core category (variable). Constant comparison
generated a number of codes and their properties but the analyst was watchful as one or
two of them might have the merit of being the ‘core’ concept. This constant alertness
was necessary to identify the ‘main theme’ — the main problem of the research
participants (people of the particular social setting) and also the pattern of behaviour
(that tells what is going on in the substantive area) that is grounded in the data.437 Often
this core variable is a basic social process438 or ‘a typology, a continuum, a range,
dimensions, conditions, consequences, and so forth’.439
Glaser stated that ‘[Grounded Theory] hinges on a core category which accounts for
most of the variation in the problematic pattern’.440 The core category clearly shows its
relevance and importance as it accounts for most of the variations in the social process
434
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that continually resolves the main concerns of the participants. It conceptually explains
the hidden pattern in the behaviour of people.441 Glaser identified certain criteria that the
core category generally has. Some of those criteria are:
(i) the core category relates meaningfully to many other categories and their properties,
and in this way it holds a distinct position among other categories;
(ii) it recurs frequently in the data, indicating a steady pattern; and
(iii)it takes a longer time to reach saturation. Its relevance and explanatory power gets
the researcher through the analytical process in which he is involved.442
For this study, the core variable that emerged was ‘improvising’ informal
communication methods with some closely related near core or sub-categories. While
‘improvising’ accounts for the ‘variation in the problematic behaviour, [it] is also a
dimension of the problem’.443 The officials of the reporting entities, the FIU and the
ACC were found to be using various types of innovative person-to-person
communication techniques in order to get access to information held by different public
agencies and other potential sources that were not under their control.
3.8.2.2 Selective Coding and the Grounded Theory: ‘Improvising’
How will a researcher know the appropriate time to code selectively for a core category
and to cease open coding?444 Glaser answers, ‘[t]o selectively code for a core variable
… means that the [researcher] delimits his coding to only those variables that relate to
the core variable in sufficiently significant ways to be used in a parsimonious theory.’445
Glaser suggested that it is wise to delimit an emerging theory to one core variable and
keep other near core variables in a position subordinate to the core.446
The selection of a core variable leads to setting further limits on the analytical process
of Grounded Theory. Now only the core variable and variables closely connected to the
core will receive all the focus of further data collection. They are the ones that will be
441
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ultimately included in the theory. A core category also delimits analysis by linking its
connection with that particular pattern of behaviour which resolves the problem. 447
Glaser argued that ‘[w]ithout a focus on how the core resolves, solves or processes the
problem, the analysis can drift to accounting for irrelevancies in the pattern, instead of
being forced to integrate around the problematic’.448 Furthermore, another delimiting
function of the core is that researchers are advised to concentrate on only one core at a
time after being confident about its relevance449 to the substantive area of research.
For this research, after choosing ‘improvising’ as the core category which resolves,
solves or processes the main problem of ‘interagency information sharing deficiency’,
other near core categories, for example, ‘collecting crucial information’, ‘being
selective’, and ‘keeping to the code’ were included under it as sub-categories. The core
and all its sub-categories have their own properties that explain what the categories
actually stand for. After this selection, the analyst collected data and coded only for the
relevant core category and its sub-categories where relevant.
As mentioned above, choosing one core category does not mean the researcher will
abandon other sub-categories; they will, however, assume a subservient role in the
theory. Thus, to analyse the basic condition of applying ‘improvisation’ techniques by
the AML professionals for additional data collection from potential sources, the analyst
used categories like ‘collecting crucial information’, and ‘being selective’, although in
other publications these variables are being treated as ‘core’.450
After selective coding, the following core category or main theme of the grounded
theory for this research and related sub-categories emerged:
(i)

Core Category: Improvising (a process of overcoming interagency information
sharing deficiency in an AML regime)

(ii)

Subcategories: ‘Collecting crucial information’, ‘Being selective’ and ‘Keeping to
the code’
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3.8.2.3 Saturation
When to stop collecting data — is an important question in Grounded Theory. In
Theoretical Sensitivity, Glaser warned that ‘[o]ver coding is unnecessary. Too many
codes dilute the impact of core and near core ones, and add only minor variations.’ 451
Therefore, it is important to apply a saturation technique during all phases of data
collection, coding and sampling.
The adoption of the saturation technique prevents the researcher from ‘collecting [the]
same data over and over based on the same questions which ignore the
interchangeability of indices. It keeps data collection to a minimum, instead of allowing
it to pile up too much data’.452 In the Discovery of Grounded Theory, Glaser and Strauss
mentioned that once some incidents have been coded many times for a certain category,
the researcher rapidly understands if similar incidents are going to add anything new. If
a new incident does not reveal any new aspect, then coding and comparison will only
make existing data voluminous and add nothing substantial to the emerging theory. 453
Therefore, the process of constant comparison and the coding of incidents continue
‘until such time as the incorporation of more incidents reveals no new category’.454
For example, after the analyst had established national IDs/ passports/driver’s licence
(government issued credentials) as the basic standard of customer identification
documents accepted by reporting entities, he no longer needed to code incidents
referring to government issued credentials as the basic standard of identification.
However, he encountered a case where government issued credentials did not appear to
be the sole basic standard of ID (a negative case); the case was coded. 455 In this case, a
globally reputable private company issued an employee photo ID that was initially
accepted as a ‘reliable’ identity document by a reporting entity. The reporting entity
argued that globally reputable companies generally recruit employees through a
rigorous screening and reference checking process; therefore, they considered it ‘safe’
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to identify the customer on the basis of the photo ID issued by such a company.
However, the question remains if indeed this was a safe practice.
3.8.3

Memos

In their first publication on Grounded Theory, Glaser and Strauss gave an example of
‘memoing’, which could be helpful in understanding why such a process is necessary,
and when to do it. As they said:
After coding for a category perhaps three or four times, the analyst will find
conflicts in the emphases of his thinking. He will be musing over theoretical
notions and, at the same time, trying to concentrate on his study of the next
incident, to determine the alternate ways by which it should be coded and
compared. At this point, the second rule of constant comparative method is: stop
coding and record a memo on your ideas. This rule is designed to tap the initial
freshness of the analyst’s theoretical notions and to relieve the conflict in his
thoughts.456

In a subsequent publication, Glaser defined memo as ‘the theorizing write-up of ideas
about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding’,457 here, by
‘code’ Glaser indicated ‘substantive codes and their theoretically coded relationships as
they emerge during coding, collecting and analyzing data and during memoing’. 458 In
the language of Strauss and Corbin, memos are ‘types of written records — those that
contain the products of analysis or direction for the analyst. They are meant to be
analytical and conceptual rather than descriptive.’459
The analyst wrote memos and kept records of the analytical process throughout the data
collection and theory development process. In most cases, he penned down memos as
soon as they ocurred to him or immediately after the interview without relying on
memory. Early memos were provisional and lacked consistency and relationship with
other memos;460 however, as the analysis progressed, the analyst realised it was a
learned skill461 and stopped worrying about achieving perfection.462 The analyst
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understood the memoing process as involving ‘analytical conversations with himself
about research data’463 and the recording of early concepts about the emerging theory.
3.8.4

Theoretical Coding

Just like substantive codes, theoretical codes are also emergent. Substantive codes
conceptualise raw data and generate categories while theoretical codes conceptualise
how those categories and their properties could link together into an hypothesis. The
story that is ‘broken’ during the coding process is put together by combining various
elements into a connected whole. Connecting substantive codes without theoretical
codes makes theory unclear and often confusing. The proper use of theoretical codes
adds uniqueness to a theory.464
3.8.5

Memo Sorting and Integration

Glaser noted that:
While ideational memos are the fund of grounded theory, the theoretical sorting of
memos is the key to formulating the theory for presentation to others whether in
words or writings. Sorting is an essential step in the grounded theory process that
cannot be skipped. It begins to put the fractured data back together. It consists of
setting up the memos in a theoretical outline in preparation for the writing stage.465

Memo sorting takes place at the end of fieldwork, when most categories have reached
close to saturation. Since memos are kept throughout the constant comparison process,
researchers find they have a large number of memos at the final stage of this process
that must be sorted and then integrated into a theory. Properly sorted memos produce a
fully integrated, dense theory. Memo sorting provides guidelines with regard to the
writing style of the theory, in that it orders the ideas in a coherent way. This is because
memo sorting is not cataloging data, but it is an organisation of ideas. Hence, unlike
data sorting which could often be assigned to a third party, memo sorting needs to be
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done by the GT researchers themselves because they know their ideas better than
anyone else, and also how those ideas may relate with one another.466
3.8.6

Writing

Writing is also a part of the GT method, that is to say, the researchers must finally
present their theory according to the requirements of their readers. A theory generated
for an article or a monograph would be different in construction of logic and shape,
however, all grounded theories need to follow certain standards to be presented in a
written form.
Grounded Theory does not begin with a problem identified through a literature review;
rather the problem is derived from the core variable of the theory. However, literature is
used subsequently to supplement or form a contrast with the theory so generated. 467 In
GT writing, the authors’ ‘approach to introducing the problem is to use a “funnel down”
from a “nature discussion” to introducing the problem. The general, grounded, most
relevant properties of the core variable are discussed, to give the fullest meaning of its
general nature’.468
Grounded Theory is a study of concept. When it comes to conceptual style, the analyst
tried, as much as possible, to avoid descriptive statements and write conceptually, by
making theoretical statements about the relationship between concepts, rather than
writing descriptive statements about people.469
3.8.7

Data Preparation and Computer Assisted Analysis

For Grounded Theory, Glaser very strongly argued against completely tape recording
and transcribing interviews. He argued that audio recording is costly both in terms of
time and money; and it postpones theoretical sampling and analysis, making it clearly
unsuitable for Grounded Theory and its requisite skill development.470 However, as time
was an important factor (and participants were busy professionals, scattered in different
locations), along with keeping extensive field-notes and memos, the analyst audio
466
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recorded interviews and transcribed them when necessary to add to the credibility of the
data as it allowed the analyst to go back and closely analyse information471 as many
times as he wished. During the interviews, the analyst discovered that putting full
concentration into note taking and conversing only occasionally with the participants
was counterproductive to building rapport. Participants often paused in their speech and
felt inclined to allow time for note taking, which distracted both the interviewer and
interviewee and could repeatedly prolong interview time unnecessarily. In subsequent
interviews, therefore, the analyst supplemented note taking with audio-taping.
Subsequently, the analyst imported all notes and transcripts into NVivo data analysis
software. NVivo is very powerful software that allows the importation of not only texts
in different formats but also audio and video files. It helps the analyst to make better
decisions by assisting in data analysis, displaying connections, ideas and findings with
visualisations (such as word trees, tree maps, connection maps and cluster analysis). In
brief, it is an excellent tool for efficiently managing huge quantities of data stored in
various formats.
3.9

Conclusion

Grounded Theory is a qualitative analysis and not qualitative research, in the sense that
it does not, for instance, do statistical content analysis of interviews or the observation
of data, which in effect is a quantitative analysis of qualitative data. Grounded Theory
focuses on the qualitative analysis of qualitative, and also at times, quantitative data to
produce concepts that are incorporated into hypotheses.472 The qualitative analysis
consists of three major components:
(1) data collection, which soon becomes intricately involved in (2) the methods
analysis, that soon generate the concepts, hypothesis and their integration which
result in the production of (3) written and verbal presentations. Number (3) takes
various forms depending on the audience….

From the time when grounded theory research begins, it follows an organised and
inductive procedure of data collection and analysis. Grounded Theory is open to
emergence and that is why researchers are required to enter the substantive area without
471
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a problem already known or framed. They do not need to force the data to fit into an
already known hypothesis for verification. A Grounded Theorist is free from this
burden; however, once the theory has emerged he can compare his theory with other
theories and suggest corrections or synthesis.473
The theory generated in this study is the outcome of the research on a particular
substantive area; however, it also has a general applicability in other substantive areas.
In reality, ‘improvisation’ is necessary in many professional activities in order to meet
the growing demands of risk management or for creativity. Also, it would not be too
incorrect to claim that in reality, developing countries may often need to ‘improvise’
implementation techniques when it comes to complying with certain international
standards, for example, international standards relating to labour, environmental
management, medicine, drug use, and the like — for which they are not fully prepared.
The next chapter, Chapter Four, will present the Grounded Theory — ‘improvising’,
which was generated by applying the methodology described in this current chapter.
Chapter Four describes how the AML professionals of Bangladesh (a low capacity
country) applied various improvised techniques to handle the problem of ‘interagency
information sharing deficiency’, an enduring problem, when premeditated and usual
methods would remain ineffective.
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4

IMPROVISING: A PROCESS OF OVERCOMING INTERAGENCY
INFORMATION SHARING DEFICIENCY IN AN AML REGIME

4.1

Introduction

This chapter is the written presentation of the grounded theory ‘improvising’ which the
analyst generated using GT methodology in the substantive area of the Anti Money
Laundering (AML) reporting system in Bangladesh. Subsequent sections of this chapter
are designed to present the main problem the (core concern) of the people in the
substantive area and how they continually resolved that issue (the core process). What
may further be noted here is that the theory is principally based on empirical data
(collected during fieldwork) supported by relevant literature where appropriate. Except
for some ‘time neutral’ expressions, which are presented in present tense, the rest of the
theory is written in the past tense as it concerns the research after it has been conducted.
Besides the lobbying of governments to encourage them to criminalise money
laundering activities, another key objective of the international AML regime is to align
itself with the core concept of the information age by connecting the individuals and
organisations concerned to a culture of easy access to knowledge and the free transfer of
information. The collection of financial transaction related information, processing and
dissemination of financial intelligence for investigating money laundering related
offences is a prime concern of this regime. This emphasis on information sharing has
resulted in the creation of a sort of social ‘information sharing’ network within the
realm of the national jurisdictions. In this study, the analyst refers to this information
exchange as the ‘AML reporting system’, where the Reporting Entities (REs), the
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the law enforcement agencies are its major
components.
The AML reporting system is a process aimed at guiding these components to combine
their diversified efforts to achieve a specialised objective: the control of money
laundering. The components act in their own ways from their own positions in order to
assist this system to work. REs must assemble information about known or suspected
violations of anti money laundering laws from customers’ transaction records, even
from external sources when possible, and send them as reports to a national central
agency, the FIU, for analysis. At the FIU, staff analyse these reports ‘by looking at
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financial transactions involving identified parties, linking that information to other
available information concerning the identified individuals or organisations, interrelationships between them or third parties’474 before forwarding them to the law
enforcement agency. At the final stage, the law enforcement agency also plays their role
by investigating those cases from investigator’s point of view. They gather evidence to
determine if any crime under the specific law has actually been committed, and if so, by
whom? If their investigation indicates that any specific crime has been committed under
the AML legislation, they collect the relevant evidence and take the necessary initiatives
to present a case before the appropriate court of law.
This apparently simple workflow of the AML reporting system components, however,
passes through an intricate interactive process, often with complexities generated by the
bodies’ overlapping relationships with each other. The interactions take place primarily
between the AML reporting system and its external sources of information, and then
among the components of the system themselves, occasioning a specific kind of social
activity that the analyst referred as ‘improvising’.
Primarily, ‘improvising’ is an inventing or coping activity undertaken by an entity in
need of information when dealing with those who are apparently in possession of the
same. If the usual procedures of information collection remain unsuccessful or less
successful in achieving their primary goal, ‘improvising’ could then be used as a
technique to gain some control over the possible consequences of such a failure. The
ultimate goal of improvisation is to manage the challenging circumstances caused by a
deficiency in interagency information sharing. When ‘improvising’ is used as an
information collection technique, it is applied in order to break the practice of
‘traditional action’ with regard to interagency information sharing, that is, the pattern of
behaviour that has always applied in a in a given situation. The use of these techniques
helps the user gain, in most cases temporary, access to such information, which is
normally almost inaccessible.
The analyst will discuss one such information collection process that occurs
simultaneously within the components of the AML reporting system and then between
each of the components and the external entities from which they seek to collect
474
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information. Generally, the relationship between the AML reporting system and its
external sources of information lacks balance. In most cases, the components of the
system do not have any influence over external sources, which are, to be exact, other
public agencies. This general picture, however, appears to change in favour of the AML
reporting system components when they are able to use their ‘improvising’ technique
effectively.475
The analyst collected the information discussed here through extensive fieldwork in
Bangladesh. He chose the substantive area, the AML reporting system of Bangladesh,
because he has a thorough understanding of its cultural environment and easy access to
data sources. Using a constant comparative method (elaborated in Appendix D), the
analyst chose only those relevant incidents that account for the core problem and its
continuing resolutions in the substantive area.
Initially, the analyst will present a description of the conditions that are apparently
responsible for prompting AML professionals to improvise alternative ways of
resolving information sharing deficiencies. Some reasons affect all three components of
the system almost equally while others affect individual component only. Subsequently,
the analyst will describe how the AML professionals applied different improvising
techniques in diverse situations.
4.2

Background and the Core Problem

After having conducted the fieldwork and undertaken the data analysis, the analyst
identified ‘interagency information sharing deficiency’ as the core problem of the AML
Reporting System. When the component entities have to put up with a number of other
issues, for instance, under reporting and ineffective AML policies, this problem has its
own unique consequences on the overall reporting system that always affect the
component entities ability to function properly.
An AML regime requires that a customer, both existing and potential, must be properly
identified before a reporting entity provides any designated services, ongoing or
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occasional.476 When an RE is a financial institution, generally they begin a business
relationship with a customer through the opening of an account for the customer or that
customer’s business. Account opening is a designated service. Therefore, each RE must
identify the customer before providing this service by collecting document-based
information about the customer. This involves, to be precise, collecting the necessary
KYC information and then comparing it against reliable and independent means of
verification.
Under the AML regime, the collection of customer data is an important exercise that
helps the REs meet vital regulatory obligations. This is an ongoing process and the REs
must carry this out in accordance with the specific provisions of the AML legislation in
each jurisdiction. This variation in the requirements exists because every jurisdiction
has its own set of unique money laundering related problems which must be addressed
by the jurisdiction’s AML regime.
In Bangladesh, for instance, AML professionals indicated that obtaining a forged ID,
especially a passport or National ID, and then using it without raising much suspicion is
quite easy. On several occasions, the FIU and ACC officials discovered one person had
used more than one passport issued under different names and to different addresses.
Naturally, the legislation requires AML professionals to become very cautious in
accepting customers for designated services, because while the correct and adequate
information could be useful, incorrect and incomplete information could be equally
useless or even pose a risk. Therefore, the REs must be cautious about what they
collect. This requires the authentication of documents by checking with the appropriate
authorities to be sure that the documents are not forged, distorted or otherwise unfit to
qualify as ‘useful’. The best way of authentication is to get the relevant issuing agencies
to check the documents against their records.
The authentication of public agency issued documents, however, is not easy in
Bangladesh. In order to determine the genuineness of any document the REs’ first point
of reference is the relevant government agency that apparently issued such a document.
Normally REs need to send copies of documents supplied along with a formal letter
476
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requesting that the appropriate authority check and verify the documents’ authenticity.
In most cases, however, such requests are overlooked by the agency that is the subject
of such a request. Even when, on some rare occasions, a request is entertained, the
process is excessively time and effort consuming.
The FIU, on the other hand, notwithstanding the fact that it is a public agency, has no
better access to other public agencies’ information than do the REs. The public agencies
often deny or delay the FIU’s requests for access to their information, which seriously
hampers the FIU’s analysis and timely disposal of cases for further action (elaborated in
section 2.4.5.4). In fact, as indicated by some of the FIU officials, many public agencies
do not even know about the special role of the FIU. They consider the FIU as a part of
the central bank which is busy with routine banking supervisory work, and then treat
their requests accordingly. This identity crisis (which results in a failure to prioritise the
requests for information by the FIU) makes the FIU’s interagency interaction even more
difficult.
The deficiency in interagency information sharing is also a serious issue for the Anti
Corruption Commission (ACC) which acts as the law enforcement agency for the
Bangladesh AML regime. The ACC receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)
from the FIU and although the FIU has analysed the material such an analysis is often
lacking in detail and may be inadequate. The ACC then launches a preliminary inquiry
in order to determine if the case has sufficient weight to merit further investigations. If
they are positive this is so, they will forward it to the next level of investigation. Both
the inquiry and investigation phases are aimed at evidence collection from multiple
sources. The ACC contacts both private and public agencies for this purpose and
unfortunately receives similar treatment to that of the FIU, with some exceptions,
however.
One of the reasons why the ACC sometimes fails to collect information using the
normal accepted formal methods is that some public agencies do not cooperate with its
staff — but for exactly the opposite reason to why they do not respond to the FIU. In
recent years, especially during the military backed Caretaker Government from 2007 to
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2008477 and in the subsequent years, the ACC has grown into a reputable and powerful
organisation in Bangladesh, with commendable success in exposing hidden corruption
cases. For this reason, when the ACC begins an inquiry against any public official, other
officials from same agency or closely related agencies often show a reluctance to
cooperate or they try to skilfully avoid the ACC’s queries. They want to avoid being the
one who ‘blew the whistle’ against their own colleagues. Especially in a jurisdiction
where there is no witness protection legislation, a point that the ACC officials
mentioned frequently, ‘whistle blowing’ can only promise risks not rewards.
4.2.1

Some General Factors Affecting Information Sharing

Given the context, it is important to further explain how the bureaucratic reality in
Bangladesh relates to the AML information deficiencies. The fundamental question here
is whether or not the very nature of Bangladeshi bureaucracy is incompatible with the
basic requirements of an AML reporting system.
As mentioned earlier, corruption is widespread in the public sector of Bangladesh
(section 1.5.1) and also ‘there is a practical nexus between corruption and money
laundering’478 (section 2.4.1) as it is at the heart of most profit driven crimes. Hence, it
is obvious that the bureaucracy will strive to maintain its traditional ‘unaccountable’
and ‘inefficient’ character (section 2.3.1.1) when it comes to promoting a sharing
culture in order to strengthen the AML reporting system. This is, because, sharing
information is often regarded as a vital step towards ensuring transparency in
governance as opposed to cultivating the colonial practice of secrecy.479 While there
could be many reasons, as we will see in the subsequent sections, why a bureaucracy
may appear unwilling to support a sharing culture among the agencies, from the
discussion in Chapter Two, however, it may be said that the excessive control over
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public information by the secrecy loving bureaucrats in Bangladesh (section 2.3.3.1) is
probably indicative of a ‘symbiotic relationship between sin and secrecy’.480
Interagency information sharing deficiency in Bangladesh is a result of the combined
effects of many closely related factors. The presence of these factors (elaborated in
section 2.3.3.1, ‘Control over Information’) accounts for the current state of the nation’s
civil administration system, which has not gone through any major reform since the
country’s independence due to ‘so many priorities at hand’.481
There are some social factors at play, for instance, the absence of a ‘sharing culture’
among public agencies and a long-held bureaucratic stance of the non-elected officials
of public organisations. Often this traditional bureaucracy is criticised for its literal
adherence to the official rules and for persisting with a level of legitimately avoidable
rigidity. Other factors are political and legislative, for instance, the limited power
provided to the ACC to investigate money laundering cases 482 and a range of
organisational barriers. In addition, there are factors related to technological limitations
in communication (elaborated earlier in section 2.4.5.4).
4.2.1(A) Absence of a Sharing ‘Habit’ or Culture
The AML professionals interviewed indicated cultural barriers as one of the core
reasons for the existing information sharing deficiencies in Bangladesh.483 They
mentioned that the experience of AML professionals during information collection from
other public agencies is no way unique. They said that a lack of interagency
collaboration that results in interagency information deficiency is a negative tradition or
habitual practice that also affects other agencies in relatively similar ways. They further
suggested that the current practice of non-cooperation has its origin in the past but that it
is still preserved in the present because historically the political and civil administration
system had been maintained not to serve the needs and aspirations of the people of a
480
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sovereign country but to suit the narrow interest of certain groups in power. 484 This
culture is deeply engraved in the Bangladeshi bureaucracy (elaborated in section 2.3.2).
How a public agency will respond to an information sharing request largely depends on
how other agencies around them traditionally handle similar requests. That is to say,
information sharing interactions are social actions that have a relationship with the
present, past or even future behaviours of others, known or unknown.485 Moreover,
traditional social actions, as theorised by Max Weber, are actions carried out by
tradition,486 which includes habit, that is, a series of steps learned gradually and
sometimes without conscious awareness.487 If we apply this theory in the Bangladeshi
context, we have a reliable explanation for why some things are done in certain ways.
Bangladesh’s colonial heritage still has a strong influence on its political culture and the
bureaucracy (elaborated in section 2.1.2). The colonial power built a strong centralised
bureaucracy in order to rule the empire with officials chosen by them and not by (and
often not even from) the people being governed.488 This very anti-democratic spirit in
civil administration nurtured a model of rigidity, isolation and the practice of unhealthy
internal politics. Here members of the civil services had no accountability to the public
but only to their superiors. Although the British colonial era ended on the Indian
subcontinent in 1947, later Pakistani rule and the subsequent martial law regime
prevented the Bangladeshi people from pursuing democratic practices until the end of
1990 (as detailed in section 2.3.2).
4.2.1(B) Inadequate Political Willingness
As we already mentioned in Chapter Two, the entire AML initiative may be denounced
for not having demonstrated any real willingness to establish a robust reporting regime.
During the interviews, the participants expressed their concerns with regard to some of
the strategic decisions of the Government taken during the last few years. They
mentioned that whilst some of those decisions might have an isolated positive effect on
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specific AML issues, they were not meant to achieve a viable solution to the inefficient
reporting regime in general.
Strategic Dilemma
Through the initial legislation, the Government empowered the Bangladesh Bank (the
nation’s central bank) or any person authorised by the Bangladesh Bank to enquire into
offences committed under the anti money laundering legislation.489 They were
authorised to use the power usually exercised by an Officer-in-Charge of Police in
criminal case investigations. Although the police do not work under the Central Bank’s
jurisdiction, this arrangement neither authorised nor barred the Central Bank from
officially engaging police or the Anti Corruption Commission in money laundering
investigations (through a mutual understanding).490 In 2008, however, the government
promulgated the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance empowering the Anti
Corruption Commission as the sole investigating authority for offences under this
law.491 This created a dilemma, offering two irreconcilable choices to the ACC. The first
option was that they would investigate the cases, which was not always possible
because according to the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004 they were empowered
to investigate only their schedule of offences related to corruption492 and only two of the
22 predicate offences under the AML legislation fulfilled this requirement. The second
choice was to delegate authority to the police if the ACC was unable to investigate, but,
under the Anti Corruption Commission Act 2004, the ACC can delegate investigative
powers only to their own officials, not to the police.493
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4.2.1(C) Organisational Barriers
The FIU indicated that on several occasions it took the initiative to bring other public
agencies under an umbrella of a Memorandum of Understanding so that the FIU’s
information needs would be formally recognised. However, the other agencies did not
show much interest in this regard but verbally assured the FIU that they would
cooperate on case-by-case basis (as elaborated in section 2.4.5.4). From the FIU’s point
of view, signing an MOU would benefit them in at least two ways. First, this would help
them to establish their distinct role in the mind of other public agencies that often
consider the FIU as merely a part of the Central Bank engaged in regular banking
supervision. Secondly, this would widen the FIU’s opportunity to get direct access to
the public agencies concerned. At the time of the interviews, the FIU officials
mentioned that their access to various public and private agencies was limited to
personal contacts that may not be available in case of an emergency. Hence, a formal
liaison officer or a contact point would help them to contact the appropriate authority
directly. They said that at times potential informants did not know if they should share a
particular type of information with external bodies like the FIU, and if so, to what extent
this was permitted. A formal arrangement would ease many of these dilemmas, they
added.
From a social standpoint, however, the FIU and the ACC mentioned that generally they
did not maintain a norm of reciprocity with many of their counterparts in the
government. AML professionals from both of these agencies indicated that their role in
the government was unique in the sense that their main business was to deal with
sensitive classified information, something that they were unable to share with most
other agencies or indeed those agencies just did not need such information at all.
An FIU official mentioned that they had to endure a greater level of demands than many
other public agencies when it came to performing their professional duties, because, as
they said, they were accountable to both the government and the international
community, since every year they must sit with APG personnel to present the country’s
AML initiatives to an international forum. They mentioned that often the international
standard setter stressed the number of STRs and the level of interagency information
sharing practices as important measures of the efficiency of the FIU. Naturally, they had
to increase their demand for information from other agencies over the period, and this
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then resulted in the ACC also having to engage in similar activities. Therefore,
sometimes the FIU and the ACC were viewed as agencies that demanded more than
what they were able to share in return. Therefore, a strong attempt on the part of the FIU
to achieve the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) remained
unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, including the organisational self-interest of other
public agencies.
The AML officials of both the FIU and the ACC stated that sometimes other agencies
cooperated only if they felt that the receiver of assistance would be able to return that
favour in some way. ‘[These] self-interest concerns of individual [organizations] present
another formidable barrier to information sharing. Because the benefits of
organizational cooperation are often indirect and difficult to measure,’494 and often
agencies agreed to cooperate only when they were confident that the cooperation would
be somewhat mutually beneficial.495
For instance, it was sometimes easier for the AML professionals of the FIU and the
ACC to collect information from the tax authority or the Criminal Investigation
Department of Police than other agencies in the government. This was because the close
connection between some serious predicate offences to money laundering often made a
case a matter of common interest for these agencies. If they believed that the problem
would benefit from a mutual solution with the FIU and or the ACC, and they had
enough organisational ability and resources to cooperate with each other,496 a mutual
information sharing partnership worked better.
4.2.1(D) Technological Barriers
Technological barriers were a crucial obstacle for the AML reporting system in
Bangladesh. Save for some isolated initiatives of using information technology for
internal information storage and sharing, the overall system was traditionally and
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continues to be paper-based. Although some of the interviewees noted that there might
have some been an underlying causality between the use of technology and the quality
and number of STRs, most interviewees identified this as a significant problem. They
indicated that the manual methods in document/information processing and
dissemination were two key reasons why some reporting entities, especially those who
extensively use information technology in day-to-day business, found reporting a
difficult task and tried to avoid it whenever possible.
During fieldwork, the analyst found that the entities that were directly connected to the
AML reporting system could be broadly classified into three groups based on the level
of information technology that they used in their day-to-day business. Among these
three groups, locally incorporated foreign or international banks were the heaviest users
of information technology. In addition to having the standard Information Technology
infrastructure for online banking services, they subscribed to international databases of
Politically Exposed Persons and also used computerised information systems
customised for AML compliance. This system helped them undertake automatic
transaction monitoring, and analysis, as well as report generation. Privately owned local
banks ranked second on this ladder as most of them have online central databases of
customer information and transaction history. These reporting entities operated only in
big cities. In contrast, public banks that had the widest banking network across
Bangladesh were mostly paper-based just like the FIU and the ACC.
The FIU staff, however, did not appear to be too judgemental about this huge disparity,
especially, among reporting entities. They said that they were well aware of this issue
but not too concerned about it at that moment. They argued that in the Bangladeshi
context this disparity was an unavoidable reality. In the remote rural areas and small
towns where hundreds of public bank branches operate, these banks mainly dealt with
local services, traders, shop-owners, rural farmers and borrowers from micro-finance
agencies. They permit bank accounts to be opened with as little as ten Takas497 (less
than 15 Australian cents) and provide banking services for a very nominal annual fee.
They were neither willing nor capable of affording costly modern IT based banking
services.
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On the other hand, locally incorporated international financial institutions and most
private financial institutions operated only in big cities and had significant investment in
Information Technology. These financial institutions had two strategic advantages in
business operations: first, the number of customers they served was small, and secondly,
most of their customers were residents or businesses in urban where IT facilities were
easily available. The FIU officials indicated that the disparity between the rural and
urban financial systems was so huge and the respective problems were so unique in
nature that it would take extensive research and planning before upgraded and
customised compliance obligations could be imposed. While the size and frequency of
rural transactions might not pose a real threat to the operation of the AML system, they
did create an obvious gap in the system that could be exploited by those who wanted
their ML activities to remain undetected.
The FIU officials mentioned that they had designed the AML reporting processes to
work in a way that technological under-dependence does not become a barrier. They
said that they had formulated the AML compliance policy for all types of financial
institutions, ranging from those who were providing credit facilities for rural farmers to
those who were serving only corporate clients in metropolitan areas. They did not only
differ in type of services they provided (and their economic values), and the kinds of
customers they handled or distinct organisational goals they pursued, they also differed
in general capacity.
The FIU considered this an important issue while setting the minimum IT requirements
for the REs. The requirements to submit STRs and CTRs were virtually similar. While
the entities lodged completely paper-based STRs, they used the FIU supplied standard
software for automatic CTR generation from daily transactions and wrote them on
compact discs (CDs) before sending them to the FIU on a monthly basis. Those who
needed to enter transaction data manually into the institution’s computer system before
writing them on CDs would require this time. The FIU officials claimed that although it
was always hard to introduce a uniform policy, the existing arrangement was a
functional minimum standard for all. At the time of that the fieldwork and data
collection was undertaken, there was no guidelines of ‘urgent reporting’ for the
reporting entities.
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A group of AML professionals working for privately owned local financial institutions
and the public financial institutions expressed their ‘neutral view’ of technology and
said that it was neither good nor bad for the reporting process. They said that they never
felt that their organisations were facing any compliance problem that could be resolved
by only by the broader application of technology. During conversations, however, some
of the interviewees disclosed that they had never reported a suspicious transaction and
others disclosed that they had reported only a few such transactions. That is, the only
thing they were sending to the FIU on regular basis were CTRs, and those once a
month.
Another group of interviewees who worked for locally incorporated international banks
and the privately owned local banks, however, indicated that paper-based STR filing
was complicated and time consuming. It not only required filling out the paper form
manually, but also required copying a huge volume of papers. They said that this
manually inefficient process had a direct impact on both the number and quality of
STRs submitted. Their argument was that if the quality and number of report had to
improve, the FIU should have taken the initiative to reduce their paperwork by
introducing a secure internet-based system for electronic information exchange.
The FIU’s position in this regard was fairly plain and simple. They said that since the
original source of most of the information was paper-based, the FIU was unable to
collect and analyse it electronically. They held that how the government would view the
idea of digital interaction between entities through e-governance or use information
technology as a tool to achieve better government was a political issue where FIU had
little to contribute. They said that unless there was a digital revolution in the public
service, an isolated effort by the FIU to digitalise the AML reporting system would not
bring much benefit.
Some AML professionals working for the privately owned commercial banks, however,
disagreed. They indicated that this was a ‘chicken and egg’ causality dilemma. They
wanted the FIU to take the first step to break this cycle of manual information
processing. They argued that the reporting entities were already producing machine
readable CTRs using the FIU supplied software. At the same time, if the FIU opened the
gate for online enrolment and submission of transaction reports electronically, many
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would accept this as the preferred method of reporting for businesses, especially those
who already have a competent IT base.
They observed that if the FIU were able to introduce online CTR submission even on a
trial basis, this would allow the businesses to figure out the benefits of online reporting
and encourage more investment in IT infrastructure. This would make it possible for the
STRs to be submitted online in future. The FIU appreciated this view of the reporting
entities and at the same time noted that neither the ACC nor the FIU were ready yet for
such an initiative. Until they gathered more experience and skill as the AML regulator
or investigator, as the case may be, they would not initiate the introduction of
substantial changes in reporting methods. However, the reality is, in order to gather
experience, they first need the reports.
In particular, as some of the AML compliance officers from the locally incorporated
foreign financial institutions indicated, in the AML reporting system of Bangladesh,
under-dependency on technology itself was the first barrier and technological
incompatibility was the second. When prompted, some FIU officials agreed somewhat
with this comment. They said that most reporting entities could not afford a modern
customer monitoring system, and those who could were still unable to procure a system
of equal standard due to their unequal financial capacity. In addition, the FIU did not
have enough expertise to guide reporting entities in this regard.
They further indicated that even if the reporting entities were able to produce and
submit electronic reports that would solve only a small part of the problem. The FIU
itself was not ready to accept such reports because it did not have a functional
information system to handle such an inward dataflow. The only software they had for
STR and CTR analysis was not fully functional, as they did not have enough data to
feed the processor. Besides, none of the public agencies had a modern computer based
information sharing network.
To ensure that the reporting entities would gradually adhere to at least the minimum
standard of online reporting was no simple task, an AML professional from the FIU
noted. He said that although the situation was gradually changing due to the ongoing
anti money laundering awareness building campaign, many agencies and reporting
entities still viewed the FIU only as an extended part of the Central Bank, the regulator
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of banking industry and not as the AML authority for financial institutions in general.
Although the FIU personnel used their inherent connection with the Central Bank as
leverage when dealing with reporting entities, they felt that it was crucial to establish
themselves as an entity which had some unique features and roles and which was
responsible to ‘receive and analyse financial intelligence’.498 It was often hard for the
FIU to impose rules on businesses that were not under their direct authority. The AML
professional from the FIU (above) described this as a general drawback for the AML
reporting system.
The above-mentioned variables were some of the key reasons why the AML
professionals had to improvise different techniques to overcome the interagency
information sharing deficiency. Irrespective of the positions they held in their respective
organisations, all AML professionals played their role as part of a system that
continually collected, processed and disseminated information. In doing so, they
improvised various techniques to build informal relationships with potential informants
and invented alternative collection methods to fulfil their professional obligations.
Subsequent parts of this chapter will provide an account of the process they pursued to
fulfil such obligations.499
4.3

‘Improvising’ — The Process of Overcoming Interagency Information
Sharing Deficiency

As mentioned earlier, the analyst acquired information for this research through
extensive fieldwork conducted over several months in Bangladesh. The primary method
of information collection was the ‘face-to-face’ interview with the AML professionals
concerned who were working in various organisations in Bangladesh (section 3.7.3).
Other sources of information were local and international legislation, rules, reports,
conventions, policy papers and the like that the AML professionals frequently referred
to at the time of interview.
It may be noted that collected information presents only those incidents that the analyst
identified and then conceptualised during data collection and the theoretical sampling
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process. The finding is ‘readily modifiable when new data presents variations’.500 In
addition, the theory presented here does not guarantee that the AML officials were
always successful in resolving their core concerns using improvised techniques. There
might be some other reasons why someone agreed to share information. To be precise,
it is very hard to determine with reasonable proximity to what degree improvising
techniques were successful.501
Interagency information sharing deficiency is a complex social phenomenon that the
analyst observed in the context of the AML regime of Bangladesh. It creates major
compliance challenges for all AML professionals in the reporting system. However,
none of the interviewees who took part in this research could suggest a permanent
solution to this problem. They held that since there was no permanent solution in their
hands, they must continue to resort to situation specific makeshift solutions to mitigate
this challenge in so far as it was possible.
They said that at times even the wittiest application of informal personal
communications would not guarantee the necessary success, that is, reasonable access to
all relevant information that they might need. Naturally, improvised techniques were
also used to prevent the emergence of any uneasy situation that could surface due to the
failure of the collection techniques adtopted. Overall, ‘improvising’ was a combinations
of techniques applied to overcome a situation created by interagency information
sharing deficiency.
In order to overcome the situation, as mentioned above, the AML professionals were
working to accomplish three major tasks simultaneously. They used different sets of
‘improvised’ techniques to accomplish each task. The purpose of ‘collecting crucial
information’ was to gather such vital information they must collect to keep the system
running. Another task was ‘being selective’ about what they disseminated because
disseminating reports with regard to an incident about which they had only a little
background information would put them in an uncomfortable situation when the
recipient would require clarification on issues or demand more links.
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Collecting highly useful information through improvised techniques would require an
enormous amount of luck at times. Naturally, the AML professionals often collected
only the amount of information sufficient to ‘keep to the code’, that is, to ensure that
they had collected at least the minimum amount required to fulfil their legal obligation.
For instance, when it was less risky from both a business and a regulatory perspective,
the AML professionals would collect information as per the minimum standard that was
stated in the rules, being fully aware of the fact that such information might not be of
much practical use. This was a defensive technique from such a point of view.
What may be noted here is that although the techniques described in the subsequent
sections were used by the AML professionals of the REs, the ACC and the FIU in order
to achieve an ultimate common objective, most of their short term goals were, however,
unique to their own particular context. Therefore, the common broader objective of
‘collecting crucial information’ was pursued by the AML professionals through such
techniques as were useful and suitable in their own particular context.
4.4

Collecting Crucial Information

The most important task of the AML professionals was to collect AML related
information from a number of internal and external sources. The information collected
from these sources was crucial for the relevant components of the AML reporting
system. They had to collect this information in order to keep their core business activity
running. They used various improvised techniques in order to collect essential
information. These techniques can be broadly divided into two sub-groups:
‘improvising informal communication’ and ‘devising alternative collection methods’.
Sometimes the AML professionals applied both techniques simultaneously and at times
separately with notable time gaps between incidents depending on the situation.
4.4.1

Improvising Informal Communication

As mentioned earlier (section 2.1.2), the interagency relationships that exist today are
the result of a long bureaucratic tradition of civil administration that requires that
interagency communications use certain official procedures, letter formats, jargon,
language and even a specific mode of delivery. In addition, public officials need to
maintain a very clear and defined official hierarchy for any official communication

144

(section 2.3.1). Sometimes they enjoy a certain level of independence when
communicating within their own department, but they need to be quite formal when
contacting other departments. For instance, the Rules of Business 1996 sets out
(amongst other similar consultation processes) the formal procedures for consultation
between Ministries and Divisions.502 To be precise, the Rules describe the
responsibilities of the various Ministries and Departments of government and the
procedures for discharging such responsibilities. These procedures evolved during the
British colonial period and are still in practice.503
Because of these traditional official procedures, it was often very hard for the AML
professionals to contact the right person easily and as rapidly as may be required. They
were always advised to follow the proper communication channels, which were slow
moving and mostly ineffective. Such channels were particularly unsuitable for the type
of business in which the AML professionals were involved. Owing to this, they often
used several informal communication techniques that enabled them to build an informal
relationship with their counterparts.
For the reporting entities, the most important source of information was their customers.
The better the relationship they maintained with the customers, the higher the chance
was to obtaining additional information about them. An AML professional working for
a reporting entity said that there had been a time when financial service providers could
maintain close social interactions with their customers, which enabled them even to
know many of the customers individually. Although the same practice may still exist in
some small towns, it is rare in big cities where the customer base is comparatively much
greater in number. In the present context of Bangladesh, customers are a privileged
group in a highly competitive market. Financial service providers are independent, and
virtually unbound by the rules of the REs in the way that REs are by the policy of their
regulatory body. Therefore, REs often failed to exercise enough authority over their
customers if they appeared to be uncooperative in providing necessary documents when
they applied for any designated services.
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Accordingly, they had to apply certain informal communication styles to build casual
relationships with many customers. Generally, in the AML context this short-term
relationship was built in order to fulfil a number of specific AML regulatory
requirements. However, reporting entities may cultivate their relationship with
customers for purely business purposes through relationship managers, which was not
part of this study.
Though in most cases RE staff successfully applied their improvising techniques to
individual customers, their efforts were less successful when dealing with organisations.
Beside customers, they had to contact various public agencies in order to collect
information on individual customers and their businesses. For example, they contacted
the photo ID issuing authorities, licensing authorities and different utility service
providers in order to verify certain customer information. Participants from most of the
REs mentioned that they remained unsuccessful in their use of informal communication
techniques with public officials. Therefore, they had to improvise their own techniques
to collect the necessary information.
Adopting informal communication methods was, for the AML professionals in
Bangladesh, the first step toward building a workable informal relationship with
potential sources of information. Instead of directly asking for any assistance, they
emphasised the establishment of friendly relationships with their potential informants
based on trust and cooperation. AML professionals in the REs, the FIU and the ACC
resorted to numerous innovative techniques according to their own capacity and need in
order to establish this communication.
4.4.1(A) Being Inquisitive
In the AML regime, the professionals working for reporting entities had the
responsibility of acting as the initial screening point to ensure they were not allowing
any anonymous account or account with fictitious names to operate. They had to
undertake Customer Due Diligence measures and adequately identify customers as part
of their business and regulatory risk management process. Accepting those customers
who provided insufficient information about themselves and their businesses and those
who provided adequate information using forged or illegally obtained documents were
just as risky. AML professionals, along with other staff-members, have the
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responsibility to oversee the document authentication processes when necessary. In
addition, they had to supervise continuing customer data collection, verification, and
authentication throughout their relationship with customers if regular monitoring
suggested anything unusual.
Customer Acceptance
Generally, the reporting entities collected customer information in two phases. First,
when they accepted a customer through account opening or when they provided
designated services; and secondly, when they detected any significant changes with
regard to the use of existing accounts. Most interviewees working in the financial
institutions said that sometimes customers did not have the necessary documents for the
type of account for which they applied. For instance, a customer may be applying for an
account in the name of his business but he fails to produce copies of a Tax Identification
Certificate or a Trade Licence although his business is already in operation. Although
customers must declare at least one source of income when opening an account,
sometimes they conceal material information about other additional businesses and or
sources of income that might also use the same account.
Whilst customers were gradually becoming aware of their AML obligations, many of
them showed resistance to providing the proper identification documentation and other
relevant information. The AML professionals mentioned that some customers were
unaware of their obligation to provide supporting documents for opening an account.
Many of them were heavily influenced by the concept of traditional trust-based business
relationships with financial institutions. Sometimes the demand for additional
information and supporting documents was viewed by small trade owners as sign that
the financial service provider viewed the trader as ‘untrustworthy’; the traders thus
construed the demand for further documentation as slur on their integrity.
Sometimes financial institutions asked for certified copies of diplomas issued by the
General Education Board as an additional verification measure when they had some
doubt about the authenticity of photo IDs already provided. While many of the
customers cooperated, a large number of them remained uncooperative because either
they had never finished college or they had finished but did not collect the diplomas.
Officials indicated that many customers tried to avoid such requests because the
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collection of diplomas gained at the public examinations involved a long process and
hence many refrained from collecting them at all unless they planned to pursue a tertiary
education.
The AML professionals of the REs predicted several consequences of allowing
customers to open accounts without sufficient documents. They said that such practices
always enhanced the chance of lodging STRs even when no money laundering or
related offences had actually been committed. In the particular context of Bangladesh,
for a range of social and cultural reason, often customers may ignore the probable
consequences of using their account in a way unfamiliar to the service provider. For
instance, a customer may allow his friends and relatives to use his account for large and
frequent cash transactions that have no declaration in his Transaction Profile. He may
also use his account for a business undeclared to the reporting entity. In both instances,
the incidents could result in the lodging of STRs although no case of money laundering
was actually involved.
‘Being inquisitive’ was the most common approach toward a new customer who was
applying to open an account with a financial institution. Some customers who came
unprepared would provide lame excuses and push staff to finish the account opening
procedure quickly so they could then leave. It was often difficult to trace these
customers later and make sure that they updated their file with the missing documents.
When the RE official concerned encountered such a situation, their first task would be
to greet the customer cordially and attract their attention to the requirements detailed on
the account opening form. If the customer appeared uncooperative, the officer
concerned would politely mention that they needed such information to know him well
and to offer better services in the future.
Along with establishing the customer’s ‘true identity’, the key task of the front desk
officer concerned was to collect as much detailed information about the customer and
their business as possible. For instance, if a customer claimed that he was a public
servant yet his declared transaction profile — predicted frequencies of monthly
transactions and their size — was inconsistent with the usual salary of a public servant
of his rank, the officer would request him to provide supplementary documents
justifying those additional earnings. If such documents were not supplied and the
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account holder continued exceeding his transaction profile, this would result in the
filing of an STR.
Often, some of the positions in the bureaucracy generate much a higher annual income
than was gazetted for their level.504 This was often because of the various forms of
illegal activities that some public servants engage themselves in. Some interviewees
indicated that they needed to be very inquisitive about public servants placed in
positions where the chance of illegal earnings was higher (section 2.3.1.2). They said
they interviewed customers and noted such information separately to use it later when
conducting a risk analysis. Although being curious about a customers’ professional
detail was often ‘most unwelcome’ in the Bangladeshi social setting, it was, however,
one of the ‘most important’ issues in the AML context. However, if officials showed
much concern or rigidity about any issues, the customer might just leave and chose
some other service provider. Front desk officials, therefore, had clear instructions that
they might not harass, offend, tip off or put across any sign of suspicion in their
behaviour while inquiring about customers’ business.
Providing financial services to certain small trade owners and employees of private
companies without conducting proper due diligence could be even riskier. During
account opening, such persons may declare that they would use their account for regular
large cash transactions but it was clearly inconsistent with their declared earnings.
When asked, they claimed that the extra money would come from their investments in
the stock market. When prompted, some of them provided copies of Beneficiary
Owners (BO) account certificates as proof of such investments but many failed, saying
they were using friends’ or relatives’ BO accounts with the stock broker. The AML
professionals would rate these customers as high risk and took various initiatives to
discover if their claims were genuine.
Sometimes the reporting entity officials used the disguise of friendly conversation to
hide their probing attitude so that a potential customer did not get offended. To begin a
friendly conversation, they offered assistance to fill out the account opening form, the
KYC form and the Transaction Profile. They asked questions on each information field
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of a form and obtained answers as it was filled it out. They would express their
pretended interest about information so provided, for example, the customer’s
profession and location of work, as well as one or two unrelated slightly personal
questions so that the customer would participate in the conversation.
Once the customer was involved in conversation, the officer would use the occasion of
an answer for asking other related questions. The name and address of a nominee would
naturally lead to further queries regarding their profession and banking information, if
any. However, the officer concerned would not ask for such information so directly.
Instead, they would indicate that they needed the nominee’s information so that they
could offer them new products. This approach often helped the REs to collect the
required KYC information about both the main applicant and the nominee without
offending anyone.
If a ‘friendly conversation’ failed to gather the required information or documents, the
officer concerned would then show a little bit of friendly persistence to remind the
uncooperative customers about the reporting entity’s regulatory obligations to collect
certain customer data. Sometimes they would even mention that Bangladesh Bank
might pay a surprise visit and discover accounts with insufficient information. This
would definitely result in the closure of such an account without notice. This technique
would, however, be used only as last resort when all other attempts at extracting the
required information had failed.
Being inquisitive was useful not only to obtain required information about customers
but also to avoid preventable errors. Some of the AML professionals mentioned that on
several occasions the FIU had warned them about filing STRs without sufficient
internal inquiries having been first conducted. The FIU’s preliminary inquiry revealed
that many of the STRs could be prevented if the AML professionals concerned
interviewed the account holder before reporting. Maybe an unemployed housewife
received several large cash deposits into her savings account in a short period of time
and the financial institution concerned reported it as an STR. However, a simple
interview with the account holder would reveal that she had sold some real estate that
she had inherited from her deceased parents and the sums deposited represented the
monies received from such sales.
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In reality, as claimed by the reporting entities, most of the customers were legitimate
business owners and their reluctance to provide information did not mean that they
wanted to use the account for illegal transactions. Rather, it was more of a cultural issue
that some individuals, small enterprise owners, unregistered commission agents, shop
owners, subcontractors or similar sole business units would run their business in less
formal ways, sometimes even without a trade licence. Although officials of the
reporting entities were well aware of this fact, they must still collect information in
order to fulfil their formal obligations often in informal ways, without losing a
customer.
4.4.1(B) Conversing Casually
After a customer has been accepted for receipt of designated services, the reporting
entities had to maintain Ongoing Customer Due Diligence (OCDD) in order to ensure
that the customer was not using his account in a way which was inconsistent with the
patterns of transactions that could be reasonably anticipated for such an account.505 This
would require the reporting entity to remain observant about customers and update their
records with current information as it became available. The ultimate purpose of this
exercise was to remain aware of the level of risk that the customer might be posing to
the reporting entity. Any customer accepted and rated as low risk might become high
risk at a subsequent stage or vice versa. It was the responsibility of the reporting entity
concerned to revise their risk assessment and deterrence measures from time to time.
Reporting entities often detected unusual activities during Ongoing Customer Due
Diligence. Most participants from reporting entities indicated that the transaction profile
of a customer was the primary basis for separating unusual transactions from normal
ones. If a customer were found to have exceeded his declared transaction profile, the
matter would be noted as ‘unusual’. If there were several transactions of a similar kind,
that occurrence would ‘trigger an alarm’ and the account would then be brought under a
regime of continuing monitoring. If the trend continued over a period, the reporting
entities would see it as suspicious and initiate subsequent proceedings.
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As mentioned earlier, the second phase of information collection about a customer
becomes necessary when reporting entities identified any suspicious transactions. The
process of collection included calling the customer over the telephone and requesting a
meeting. Generally, there had to be quite a few telephone calls before a customer finally
appeared. On a few occasions they never did, which was dealt with in different ways.
Upon a customer’s arrival, the case officer or the AML professional concerned warmly
greeted them before beginning the conversation.
Generally, most reporting entities would process a case involving suspicious
transactions with adequate precautions. A hasty move could result in ‘tipping off’ the
customer (and possible offender), which was an offence under the AML legislation; and
similarly, accusing an innocent customer by mistake could result in a loss of business
and reputation. In view of that, once a reporting entity had detected a suspicious
transaction and decided to call the customer in for an interview, the primary goal of the
AML professional concerned would be to build an informal, yet guided, rapport with
the customer in question. The reporting entity personnel would employ this window of a
‘casual relationship’ to explore the suspected transactions.
‘Conversing casually’ was one of the most used improvising techniques used by
reporting entities for information collection when they were dealing with an existing
customer. As mentioned earlier, many customers did not understand why they had to
explain everything related to their business to the financial service provider. Often, as
noted, they remained uncooperative. The reporting entity had to ensure that a capable
officer would handle each case in a covert manner to ensure maximum success. The
conversation would usually begin with a topic that was ostensibly unrelated to the
transactions in question. Usually, it would begin with some praising words about
customer’s business followed by the offer of new products or services. Afterward, the
AML professionals would use situation specific tactics to collect information from the
customer. Some widely used common tactics are presented here.
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Common Tactic in Response to large Deposits: Dealing with ‘Service Holders’506
Reporting entities applied the following tactic to respond to numerous sudden deposits
in a customer’s account from unknown sources. Once the casual conversation began, the
AML officer would raise the issue very politely. If the customer was a service holder,
the officer would inquire if he was selling any real estate, that is, a piece of land or an
apartment. An ‘honest’ customer normally cooperated with direct answers and
subsequently presented the necessary documents for examination. The most common
reasons, as demonstrated time and again by most customers, were: the sale of real
estate, receipt of interest from stocks held or profits from the sale of stocks on the stock
market, as well as allowing a friend or relative to temporarily use the customer’s
account, or borrowing or receiving foreign remittance on behalf of friends or family
living in rural areas where there is no banking services, and the like.
Instead of answering directly, some customers often expressed their reluctance by
asking a question in reply, for example, ‘Why do you want to know?’. In return, the
officer would say that if the customer was selling, then someone was buying the
property, and that party might be interested in the RE’s home loan products. While
observing the customer’s reaction, the officer may candidly add that they were
struggling to achieve the monthly sales target and was wondering if the customer could
help by providing the buyer’s contacts.
On the other hand, some customers would hesitate and try to avoid answering the RE
officer’s initial inquiry as to whether the inflow of capital was from the sale of real
estate and instead respond, for instance, that he had investment in stock market. The
officer then would look very enthusiastic and offer him or her new services related to
investment in stock market. If a customer showed any interest to such offer, the officer
concerned would view it as ‘positive gesture’, and then request him to provide copies of
his BO account certificates. The officer would stress that the RE required those
certificates in order to be able to design and offer the products or service which would
be the most appropriate for the customer. However, often customers said that they did
not have any BO account of their own but rather that they were investing through the
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accounts of their friends or relatives. In such a case, the officers would then request the
customer to provide copies of the BO account certificates along with copies of the
investment agreements between the customer and his friends or relatives, as the case
may be.
A difficult customer would still try to avoid production of such documents and insist
that there were no written agreements at all. At this stage, the officer would politely
remind the customer that he (the officer) had some obligations under the company
policy to update the customer’s file with the necessary documents. Later, the AML
officer would record in writing the outcome of this ‘casual conversation’ with the
customer and determine the subsequent course of action.
Common Tactic in Response to Large Deposits: Dealing with Businesspeople
When the suspected customer was a businessperson, the casual conversation started in a
rather more direct way. This was because the large cash transactions of a certain amount
and frequency were not very unusual on accounts held by this particular group of
customers. Generally, the AML officer would politely mention that they were happy to
see that the customer’s business was running well. They would congratulate the
customer, and refer to the recent high volume transactions and eagerly inquire if he had
opened a new business or expanded the existing one. Irrespective of how the customer
reacted to such an assertion, the AML officer would immediately make a brief oral
presentation of the new products customised for the customer.
An AML professional working for an RE said:
If there are a lot of [large] deposits, we ask the customer, please tell [us] if you
have opened new business units, [if yes], then where? If he is a good/legitimate
customer, he would say, oh, yes, I have opened a new chain store …, why don’t
you drop in some day. It happens sometimes.507

While a ‘legitimate’508 business owner would give simple answers and even invite, in
some cases, the officer to visit their new business, the AML professional in this
particular instance held that a businessperson whose intention was to avoid providing
507
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further information would behave differently. They would attempt to establish the
transactions as normal business practice and try to leave as soon as possible to avoid
further discussion. At this stage, the AML officer’s task would be to offer him tea or
coffee and ask if the customer was unhappy with the new products or services they
offered and if yes, why.
If the customer stated, for instance, that they thought the new offers were good and
would think about the proposal and contact the officer concerned later, then the officer
would request a date and time to contact him again. If the customer hesitated, the officer
would make a final request for information with regard to his sources of money. This
time the officer would say that the RE needed such information to understand the nature
of the business that the customer was involved in so that they could develop new
products and services to meet the customer’s changing business needs. If all efforts
failed and customer avoided all attempts to give any satisfactory answer to the reporting
entity’s queries, the matter would be noted for further action.
Here an important point that came out of the above quotation was that sometimes the
AML professionals working for the REs became judgemental and labelled the
customers as ‘good’ or ‘legitimate’ (or the opposite, for example, ‘dishonest’). This
mind-set probably developed from the assumption that the AML compliance officers
may assume the role of an assistant to the law enforcement agency, which, in fact, was a
sign of an unclear or even a wrong understanding of the role that they are supposed to
perform.
Precaution in Dealing with Customers
Some of the AML professionals working with privately owned local financial
institutions mentioned that their managements strongly advised staff not to jump to a
conclusion but arrive at it more slowly with due deliberation after they had carefully
examined all suspicious issues and became confident that the alleged transactions were
probably ‘linked with … illegal activity’. They were warned not to misinterpret the
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careless attitude of uneducated509 customers as ‘suspicious’ and file an STR when
reasonable patience could reveal the ‘truth’ of the matter. One interviewee noted:
Yes, we have some guidelines, for instance, when you see that [a customer] looks
hesitant or, you know, [like] a thief … if the Police suspects someone [is a] thief
and [question] him, his facial expression will change [during questioning] and you
can see changes in his gesture and he will appear as if he is “caught red-handed”.
We don’t question [in] exactly the same way, but when we ask [a suspect
customer]. ‘What is the name of your shop? Are you the owner or the manager?
Please tell us your address so that we can … you see, at this stage the customer
appears a little hesitant and we assume that there might be something
suspicious…510

Once again, an AML professional’s misconception about their role is evident. This
misconception might have its root in the very instructions that streamed down (direct or
perceived) to them from their respective managements to look for a ‘link with any
illegal activity’ when an unusual incident took place. This group of AML professionals
— who actually compare their role with that of the police — might feel more dutybound to improvise information collection techniques, go deeper into the problem, set a
target which is fairly impossible to achieve, fail, and close the file without reporting.
Participants who were working for locally incorporated foreign financial institutions,
however, mentioned that their management had hardly objected over-reporting from
branch level to central compliance unit. They said that their reporting was more frequent
than most other reporting entities because they had to follow the reporting guidelines set
out by their Group along with the compliance standard of the local FIU. For example,
when calculating threshold amount for Cash Transaction Reporting (CTR) they not only
considered single transactions of a certain amount or above that limit511 but also
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considered combined figure of a series of smaller transactions, both deposits and
withdrawals, on any account within a specified period of time.
One participant from a public financial institution and two participants from local
private financial institutions mentioned that until the end of 2005 they lodged many
STRs mainly based on CTRs. Later, the central bank circulated an official notification
advising reporting entities not to suspect transactions only because they exceeded
threshold amount.512 In contrast, some reporting entities that had never submitted an
STR because they thought that submitting only the CTRs was enough, were reminded
by the central bank that they must continue both types of reporting simultaneously. 513
Hence, the officer concerned continued conversing with customers until they arrived at
the conclusions that either the suspicion was actual or it just appeared suspicious due to
an unrevised transaction profile, for example, undeclared businesses (undeclared to
financial service provider or appropriate government authority — for instance, the tax
authority —or to both). If they were reasonably certain about any probable suspicious
transaction, this would normally make their task easier. They could quickly report the
incident to the central compliance unit and end the preliminary inquiry phase right
away. In other cases, especially when the case involved businesspeople who ran cashbased514 trades and had a limited knowledge of modern banking rules, the reporting
entities had to be very patient and continue conversing until the ‘real nature’ of the
problem came out. An interviewee pointed out that occasionally money launderers used
their friends’ bank accounts, especially of those who ran cash-based small and medium
size trade enterprises. The actual operator of the accounts might not have any
knowledge that their so-called friends were misusing their accounts. Therefore,
sometimes even multiple sessions of interviews with the same customer were necessary
to reach a conclusion.
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Example
A reporting entity officer provided an example from their experience on how an
incident of negligence on their behalf resulted in an uneasy situation. In that particular
incident, an STR was filed against a customer who failed to update his account-opening
file with adequate supporting documents. When a disparity between actual transactions
and the declared transaction profile was noticed, the reporting entity filed an STR
without making any reasonable effort to contact the customer and request an
explanation, if any, from that person. After being questioned by the law enforcement
agency, the customer visited the reporting entity concerned and expressed his deep
frustration because he thought he had been reported as a ‘criminal’.
In a subsequent interview with the RE concerned, the customer denied any connection
with crime and criminal proceeds. He claimed that he was a local agent of a Chinese
trading house although he failed to provide any certificate of registration or
authorisation of any form issued by such foreign company. He then changed his
position and said that he was actually a broker working for that Chinese company, and
received sales commissions in cash from local traders. When further questioned, he was
surprised to learn that even brokers needed a licence to operate. Finally, when he
ultimately failed to provide any government permission to operate a brokerage firm, the
AML compliance officer concluded that the customer was not even a broker in that
sense; rather he was an informal commission agent.
This particular customer actually acted as an intermediary between the foreign company
and its local exporters in exchange of commission paid typically in cash. He had his
own registered shop and a Tax Identification Number (TIN) but at the time that the RE
concerned was investigating his case his (undeclared) income, as a commission agent
was much higher than his (declared) earnings from the shop. Regarding the TIN
certificate, he said that he had obtained the certificate only because most of the other
shop owners in the business centre where his office was located also had TIN. However,
he claimed that he did not know that government permission was required to operate a
brokerage firm.
The RE mentioned that the incident was taken seriously by the FIU who pointed their
finger at the weak KYC system of the reporting entity concerned. They, however,
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defended their position and argued that the said account was opened when Bangladesh
had just entered into an AML regime and the concept of Customer Due Diligence for
AML purposes was still in its infancy. In a subsequent interview an FIU official,
however, stressed that they had given clear instructions on how to apply such measures
to all high-risk customers.
The incident mentioned above was one of several similar incidents that took place at the
initial stage of the AML regime in Bangladesh, which, some of the financial service
providers interpreted rather plainly. As one AML professional of a reporting entity said:
Then quality of our reports is good, because ... I believe ...[a]nything we report, I
mean … we will not report unless we are 100% confirm. We report only when it
appears to us that it is 100% [suspicious].515

Just like being judgemental about the customer and feeling responsible for identifying
any probable connection with illegal activity (as mentioned above), here we see that
some AML professionals were also being too careful and rigid in assessing unusual
transactions. This stance, once again, was based on a somewhat poor understanding of
what ‘suspicious’ actually meant in an AML context. Reporting Entities are supposed to
lodge STRs if they have a ‘reasonable belief’ that a transaction is suspicious, that is, any
unusual transaction not supported by sound evidence to the contrary may lead to an
STR. Here, an attempt to be ‘100% confirm’ only introduces a rigidity that could easily
lead to the problem of under reporting.
Later, a few AML professionals working for privately owned local financial institutions,
however, noted that the retention of a financially solvent customer appeared to be their
management’s unwritten priority. They pointed out that up until that time the FIU had
not imposed sanctions on any financial institution for only accidentally omitting a
reportable incident. Apparently, the managements of their institutions were ready to run
the risk of overlooking some suspicious transactions, an action which may or may not
have future consequences.
A small fraction of the total number of participants working with the reporting entities
indicated that the level of effort in communication and information collection would
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have depended largely on their prediction of probable consequences of omitting to
report a reportable incident because, as they added, there had always been a ‘second
chance’ of detection. They illustrated this by saying that on a few occasions the
reporting entities lodged STRs only after some incidents of financial fraud were made
public by the media, or sometimes after the ACC had contacted the financial institutions
after being tipped of by their own (ACC) secret sources about probable corruption
cases.
Common Tactics in Response to Sudden Withdrawals
Like sudden large deposits from unknown sources, sudden withdrawal of very large
cash or the entire balance from an account was also viewed as suspicious. This
suspicion, however, applied mainly to accounts run in the name of a business or other
entity with legal personality, for instance, NGOs. In recent years, a number of
fraudulent entities had emerged that had targeted people in small towns and rural areas,
promising a quick profit in exchange for small weekly cash subscriptions. They
collected money from thousands of people and then fled with the fund. Some of the
accused persons were arrested and prosecuted after the central bank shut down their
fraudulent activities;516 however, often these businesses later re-emerged under a new
name in a different location.517 Naturally, there was a growing concern about these
issues.
The AML professionals working for the reporting entities had always been extra
cautious about organisations attempting to withdraw every last penny. In fact, they had
both a regulatory and business interest for such preparedness. They used various tactics
to initiate a casual conversation as the first move to learn the probable reason behind
such an order for a withdrawal. Some of the most common tactics were ‘playing the
victim role’ and ‘awaiting method’.
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Playing the Victim Role
This was the first tactic that the AML professionals applied to begin a conversation with
the customer who was suspiciously attempting to withdraw all their money. The officer
concerned would pretend to be surprised and politely ask if the customer had suddenly
experienced any instance of poor customer service that had made him take such a
serious decision. A ‘reasonable’ and ‘honest’ customer would provide a simple and
acceptable answer; for instance, their business had been relocated to a place where the
financial service provider concerned did not have a branch, and so on. In the
Bangladeshi context, this reply could be acceptable since many financial service
providers operate only in the big cities. In addition, the customer’s attitude and style of
query might also suggest their ‘innocence’. For example, before lodging instructions for
such a transaction, many customers would enquire about the process involved in such a
withdrawal and if there was any requirement for giving prior notice, and so forth.
Some customers (who is not ‘honest’), however, would adopt a rather more direct
approach. They would ask the financial service provider about the fastest possible way
to withdraw all their money in cash. In order to make this customer relax and provide
more information about his intention, the officer concerned would ask where he was
taking the money. He would stress on the point that the sudden withdrawal of such a
large amount may raise a question about the performance of their branch and they may
even lose their job, because the incident would definitely disappoint the management.
They would mention that they needed to know the information so that they could offer
some product or services to the other party and bring the deposit back.
The AML professionals said that they tried all these tactics to buy time for internal
consultation and to identify the vulnerabilities of the suspect customers. They
mentioned that such customers generally appeared to be low in confidence. Some of
them would give in to simple unmerited flattery and some would cooperate more when
offered the possibility of an attractive investment offer due to their ‘greediness’ and ask
for more information about it. The relentless application of various behavioural efforts
would often put the customer on the defensive and at some point of the conversation
their behaviour would begin to indicate that something was ‘suspicious’.
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However, many of the suspect customers were rather well prepared to answer questions.
During the initial inquiries by the AML officer, they would ‘put on a brave face’ and
hardly showed any sign of urgency to liquidate the account. They inquired carefully into
the options of withdrawing their money and possible closure of the account. When they
felt the officer was probing, instead of showing impatience they would try to steer the
conversation to slightly different topics. The AML professionals said that they were
advised to assess such customers for a longer time than usual.
Instead of applying positive reinforcement like unmerited flattery or playing a victim
role at the initial stage, they acted rather more formally. That included making simple
queries, like, ‘Sir, you said you wanted to close your account, right?’ and, when the
customer replied, he would be politely put on hold, with the officer saying ‘Sir, please
wait a moment’ and then the officer would serve another customer,518 or pretend to look
for something urgent in the computer or in a file. They would then observe the
customer’s behaviour and simultaneously keep asking relevant questions. However,
gradually they would advise what probable negative consequences might follow if they
lost such a valued customer. Yet, the language or tactic used would depend on the
officer’s initial covert assessment of the customer in question.
Awaiting Method
If ‘playing the victim role’ remained unsuccessful or worked only slowly, the AML
officer would employ the ‘awaiting’ tactic, making the customer comfortable and
‘buying time’. The AML professionals knew from experience that the customer they
were dealing in a situation like this would generally be in a hurry and had less interest in
unrelated discourse. Therefore, the officers had to choose their excuses carefully so as
to keep their real intention hidden from the customer. The most common excuse was to
indicate that the officer who usually handled large cash withdrawal orders was not
available at his desk and then pretend to look for him, and then use the time for weaving
casual conversation. Often they utilised this opportunity to leave the desk for quick
internal consultations or to contact the central compliance unit.
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Proposing the Alternatives
At times, customers remained uncooperative and did not reveal much even after a
reasonably long casual conversation. In such a situation, one common tactic was to
propose an alternative to cash. Generally, officers requested the customer to accept
various bank instruments instead of cash. Where customers requested conversion of
their money into foreign currencies, the officers offered remittance services and the
customer to provide the necessary information about the recipient. In any case,
generally, a customer who was trying to hide something would come up with a number
of excuses as to why they were unable to accept anything other than cash.
The AML professionals suggested that their inquiring attitude and informal chatting
were of great help in knowing their customers better and collecting vital information to
fulfil some of the crucial AML obligations. They said that these practices had always
been a part of their business as they had begun using those tactics in a limited scale long
before there was any AML regime. Under the AML regime, however, they had the
opportunity to apply them extensively. The extensive customer data that they collected
for the AML regulator through this process not only helped them to save their business
from being used as a conduit for criminal gains but also facilitated corporate decision
making with regard to the development of new products and services, as well as
cultivating valuable business and professional relationships.
4.4.1(C) Communicating Informally
The AML professionals working in the FIU also applied similar techniques which were
a little more formal in style than ‘conversing casually’ since in most cases their
counterparts were equally well-placed government officials. Although in most cases the
FIU had easy access to various public agencies, in order to collect sensitive information
about a person or entity they frequently relied on indirect ways. When FIU officials
required some information which was apparently held by a public agency, their first
task would be to identify the particular unit and the appropriate officer within that
agency. They did this with the help of their personal contacts who might or might not be
an official of that public agency. These contacts were relatives, friends, friend’s friends,
former colleagues or just known persons in some other capacity. At times, the
communications progressed in phases, as they had to accept assistance from more than
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one source. Use of such an ‘insider’ or someone closely related to the insider to
establish communication was, however, also a form of Tadbir.519
The FIU officials requested the relevant personal contact to introduce them to the
specific unit or department of the public agency that they were trying to reach. If the
contact had direct access to that agency, they would introduce the FIU officials directly
and request the other party to cooperate. This introduction was generally unofficial and
sometimes less formal depending on how well the contact person was known to the
other party. Sometimes, one source might be good only to identify who the right person
was in a certain public agency and then s/he provided some advice on who the FIU
officials should contact next in order to reach that person. One FIU official mentioned
that on occasion they directly approached the person so identified when no such
‘introducers’ were available.
After the informal introduction, the FIU officials’ job was to continue the informal
communication and maintain a workable relationship. To them, a workable relationship
meant being able to call the person directly over the phone, exchange greetings and end
the conversation in a friendly manner. On rare occasions, they even visited a person
only in order to further cultivate the relationship. One reason behind this was the busy
schedule of both parties, and the other was the FIU officials’ attitude of treating this
relationship like a savings account. The ‘less you use [it], the healthier it remains’,
hypothesised one FIU official. He said that even their casual communications had a
formal dimension due to a number of cultural issues with regard to how junior officers
should deal with their seniors.520 They never asked for personal favours, but only for
professional assistance.
The most common and easiest communication method for the FIU officials was to
contact the other party via telephone. They called the person, exchanged greetings, and
then, depending on how welcoming the other party sounded, the FIU officials would
make a request for a personal meeting. During the meeting, they would reintroduce
themselves by referring to their previous telephone conversation and/or the introducer in
order to open a conversation. After that, they would express their real intention and
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solicit assistance. Generally, their request for a favour regarding the assistance required
was polite, plain and direct.
Two FIU analysts, however, said that their efforts were not always successful in
establishing amity right away. At times, they had to spend some time in cultivating the
relationship, directly or through personal contacts, before making a request for
assistance. If the other party was too busy or just did not want to make friends quickly,
or somehow sensed that the FIU officials were contacting them with a purpose, the
technique worked more slowly. A similar thing happened when FIU officials contacted
them through personal contacts that were not equally known to both sides. All these
pretences were applied due to the absence of a culture of regular interagency
information sharing.521
In response to the scenarios mentioned above, and sometimes as the very first step
toward contacting an agency, the FIU officials tried a blend of both formal and informal
tactics. The purpose of using such methods was to minimise any chance of virtual
refusal, which many busy public officials sometimes expressed in the guise of blunt
reluctance. By using selective inattention and selective attention techniques during
conversation, those public officials would communicate their disinclination to attend to
something not related to their core business.522
First, the FIU officials sent a formal letter to the top officials of a certain agency and
then contacted the agency concerned in an official capacity with the excuse of following
up on the letter. An FIU official argued that, despite the fact that many official request
letters were eventually ignored, nobody ever rejected a written communication upfront
when it was formally addressed to a top authority — not even verbally, let alone in
writing. The officials visited the agency that was the intended subject of their approach
for information with a copy of the letter on which the said agency acknowledged, with
official stamp and reference number, their receipt of the original.
Sometimes, this approach shortened the FIU officials’ access route to an agency by
opening a window of direct communication, which they would be able to use in
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subsequent interactions. They visited the public agency directly, met the intended
person with ease and requested the required information. Even though they carried a
copy of the official acknowledgement of receipt of their original letter to that agency’s
top authority, they hardly showed it to the lesser official but only politely referred to it
in a casual fashion and inquired if there were any progress regarding their request.
However, this did not take away the stress that someone would go through under normal
circumstances but only lightened it a little bit. They still had to work on the relationship
until the other party appeared to be accommodating.
One FIU official clarified that the application of this tactic did not, in a sense, work all
by itself; sometimes, they applied this tactic not in the beginning, but only after they had
succeeded in establishing a workable informal communication using a certain level of
positive reinforcement. If the initial friendly informal communication worked, the other
party would come forward and advise the FIU officers to employ this tactic. For
example, a junior officer of a public agency agreed to share certain official records with
FIU officials but his inferior rank would not allow him to do so directly and instantly;
however, he was able to advise the requesting party on exactly how the bureaucratic
process worked in their agency. That is, sometimes communication tactics were not
improvised by the official, but suggested by an officer in the target agency. One FIU
official said that often they would be able to get assistance from the same person and
method on a number of similar occasions. This is because, as Weiss observed,
improvisation is often common in public agencies.523
Faced with an event that calls for response, officials use their experience,
judgment, and intuition to fashion the response for the issue at hand. That response
becomes a precedent, and when similar — or not so similar — questions come up,
the response is uncritically repeated.524

The FIU officials used no specific jargon or set expressions as part of their positive
reinforcement, but there was something in common — there had always been a clear
expression of an honest willingness to cooperate if the requested party ever needed the
FIU’s assistance as far as the exchange of information was concerned. If the public
523

Carol H Weiss, ‘Knowledge Creep and Decision Accretion’ (1980) 1(3) Science Communication 381,
401, cited in Karl E Weick, ‘Introductory Essay: Improvisation as a Mindset for Organizational Analysis’
(1998) 9(5) Organization Science 543, 549.
524
Carol H Weiss, ‘Knowledge Creep and Decision Accretion’ (1980) 1(3) Science Communication 381,
401.

166

agency in question was the one dealing with issues closely related to those of the FIU
— for instance, officers managing issues like tax, customs, foreign trades, foreign
currency control and so on — this promise of future cooperation appeared to have
worked better.
It may be noted here once again that these communications were not covert initiatives in
order to gain access to highly classified documents. Generally, the FIU would request
such information that any FIU would require to run their normal business. For example,
the agency in control of the immigration database would be approached in order to track
a reported person’s travel patterns, or the agency responsible for records of the filing of
income tax returns would be approached, or that in control of the passport application
database and the like. The problem was not a lack of understanding or authority on
anyone’s part, but mostly a lack of a good well-established culture of interagency
cooperation.525
4.4.1(D) Using Professional Network
Another common way to identify a potential contact person or to establish informal
communication with some public agencies was to use professional networks. This, once
again, was an informal network. This network developed when the FIU officials met
their counterparts in some professional training situations, seminars, or workshops,
which might or might not be related to anti money laundering issues. During those
sessions, the FIU officials identified potential individuals who might be helpful in
future. If any of them represented a public agency that worked in a field closely related
to the FIU’s interests, the FIU officials would collect their contact details and maintain
communications.
For rapport building, the ACC’s investigators used similar techniques, however, in a
slightly more confident manner. Unlike the FIU, the ACC enjoyed a powerful influence
in society due to their authority to investigate and prosecute corruption cases that
occurred within most of the other agencies. This image sometimes helped investigators
to contact key personnel in other public agencies in ways that were more direct than
could the FIU. They frequently made direct visits to other public agencies during the
525
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preliminary fact finding phase. Nevertheless, they were not fully exempt from the need
to cultivate relationships with others.
As described earlier, historically the Bangladeshi bureaucracy is stained with many
unwanted elements like elitism and conservatism.526 The bureaucrats’ paternalistic
attitude toward the general population, and the inbuilt social dilemma of low trust (in
the authorities),527 create a distance between the bureaucracy and general masses.
Bureaucrats are viewed as privileged and powerful — not only by general masses but
also by the public servants who work in inferior positions. Naturally, some public
agencies, like the police and the ACC who are able to use legitimate force against
disorder often appear as a more powerful authority than many other public agencies.
This may bring both advantages and disadvantages.
During the interviews, the analyst observed that although the ACC’s powerful image in
the society of Bangladesh often helped them to gain easy access to sources of
information, sometimes the same image acted as hindrance. Generally, people working
in various public and private organisations did not volunteer and tip the authorities off
about misdeeds taking place around them. When the ACC approached any such
organisation after being tipped off by secret sources, many of the officials working in
those organisations showed a reluctance to cooperate and remained tight-lipped. This
was because they believed they might end up ruining their friendship with the person
about whom the ACC was enquiring. They just did not want to be the reason for a
criminal case to be filed against their own colleague. It also demonstrates the lower trust
in law enforcement agencies with regard to their ability or willingness to maintain the
privacy of informants.
Unless the evidence suggested someone’s direct connection to an incident, at times it
was very hard for an ACC investigator to convince anyone to reveal information about
an offence. Naturally, in order to gain trust the ACC officials had to maintain a friendly
and informal relationship with potential informants. It was not an easy task, however. In
the absence of a witness protection mechanism, a fact to which all the ACC officials
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who participated in this research referred, it was close to impossible to convince people
to act as whistle blowers.
4.4.2

Devising Alternative Collection Methods

Improving informal communication marched side by side with devising alternative
methods for collecting information. The AML reporting system components — the REs,
the FIU and the ACC — collected their information through various alternative ways in
different stages of the reporting system. Figure 3 shows the interactive information
collection relationship among the components of the AML reporting system and
between the system and their external sources. External sources may range from an
individual customer of the REs to various public agencies.

Figure 3: A Simplified Interactive Information Collection Relationship
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This figure (Figure 3) presents a simplified information collection relationship in the
Bangladeshi AML context as described by the participants in this research. In real life,
this relationship is actually very complex. All three components of the reporting system
collect information from external sources at different stages and share with each other.
For the REs the major source of information is their customers and, on a very limited
occasions, the public agencies. They share this information with the FIU, mostly in the
form of STRs when filing of such reports becomes necessary. The FIU analyses the
STRs and forwards material to the ACC (a partner agency) for further investigation.
Both the FIU and the ACC need to contact each other, their external sources, as well as
the REs in order to complete their respective tasks.
Figure 4 is a very simplified presentation of information flowchat (as described in
FATF 40 Recommendations) of AML reporting system in Bangladesh.

Figure 4: AML Information Flowchart of the AML Reporting System in
Bangladesh
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The AML information flowchat of the AML reporting system in Bangladesh (Figure 4)
indicates that the AML professionals working for the REs are the first to collect and
feed the system with information. Their primary source of information is their
customers and, on rare occasions, some public agencies. In both Step 1 and 2, the REs
need to contact public agencies either to collect or to authenticate already collected
information about their customers.
During the ongoing business relationship with customers if a reporting entity discovered
any unusual and a suspicious transaction on a customer’s account, they would file
reports to the FIU generally in the form of STRs as shown in Step 3. The FIU’s task
would be to analyse the reports and add more value to the information (Step 4). Here the
second level of information collection began and, for this purpose, the FIU had to
access a number of public and private agencies’ databases and collect information to
support their analysis.
After the analysis had been conducted when they were convinced that a report had
enough merit they forwarded it to the ACC with their analysis, as shown in Step 5. In
the ACC, a report had to go through several screening stages before it would be ready
for the prosecution process. This screening and analysis phase required ACC
investigators to contact many external sources in order to collect more information with
regard to the case. This included going back to the REs concerned and the FIU who
were responsible for preliminary data collection, reporting, and analysis.
In every step of data collection as mentioned above, the AML professionals used
various types of techniques. Although the preliminary rapport building communications
were mostly humble and informal, the actual collection method took various forms.
Once they identified a potential source, the AML officials used diverse informal, semiformal or formal methods or a combination of multiple methods in order to collect
information. Subsequent sections describe the most commonly used methods the analyst
identified during interview data analysis.
4.4.2.1 Improvising the Authentication Process
When a customer provided personal and business details on an account opening form,
for instance, they also had to supply supporting documentation. Here, the AML
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professionals’ responsibility was to verify that the information supplied against the
supporting documents and make sure that the information matched the corresponding
documents. This exercise, however, would remain half-done unless they checked the
authenticity of those documents. To do so, the reporting entities applied different
alternative techniques since there was a growing tendency of persons using fake
documents in account opening procedures, but there hardly was any government
initiative to curb this problem.
There were multiple reasons why some people were found to be using forged
documents, including the personal identity card. One key reason behind the use of a
fake national photo ID card was conflicting government policies or inadequate
clarification on how to implement those policies. In 2008, the Government established
the National Identities Registration Authority (NIRA) through the National Identities
Registration Authority (NIRA) Ordinance 2008528 when the Bangladesh Election
Commission (EC) was updating the electoral roll for the upcoming election. Under this
project, millions of voters received a national photo ID which, according to the EC,
would be required to obtain 22 different types of public and private services.529 Sections
13(1) and (2) of the NIRA Ordinance 2008, as well as section 11(1) of the National
Identity Registration Act 2010 (NIR Act), stated that the Government may, by
notification in the official Gazette, introduce a system that requires any citizen in receipt
of any service or civil facility to present their national identity card.530 However,
apparently most of the citizen service providers, including government agencies, like
the Department of Immigration and Passport, as well as most commercial banks ignored
the immediately preceding sub-section 13(3) of NIRA Ordinance 2008 and the second
clause of Section 11(1) NIR Act 2010 where it was stated that no such notification
could be issued until the issuance of a national identify card was generally completed
throughout Bangladesh, and thus, no such requirement for the compulsory production of
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the national photo ID could be imposed on citizens. Many organisations, therefore,
(erroneously) made it compulsory for citizens to present their national photo ID in order
to obtain various citizen services. Later, in 2009 and in 2012 the EC circulated official
notification acknowledging the confusion and advised all service providers not to make
it mandatory to produce a national photo ID since the issuance of such a national
identity card was still incomplete in many parts of the country. 531 In the interim a
number of citizens had obtained a fraudulent national photo ID in order to secure access
to even the most basic of services (and services to which they were otherwise entitled).
Primarily the authentication required for documents related to the identification of the
individual and their business. In the absence of a central database or reliable commercial
identity checking services, the REs needed to contact the public agencies concerned for
authentication of documents ostensibly issued by them. This could either be about
checking photo IDs or the documents directly related to identification, for instance,
proof of address, or both. Almost in all cases, they never received any response and if in
rare cases they did, the subsequent process would be too long and full of bureaucratic
hurdles. Naturally, the REs had to improvise alternative ways of authentication.
Authenticating Identity: Person
When it came to identifying a person, the REs asked the customers to submit the
necessary identity documents along with the account opening form. This might include
a photocopy of a passport, driver’s licence and the national ID issued by the public
agencies concerned. Some of the RE officials mentioned that they used available inhouse knowledge that they had either gathered from years of experience or learned from
senior colleagues in order to authenticate photo IDs. They said that through years of
experience they had learned to identify some unique features of genuine documents. If
such security features were absent from a document, they would know it was fake.
Some reporting entities always asked for more than one photo ID for additional
security. Two were considered good, three or more were better. They matched the
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information on one photo ID with the other and examined whether the information
matched. Next, they matched the information on the photo IDs with other documents
such as a trade licence, Tax Identification Number (TIN) certificate, and sometimes
even with diplomas issued by educational institutions; to be sure there were no
discrepancies.
Officials claimed that if there had been anything suspicious with regard to the identity
of a customer, there was a high chance that it would appear at least on any one of those
identity documents.532 For example, a person finished his high school from his place of
birth and registered him as voter in the same constituency would definitely raise
suspicion about his identity if he held a passport issued by a passport office located in a
district far away from his usual place of residence and business. Comparing one
document with another occasionally helped identify potential gaps in information. The
AML professionals said that they found this method of verification and authentication
useful.
Authenticating Identity: Substantiating Address
The personal identification was not fully complete until the RE concerned had reliable
proof that a customer’s address was genuine and that they could successfully trace him
if needed. Although a small geographic territory, Bangladesh is one of the most densely
populated countries in the world.533 In the urban areas, the population has a very high
density as more and more people rush there for work. Most of these people do not have
permanent accommodation in these cities. They move very frequently from one place to
another, making it difficult at times for service providers to track this highly mobile
customer base.
Another reason why that they found it hard to trace these people was that generally
private accommodation was not rented through leasing agents. Traditionally, in most
cases tenants would rent the property directly from the proprietors through a verbal
contract. The AML officials from the REs mentioned that they often tried to contact
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customers for various reasons but communications sent to many of the addresses on
their records returned undelivered. Subsequent onsite visits revealed that the address
that the customer had provided on the account opening form was either old or just a
fake one. However, reporting entities must improvise some techniques in order to
authenticate a customer’s address before that person could be accepted for designated
services.
Thanks Letter
The customer address, as provided on the account opening form, had usually been
verified against some documents, for instance, a copy of a passport which bears both the
permanent and current address of its bearer. Passports and other identity documents
were generally genuine; however, it was not hard to obtain a fake one as mentioned
earlier. Therefore, the REs verified the address of a potential customer by sending a
‘thanks letter’ to the address provided. If the customer brought the letter back to the
bank with his signature, as instructed, the address was authenticated and accepted as
apparently genuine. Generally, thanks letters would be sent to all who applied for
designated services, although the exact time and mode of such delivery would be known
only to the RE concerned.
Third Party Issued Documents
In many cases, the REs verified the customer address against documents issued by third
parties, for example, insurance policy papers, utility invoices and the like. While some
REs would collect these documents only as an extra layer of security, others would
make it a routine practice. This was not a common practice like sending out thanks
letters, but REs widely accepted utility invoices as proof of address because in
Bangladesh utility companies are state-owned entities. The popular belief is that stateowned agencies never approved an application for service without prior verification.
Yet, all the REs who participated in this study agreed that if anyone wanted to hide their
address, it wouldn’t be impossible because utility invoices were issued in the property
owner’s name, not the tenants’.
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Personal Visit
At times the REs employed stronger and more reliable authentication technique when it
came to dealing with high-risk customers, for instance, when a new or existing customer
applied for credit facilities. Before granting such application, the RE concerned would
re-check the applicant’s identity, business details and their address. Records of the
account’s beneficiaries and guarantor would also be checked in the same way. REs sent
their own employees or hired agent or both to visit the applicant’s residential and
business address and inquire into their other personal details. In addition to the thanks
letter and third party issued documents, this visiting exercise provided another extra
layer of security.
One AML professional, however, mentioned that often their hired agents were inquiring
sometimes unduly into the customers’ private information. This was not merely because
of a conservative bureaucratic system that denied the REs’ access to many public
agencies’ databases but also because many of those agencies actually lacked the
resources to help the REs. He claimed that in the absence of fast and trustworthy
support from public agencies, the financial institutions were increasingly relying on
unconventional methods to know about customers. He warned that the application of
such techniques would soon raise the question of privacy violation. Besides, the method
had its own limitations. The hired agents normally provided these onsite verification
services through casual employees, who had no or very little accountability with regard
to the quality of information they were collecting. And, most importantly, ‘There [were]
no clear provisions governing procedures for the use of third parties for services that
[involved the] CDD’.534
For the REs the most useful sources of information were their customers. It was
comparatively much easier for them to contact their customers and collect information
using some techniques than collecting it from public agencies. ‘Being inquisitive’ and
‘conversing casually’ were virtually ineffective against the time old bureaucratic system
where public servants remained somewhat distant from the general population.
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Therefore, the REs needed to find ways of collecting information as directly as possible
from its original sources.
Depending on their risk analysis, the REs employed multiple improvised authentication
and substantiation techniques for document authentication. At times, they were
extremely careful and the other time they turned somewhat of a blind eye to this
authentication process. If a customer was officially introduced by one of their staff
members, or the applicant was an employee of the RE’s corporate client, they would
generally be accepted based on a ‘minimum’ of documents required by the FIU (for
account opening). That is, sometimes the decision to apply an improvised authentication
technique would depend on how risky the RE concerned considered a potential forgery
of information from the general business risk’s point of view, which might not be
related to risk of being used as conduit of money laundering.
4.4.2.2 Using External Information Supports
Although the REs were the primary sources of information for the FIU, they collected a
great deal of additional information from external sources apart from those public
agencies that they had to contact for most of their information. Sometimes, the REs did
not have information beyond what they had already supplied in their STRs and
sometimes they had it but just did not volunteer it to the FIU. This wilful nondisclosure
and its context will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter but cannot be
fully ignored in the present context. On some occasions, especially during the initial
stage of the AML regime, some of the REs volunteered and provided some information
about a suspected launderer.
This apparently incautious generosity of some REs as well as other difficulties the FIU
faced in gathering intelligence from most public agencies sometimes encouraged them
(the FIU) to become uncomfortably frank in their approach. On some occasions when
the AML regime of Bangladesh was still in its formative years, the FIU asked the RE
concerned to arrange a meeting at their (REs) premises and introduce them directly to a
suspect and reported customer. This would be uneasy for any RE, no doubt.
Consequently, the REs concerned became very careful in sharing such information that
was not directly requested in the STR form. These factors, coupled with many others,
made the FIU rely more on external sources.
177

The information that the FIU collected from non-financial institution was very useful in
their analysis. A frequently cited example during the interview was about the practice of
buying real estate in the name of a family member(s) of a suspected money launderer.
The family member’s declared income did not support the ownership of such a
property. Often the proceeds of crime were used to buy high value properties in the
name(s) family members as part of the layering process. The Land Revenue Office, for
example, had been a source of records on all transfers of land ownership, which were
registered in a certain administrative area. The FIU also collected information from a
number of local and foreign media to support their analysis.
4.4.2.3 Using Secret Sources for ML Discovery
Another important source of information for both the FIU and the ACC was their secret
sources. These secret sources were individuals who on condition of anonymity
volunteered information on suspicious activities that they had come to know about from
some source or another. Some of these individuals were attached to public or private
agencies and some were self-employed persons. At times they tipped off their contact
officers in the ACC or the FIU about an incident that the FIU and the ACC had already
discovered and sometimes they provided additional information on an incident that the
FIU had come to know about from open sources.
These so-called ‘secret sources’ were connected to individual officers and not to the
agency itself, as the interviewees claimed. Interviewees chose not to discuss how those
‘secret sources’ were recruited or if they received incentives of any kind for the services
they rendered (which would definitely raise questions about the source of funds), but
there is a common belief in Bangladesh that ‘secret sources’ receive various types of
incentives — whether financial or non-financial. However, the FIU and the ACC
regularly cultivate relationships with these persons as they were not only the provider of
preliminary information on incidents but also a good source of providing ‘links’ useful
for forming an audit trail of incidents. There were also anonymous complainants who
frequently provided information about corruption and other types of offences committed
for financial gain.
To encourage people to provide information, the FIU and the ACC opened complaint
boxes where anyone could submit information at any time, with or without disclosing
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their identity. The FIU officials said that they generally rejected complaints that were
fully anonymous since often they were made only to harass opponents. They, however,
did not explain how they knew without an investigation that an unsigned complained
was filed mala fide. At the same time, along with two other investigators from the ACC,
the FIU officials argued that unless there was a witness protection mechanism in order
to protect individual security and privacy it was very unlikely that people would
volunteer such information.
Investigators and analysts from the ACC and the FIU still stressed that they must
continue to encourage people to come forward and drop information in the complaint
box. The ACC officials claimed that often they discovered serious financial
irregularities with regard to some of the REs based on the warnings of an anonymous
complainant; such irregularities had taken place months ago but had not been reported
through the proper channel. Later, the REs concerned filed an STR with the FIU with
regard to those incidents but only when the ACC drew their attention to the matter.
4.4.2.4 Collecting Information from Witnesses
The involvement of witnesses in an ML related case is part of the regular investigation
process, yet in the current context their ability to share valuable information is very
relevant. In order to overcome the information deficit, the ACC often relied on the
witnesses of particular cases. Sometimes a paper trail for an incident would indicate
individuals who had a direct affiliation with certain transactions. These individuals were
asked to be witnesses in the case and disclose further information to the ACC. This
would not be easy when several individuals of an organisation appeared to have their
signature on a file and everybody, as they would claim, just carried out only their
official duty and had no knowledge that the matter was actually linked with something
suspicious. Naturally, sometimes the investigators had to convince individuals
separately to provide as much information as possible. In practice, persuasion may not
work because it could be very hard to compel someone to give evidence against his or
her will. However, one ACC investigator provided a somewhat opposite analysis. He
said that if a paper trail suggested any direct connection with a person (for example, an
officer who dispatched a document with his signature on it) in regard to some
transactions, it was rather easier for the investigator to convince that person to divulge
more information since his knowledge about the incident was already evident.
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4.4.2.5 Using Persuasion
Both the FIU and the ACC used persuasion for information collection when necessary
and possible.535 Here the term ‘persuasion’ is used to mean using some form of
influence (without duress) to change the person’s attitude toward information sharing.
Depending on the situation, the FIU officials generally resorted to this technique if their
informal professional network and most other means of information collection failed.
While applying this method they contacted the agency concerned directly, tried to
influence the relevant person with their eloquence, and urged cooperation. The ACC
had been more successful in persuasion than the FIU because, as mentioned earlier, the
former had a nationwide authoritative image, something the FIU was still struggling to
create. However, the FIU’s persuasion worked better on non-banking financial
institutions and closely related industries.
4.4.2.6 Being Persistent
When most other improvised information collection techniques remained unproductive,
the ACC officials resorted (sometimes in accompany with other techniques) to
persistent requests for assistance. They demonstrated such persistence by regular visits,
longer stays, and systematic enquiries about the piece of information that they were
looking for or an update on the formal request letter they had initially submitted. One
ACC investigator said that they would not use this technique during a preliminary factfinding mission but during the investigation that began only when the ACC officially
gave the go ahead for the investigation. The FIU officials apparently avoided using such
a technique.
4.4.2.7 Collecting International Intelligence on an Ad Hoc Basis
When the ACC needed to collect information from foreign FIUs, their first point of
reference would be the FIU of Bangladesh. In most cases they failed to obtain assistance
from the FIU in this regard because — at least until December 2010 when fieldwork for
this thesis was in progress — Bangladesh was not a member of the Egmont Group.536
That is, officially the Bangladesh FIU was out of the international group of FIUs who
535
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were sharing international financial intelligence. This had been a serious setback for the
AML regime of Bangladesh, and one which made the ACC’s AML case investigation
rather harder when it came to examining foreign elements in a case.
In order to overcome this challenge, the ACC had to improvise ways to collect
information through existing resources without any support from the local FIU. They
obtained assistance from the Office of the Attorney General and signed Mutual Legal
Assistance agreements on an ad hoc basis under Article 46 of the UN Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC). One ACC investigator stated that sometimes they had to
satisfy the other parties that the offence under investigation in Bangladesh would also
be an offence if committed in state party to whom the request for information was being
made (dual criminality).
The AML professionals engaged in all these improvised techniques for informal
communication, relationship building, cultivation, and also for the actual collection of
information when they were dealing mainly with parties outside the AML reporting
system. Within the system, information sharing worked apparently smoothly and
without any improvisation on anyone’s part. Yet, stakeholders had some serious issues
to complain about, in a constructive manner however. They frequently raised the issue
of very poor quality of information that they were receiving from each other, along with
many other issues.
As information passed from one hand to another within the system, the recipient gained
an idea about the level of sincerity of its sender in performing their part of the task.
Being the customer in same information market, all three components of AML reporting
system knew exactly what it took for a party to gather information from external
sources, and, simultaneously, they also could sense if there had been any negligence on
anyone’s part. They acknowledged the difficulties their counterparts were facing in
collecting information from external sources and agreed on the point that no one party
could enhance reporting quality overnight with their sole effort.
While this understanding helped individual components to identify their own strengths
and weaknesses, it also made them more accommodating to each other. And this
ultimately worked toward reducing the growing pressure of the interagency information
sharing deficiency in rather atypical ways, as we will observe in the following sections.
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4.5

Being Selective

Being selective had been a widely used, yet rarely acknowledged improvisational
technique applied by all three components of the reporting system. Most research
participants abstained from making direct comments about the real intent of being
selective while sharing information with each other. Others claimed that the main
purpose of screening was to ensure that no innocent person was falsely or wrongly
reported and then accused. Nevertheless, ‘joining the dots’ during the coding537 of the
interview data suggested that an important purpose behind application of this technique
was something actually different from what participants claimed.
The AML professionals put a stringent screening policy in place, which aimed at
identifying and sharing certain types of reports/information from the great number
available to them. The successful application of this technique served at least two
purposes. Initially, it lightened the workload of the organisation concerned and,
secondly, it helped them prevent some anticipated consequences. They were selective in
every step of data collection, processing and dissemination.
Selecting only ‘suitable’ reports for next level of processing while dealing with a large
number of reports was an objective issue, yet, it was interesting to observe that the
AML professionals took the liberty to define ‘suitable’ in this context from a subjective
point of view.
4.5.1

Authenticating Selectively

For the REs, the authentication of customer identity and their business documents was
always difficult, time consuming and above all costly, since there was no trouble-free
way of doing it. If a customer appeared to be less risky because he was introduced by a
trustworthy person (for instance, one of the employees of the organisation), then the
REs normally tried to avoid the use of any improvised authentication process. They
would selectively authenticate documents of only those files which were apparently
suspicious; leaving them unattended could be risky for the business and include the risk
of regulatory sanctions. For instance, all loan applications had to pass through an
improvised authentication process.
537
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4.5.2

Narrowing Suspicion on TP Violation

During account opening, customers had to declare their known sources of income and
the highest amount as well as the frequency of predicted transactions each month. They
supported this Transaction Profile with appropriate documents, such as a salary
certificate; and updated the financial service provider with ensuing changes in earnings.
If an RE detected that a customer had been significantly exceeding the declared limits of
this TP in terms of volume and or frequency, the RE would consider it unusual. Several
unusual transactions prompted them to put the account under close watch. If the trend
continued and the customer failed to provide n acceptable explanation when asked, the
matter would be forwarded to the FIU as Suspicious Transaction Report.
All research participants from the REs indicated that this was their primary basis for an
STR, and to be ‘unusual’ every single transaction had to individually cross its declared
limit, while only one RE claimed that even a series of smaller transactions over a
shorter period of time would raise suspicion for them. Hence, if a customer’s transaction
pattern did not deviate considerably from their declared TP, they would not be put under
scrutiny and no STR would be filed. Apparently, by and large it was possible for any
customer to revise their TP several times a year to update their files with a new
declaration and then structure transactions below the threshold amount in order to avoid
suspicion.
TP violation was initially suggested by the FIU as one of the means of identifying
unusual transactions, but subsequently this narrow approach was accepted as the
‘principal method’ by most of the REs. This over dependence on a particular method
almost assured that other types of unusual transactions could be ignored. One reason
behind this approach was that both Transaction Profile and its violation (that is
exceeding the declared transaction limit) very clearly appeared on the documents for
ready reference. For other types of transactions or activity which required intense
scrutiny in order to be detected, it seems that this would be avoided whenever possible,
as there had not been any record of harsh sanctions applied because someone ignored a
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reportable incident. This was one reason why the level of reporting was too low in
Bangladesh. From 2002 to 2008, the FIU received only 481 STR from the REs.538
Table: Total Number STRs Reported to the FIU and Disseminated by it between
2002 and 2008
Period

No of STRs
Received

No of STRs closed
at end of FIU
enquiries

Disseminations

2002

35

32

3

2003

23

18

5

2004

100

44

56

2005

52

46

6

2006

138

122

13

2007

105

105

0

2008

28

17

2

Total

481

384

85

Courtesy: APG Mutual Evaluation Report 2009

4.5.3

539

Sharing/Reporting after Rigorous Filtering

All three components of the reporting system applied this method almost equally from
their own perspective. They employed a rigorous screening process before sending any
information in order to ensure that only reports with adequate external links went out to
a stakeholder. This helped them to respond quickly and efficiently to any future queries
from the recipient. From the general point of view, rigorous screening before
forwarding a case should have been a part of normal business practice; however, to the
AML reporting system components, it was also a mechanism to avoid unattainable
requests.
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4.5.3(A) Rigorous Filtering of STRs
If a suspicious transaction had been detected, it would go through quite a process before
being reported as an STR. First, the front desk officer or cashier who detected an
unusual transaction would report it to the Branch Anti-Money Laundering Compliance
Officer, commonly known as a BAMLCO, who then put that account under regular
scrutiny and, if the trend of unusual activity continued, they invited the customer in to
try to obtain the necessary information in a covert manner. If they were satisfied that
there was nothing suspicious, the matter would end there; and if not, the BAMLCO
would report it as a Suspicious Transaction to the central compliance unit.
The central compliance unit would then conduct its own investigation into the STR.
They would collect more documents and then, unless they decided otherwise, the matter
would be forwarded to the FIU as an STR. One RE officer said that they had a special
committee in the central compliance unit that analysed each potential case of an STR
before sending it to the FIU. The Managing Director (MD) of the organisation was a
member of that committee and he was aware of every decision the committee passed. A
staff member at another RE, however, observed that their final submission of STRs to
the FIU required MD’s verbal permission. That is, an incident would require agreement
of many persons in an organisation before it could be lodged as an STR, and any one of
those persons could stop a case proceeding for any number of reasons.
Although all the BAMLCOs who participated in this study dismissed the idea that
immediate business profit making was their priority over and above protecting their
organisation from the risk of losing reputation due to its failure to report money
laundering incidents, nevertheless all of them agreed that reporting a customer was
always risky. Such an act would almost guarantee that the RE would lose business from
both the customer reported and some of their friends and family. Their concern reflected
a situation where AML reporting did not remain as secret as it was supposed to do.
Reported customers, even if they were not ultimately prosecuted for money laundering
offences, became aware of the fact that an STR had been filed against them. One of the
most common reasons why the confidentiality of the STRs were compromised, as some
of the interviewees from the REs claimed, was the direct communications between an
investigating officer and the reported customers or their friends and colleagues in the
preparatory phase of the investigation. In the initial stage of the AML regime, as
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indicated earlier (section 4.4.2.2), some REs concerned were even asked by the FIU to
introduce them directly to reported customers. In many cases these types of erros are not
the result of any attempt to ‘tip off’ customers but simply a failure to understand and
apply basic investigative techniques. These fundamental failures of the most basic
elements of AML investigations demonstrate how often assumptions made in developed
economies about the way in which AML norms will be implemented in developing
economies fall short of reality. They underline the need for training and technical
assistance for both FIU staff and those within REs in developing AML systems.
They further added that REs’ employees (including its individual branches) who were
the initial identification and screening points for unusual activity (in most cases) had
both business targets and regulatory obligations to attain. Often young sales executives
had very high monthly sales or deposit targets which they must achieve, and
simultaneously their manager had the responsibility to comply with all business
regulations including the AML laws. And, as mentioned earlier,540 ironically, in most
cases branch managers (especially in the banks) are also the AML compliance officers.
The manager must bring deposits into the RE through his sales team and yet is expected
at the same time to ensure AML compliance.
One ACC investigator highlighted this situation as a considerable predicament. He
stressed that it was not hard for anyone to understand which groups of customers might
have millions of Takas541 to buy various deposit products in a poor economy like
Bangladesh where corruption was so widespread.542 He further argued that some of the
REs were fully aware of the fact that many of the deposits that their sales team would
bring in might be from questionable sources. Therefore, at least some of the REs used
rigorous screening not only as a method of overcoming information deficiency but also
as an important means to protect their business interests.
Then what was the most pressing reason why there were few reports and what actually
prevented the REs from lodging STRs? Let us consider some ‘dots’ that were suggested
by both the interview data and the existing literature on the AML issues of Bangladesh.
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For the REs, reporting normally meant opening a gate for continuing incoming queries
from the FIU with regard to the incident reported and suspect individuals. Since it had
always been a difficult process for the FIU to collect intelligence from external sources,
naturally they put pressure on the reporting parties to provide more information about
any incident that they reported. And, as we have already seen, collecting information
from external sources only for compliance purposes was quite an unattractive task for
the REs. Consequently, if a reporting entity were aware of the fact that the suspected
customer had another account with a second RE and also had some stock in a certain
company, they would not include this information in the STR, even if these facts were
relevant, unless they had enough documents to satisfy the FIU in this regard.
In this connection, the ACC officials were rather frank in their expression and stated
that many of the REs did not report unless they had to. The investigators claimed that,
on a number of occasions, STRs were filed only when the ACC visited an RE after
being notified by their ‘secret sources’. The APG stated in their Mutual Evaluation
Report that in 2008 REs filed several STRs based on media reports of the arrest of
criminals. Although the APG described those incidents as the REs’ tendency towards
‘confirmed suspicion’,543 the analyst believes that the account of the ACC’s
investigators best describes the incidents.
This was because, in the same report, the APG further mentioned that the REs did not
conduct regular checking of suspicious matters on publicly available information about
the customers. They said, at times, even an inquiry launched by the relevant law
enforcement agencies failed to have the REs looking ‘at related accounts to consider
possible suspicious transactions’.544 One easily conceivable explanation of this
imprudence could be false (or real) assurance that no serious consequences would
follow; or, as APG indicated, ‘a poor understanding of what [was] suspicious among
those group of REs who had “the greatest numbers of customers and the widest
geographical coverage across Bangladesh”.’545
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Now, ‘joining the dots’ we just compiled here would apparently suggest that rigorous
filtering were helpful, at least for the time being, for the type of business that the REs
were involved in and the nature of the challenges that they were facing in doing such
business in the traditional bureaucracy of Bangladesh. However, this generalisation
should not apply beyond its justified limits, to be precise, to be applied only to those
participants who were theoretically sampled546 and also to the particular context of
interviewing which might have significant implications for the interpretation of data.
4.5.3(B) Sorting and Analysis
The FIU receives many reports from the REs which had been lodged on the basis of
only the slightest suspicion or without thorough analysis. The FIU officials described
this as ‘defensive reporting’547 by some REs, especially after being strongly reminded
by the FIU of their non-reporting. Sometimes STRs were lodged ‘according to the strict
interpretation of the provisions’548 of the AML laws which resulted in the submission of
reports on every unusual transaction.549 Sorting and analysis of these types of STRs was
wasteful in general, and in particular, sometimes their poor presentation may have
masked (whether intentionally or not) serious money laundering incidents. After
dissemination, all those STRs would return with enormous numbers of queries from the
ACC to which the FIU would have few or no answers, which also indicated poor
analysis on the part of the FIU.
In order to confront this challenge the FIU began encouraging the REs to send ‘linking
case’ that is, the reporting entities should report primarily those STRs that had a good
audit trail so that the FIU could trace back and more easily go deeper into a case. This
helped the FIU to start their analysis quickly and gather more information before
dissemination. In their mutual evaluation report, the APG referred to the FIU’s lack of
understanding of the various money laundering typologies. This seriously undermined
the effectiveness of the system. The APG stressed the immediate need for the adoption
546
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of improved analytical tools, increased staff training, and timely access to public as well
as open source information.550 This recommendation was a clear reference to the FIU’s
lack of resources and explained why the FIU might be interested mainly to those STRs
which came with lots of hints (or accompanying materials) for further enquiries.
The FIU advised the reporting entities to put in place a rigorous internal screening
process before sending anything to the Unit. They argued that the purpose of this
screening was to ensure that only relevant good quality reports were lodged. However,
the REs might not have enough information about a genuine case of money laundering
for a number of reasons and the FIU also seemed to be aware of this fact. Yet, for now,
they would prefer cases with more external links so that the suspected criminals and
their collaborators could be easily identified.
4.5.3(C) Initiating Case after Rigorous Screening
Just as for the FIU, screening the STRs was also a part of the ACC’s normal business
practices, but the ACC’s screening was more thorough than that of the FIU. During the
data collection and coding process that one major reason behind this stringent process
was the need to counterbalance the existing information deficit. Every case they
received would first be placed on the table of a ‘sorting committee’. Its members would
examine whether the case met certain specific criteria, for example, if the case had
merit, if the ACC had the legal authority to investigate the offences involved in the case,
or if the case had adequate supporting documents, and the like. The sorting committee
would decide if the case would be accepted for next level of processing.
The sorting committee could end the processing of the case right away. If they decided
otherwise, the case would go to the office of the Commissioner for enquiry and
investigation. If the Commissioner presumed the case had merit, he would assign it to
an enquiry officer for preliminary enquiry. After conducting his enquiry, a preliminary
enquiry officer might arrive at the decision that the case was not worthy of further
investigation. However, if he found something substantial in his enquiry, an
Investigation Officer would be appointed to conduct further investigation in the case. It
was the report of the Investigation Officer that would determine if the case would be
550
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reported to police as a ‘First Information Report’ and thereby initiate the prosecution
process.
During the interviews, the ACC officials mentioned that overall they were not happy
with the quality of reports they were receiving. They indicated that many of the reports
they received should have been resolved at the end of the FIU, and the REs should have
never lodged some of them if they had analysed the information properly. While they
made it clear that they were fully aware of the problems other components of the
reporting system were encountering, they still maintained that their counterparts were
not making the best use of available resources. Naturally, they had adopted a very strict
filtering method to ensure only genuine laundering cases went through. This extremely
rigorous procedure laid down for screening was to ensure that, if the ACC finally
decided to proceed with a case, they had enough materials in hand to successfully
prosecute the money laundering offence.
4.6

Keeping to the Code

‘Keeping to the code’ was basically a defensive technique applied mainly by the REs
but also by the FIU and the ACC when improvisational efforts for data collection failed
or became too difficult. The personnel involved in the AML reporting system,
depending on the particular party’s capacity and position, applied various techniques to
accomplish this task. Although the immediate purpose of undertaking these tasks was to
remain compliant at least in the eye of the higher authorities, it ultimately contributed
toward avoiding the use of discretion in compliance, which was a major element of the
risk-based approach. None of the reporting system components ever admitted that they
used this method with the purpose of avoiding a non-compulsory task; however, during
the interviews all participants agreed that for the less risky customer they often
complied with only the minimum obligations to remain safe in the eye of law and
management.
4.6.1

Collecting the Minimum

Officials of the REs said that at times they collected customer information only to
satisfy the FIU. They followed the rules strictly and collected only such type and
quantity of information as was set as the minimum by the FIU. They knew very well
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that the information collected only to meet minimum regulatory requirement might be
inadequate, of inferior quality or otherwise useless. When improvisation was avoidable
or costly in terms of resources, the reporting entity decided to stay away from that
exercise. They used the narrow interpretation of FIU notifications on CDD and
collected customer data only to the extent that it was compulsory to meet minimum
threshold.
The FIU was also aware of such circumstances when the collection of adequate
information by the REs might become extremely inconvenient even with their best
efforts. Therefore, they left an option in the regulation asking the REs to collect
customer information ‘up to its satisfaction’.551 In an explanation of this, an FIU official
said ‘up to its satisfaction’ should mean anything that the RE concerned honestly
believed would satisfy the FIU. However, the REs did not apply this method (‘keeping
to the code’) when they believed that their business was at risk. They took advantage of
the ambiguity of the rules and applied this method only when it was apparently ‘risk
free’ for them, from both a business and regulatory point of view.
4.6.2

Collecting via Customised Forms

The FIU provided a customised STR form and gave some objective guidelines for
forming suspicion. The guidelines indicated that the REs must fill out the information
fields in the form when lodging STRs and provide additional information, when
possible, with supporting documents. Providing additional information and or
documentation in support of an STR was not mandatory. Thus, if they were unable to
collect any additional information, or if they did not choose to provide additional
information for some other reasons, they just filled the form out and lodged the STRs
with a minimum of information. This method appeared as particularly helpful when the
REs were somehow bound to report an incident, which they would not report in an ideal
situation, for example, reporting based on a media report of criminal arrests.
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4.6.3

Avoiding Non-Compulsory SAR

Any suspicious activity might turn into a suspicious transaction or may bear elements of
potential money laundering offences. Thus, it is a legal requirement for REs in many
countries to report suspicious activity of customers or potential customers. However, in
Bangladesh, filing a Suspicious Activity Report/ SAR was discretionary552 unless the
REs decided that the activity had link with suspicious transactions. This gave the REs
permission to ‘turn a blind eye’ to suspicious activities and refrain from reporting them
unless it was truly risky for their business. When most REs did not report suspicious
activities, some of the locally incorporated foreign banks indicated that they used
elements of suspicion (from activities that did not involve any transaction) in their
internal investigations before lodging STRs. However, wilful negligence in regard to
SARs kept the rate of AML reporting very low and helped most of the REs reduce the
mounting pressure for improvisation and collection of information.
4.6.4

Shifting Responsibility to the ACC

When the FIU apparently failed to use ‘all available means ‘to collect additional
information in order to support their analysis of important money laundering cases, their
last option was to forward the case to the ACC to fill this gap and take further measures.
The FIU officials said that they attached a note with the reports indicating what further
information was needed for the file to be considered for the next level of enquiry. The
FIU officials admitted that at times the ACC was in a better position than they,
especially when the FIU failed to manage support from the police for the FIU
investigation. They had no choice but to shift responsibility to the ACC for further
investigation in such instances. For the FIU, this was another way of dealing with the
information sharing deficiency.
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4.6.5

Sending Back for Further Analysis

When the ACC became unable to discover enough material with regard to a case that
they were enquiring into, and they were of the view that the FIU could have provided
them with a better analysis of the incident, they would refer the STR back to the FIU for
further information and analysis. If the FIU were able to assist, then the case would go
to the next stage, or else it would be dropped by the ACC either at the enquiry or
investigation stage. The ACC and FIU were separate government entities with a
separate mission and vision. They were not accountable to each other. Their relationship
was formally established in April 2008 under section 9 of the Money Laundering
Prevention Act, 2008, which declared that the ACC was the investigating agency for
cases filed under the Act.553 The provision remained the same in Money Laundering
Prevention Act of 2012, where section 9(1) of this Act designates the ACC (or any other
agencies authorised by ACC) as the investigating agency.
4.6.5(A) Using Court Orders
When improvisations virtually failed, or became otherwise inconvenient to pursue, the
ACC obtained a court order and collected information from the agency concerned. This
was often a time consuming process to appear before a court and obtain an order, yet at
times this was the most effective way of collecting the information. This was not an
improvised technique in the regular sense (as mentioned in the preceding sections of
this chapter), but the ACC often utilised this technique although it was a little time
consuming and formal, but most effective at the same time. No court would grant
permission to search a premise only because an application had been made by the ACC
based on mere speculation. The ACC had to satisfy the court that there were concrete
grounds for suspicion, which often would not be possible to prove in the court unless a
considerable amount of information had already been collected.
Although the techniques used in achieving the task of ‘keeping to the code’ was the
result of the apparent failure of most available improvising techniques, it may be noted
that this was also a form of improvisation. The AML reporting system components
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applied this technique in order to remain compliant with their respective regulatory
obligations.
4.7

Conclusion

The collection of information from the various public agencies will not be easy for the
AML reporting system since those agencies do not function under the authority of the
FIU or the ACC, and besides, the traditional bureaucracy in Bangladesh will prevent
interagency information sharing to prevail at a level that is required by any modern
administrative system. At times, the public agencies are hardly accountable to anyone
for not being cooperative with their counterparts in other agencies. 554 From this point of
view, the AML reporting system components and their potential information sources are
in a relationship where the latter enjoy a position of nearly absolute power over the
former. If the former are able to apply their improvised techniques on the latter or in the
circumstances, they will be able to balance this power asymmetry and thereby reduce
the compliance pressure that now exists on them.
As discussed in this chapter, the AML reporting system components did exactly this.
They applied multiple improvised techniques and tried to deal with the existing
interagency information sharing deficiency. When they applied a number of informal
methods of communication, they were able to gain easier access to information held by
other public agencies. At other times, they were able to reduce the pressure of
information collection either by being selective or by collecting only the minimum
required. Since information is the heart of the AML reporting regime, the AML
professionals concerned must collect whatever information they require in order to keep
the reporting system running, because a failure to do so will increase the chance of
being viewed as a ‘failed system’ in the eye of both domestic and global policy makers.
However, this was only part of the problem that the AML system components were
trying to resolve. Soon they discovered that the necessity to improvise techniques, even
only for the very basic level of information gathering, was so acute that they could
hardly focus on the quality of the data they collected or produced. In the next chapter,
554

However, it does not necessarily mean that the public agencies are isolated entities and work
separately in competition with one another. A certain level of cooperation or social pattern does exist
which actually forms the basis of the behaviour presented in this chapter.
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we will discuss what improvisation actually means in different contexts, why it becomes
necessary and under what conditions it can bring best result. The discussion will also
help us to examine the extent to which the AML reporting system was successful in
applying their improvised techniques.
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5
5.1

DISCUSSION

Introduction

The following discussion is a part and continuation of the previous chapter. In the first
few sections of this chapter, the analyst has explored certain dimensions of a number of
general theories on improvisation and then integrated into them the theory presented in
Chapter Four. After that, the analyst explains that the activities mentioned in Chapter
Four were actually aimed to achieving several short-term targets in pursuit of a longterm goal.
Depending on circumstances, the act of improvisation could take different shapes. In an
organisational context, improvisation could differ in many respects from those generally
seen in their typical context of the performing arts, such as music, dance and theatre.
Then again, further differences may occur along the dimensions of improvisation and its
properties even in organisational context when it is done ‘off the cuff’ for ‘crisis
improvisation’ instead of as an improvisation of a new product or process, for instance.
However, irrespective of its dimension and areas of application, the success of
improvisation actually largely depends on the skills and experiences of the persons
involved in the process.
In this chapter, the analyst will show that improvisation initiated in response to some
intricate social crisis might require some proactive reactions, which might initially look
consistent, coordinated and even successful. However, due to their ‘makeshift’ nature
and the involvement of inexperienced persons along with the influences of other
external factors, such efforts might ultimately fail to produce a lasting solution to the
enduring problem. The analyst will further explain why this situation warrants
immediate attention and what could be done to improve the very circumstances that
encouraged the ‘improvisation’ in the first place.
At the end, this discussion will lead to drawing a hypothesis based on the nature of the
core problem, the level of success achieved using existing resources, lessons learnt from
failures, and the available resources at hand. The analyst argued that improvising
activities in the context of the AML reporting system of Bangladesh could be compared
with ‘crisis improvisation’. This crisis was a direct outcome of the deficiency of
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interagency information sharing caused by bureaucratic failure and a general deficit of
relevant information.
Although some historical evidence, as described in Chapter Two, suggested that such
failure was a consequence of a continual abuse of the system at the hands of colonial
and autocratic authorities, however, it may not be wrong to say that today the failure is
largely deliberate.555 In the AML context, the negative influence of the bureaucracy
could be seen as a major impediment towards the creation of ‘information capital’ on
which the output of the AML reporting system is virtually based.
This impediment may seriously disrupt the AML reporting system, rendering the entire
AML regime ineffective. This is because the AML reporting system, as described
earlier,556 is virtually an information sharing social network and the triadic ties between
actors of this network could be interpreted using network theory. That is, the ‘nodes’
(the REs, FIU and ACC) are ‘tied’ to each other through their organisational position.
The REs report STRs to their reporting body, the FIU; and after analysis, in appropriate
cases the FIU shares those reports with the ACC — their AML partner agency.
Similarly, the ACC may contact both the FIU and the REs for further information on a
case.
This refers to a symmetrical causal relationship among the actors. In this deterministic
system, the quality of the STRs produced by the REs affected the analysis by the FIU.
The literature review and data analysis in Chapter Two557 and Chapter Four suggested
that the STRs submitted by the REs were declining significantly in both quantity and
quality over the last few years. This lack in quality cascaded down to influence the
outcome of the partner agency’s investigation and preparation of cases. Ultimately,
these poorly prepared cases failed to have a deterrent effect in the society as they just
failed to prove the crime in the first place, that is, this reporting process is a chain of
events based on causation where a second event is understood as a consequence of the
first.
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However, this was only half of the problem. Both the APG mutual evaluation report on
Bangladesh and the empirical data suggested that the collection of good quality data and
information from external sources is a growing challenge for the entire AML reporting
system. Beside their internal limitations, all three actors of the reporting system were
almost equally affected by external factors, like the bureaucratic impediments and the
general tendency towards noncompliance in society, among others. Irrespective of the
context — for example, business, social or regulatory — the lack of cooperation
between the users and the furnishers of information was evident. Here, the relationship
between the AML reporting system and the other public agencies was virtually
asymmetric and the AML professionals needed to work hard to bring it near symmetry
as described in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, this approach offered only a partial and
temporary solution to the real problem.
The analyst argues that the improvisation in the AML reporting system context was an
isolated voluntary response to an enormous multifaceted problem. On the one hand, the
newly established reporting system had enormous pressure of compliance and, on the
other hand, the very basic means for such compliance — the experiences and access to
adequate quality information — were unavailable. All these encouraged the AML
reporting system to resort to a makeshift arrangement in relation to their AML reporting
related obligations. The obvious consequence of this attitude was the collection and
sharing of poor quality information in every phase of reporting process, resulting in a
‘garbage in, garbage out’ trend.
The problem of the AML reporting system represented one of many similar problems
related to a short supply of information. The information sharing deficiency, therefore,
was a general problem, and the AML reporting system could not make any significant
difference through improvisation alone. Nevertheless, the improvisation efforts were
successful in that they identified the core problem of the substantive area, identified the
possible gaps between compliance and non-compliances, and provided some indications
with regard to how to design a way out. The continuing employment of improvised
techniques to establish smoother communications that resulted in enhanced cooperation
and easier access to some information — altogether failed only to indicate that the root
of the problem was not within the AML reporting system. While the reporting system
must take the initiative to resolve its own limitations, a key resolution might come
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through a rather more general approach to the problem. The analyst argues that the
deficiency of relevant information might not be a problem caused only by a shortage of
supply, but also of demand. As in the vicious circle of poverty, this indicated a vicious
circle of general information deficiency, which was comparable to the problem of
capital formation in economics.
Based on a well-known theory of economics, the proposed hypothesis presents a general
model to break this deadlock in the AML reporting system context. Comparing
‘information’ in AML context with ‘capital’ in economics, the analyst observed that
solving the problem of ‘capital’ formation by breaking the vicious circle of poverty in
developing countries could be comparable with the challenges of creating ‘information
capital’ in a poorly regulated AML regime. Therefore, a similar solution could be
applied in both cases to break the stalemate.
5.2

Improvisation

Finding a creative solution to a problem, especially in a ‘stress situation in which one
must search for new ways of solving old problems, where the means to do so have
suddenly been denied’,558 could be a simple explanation or definition of the word
‘improvisation’. This, of course, does not clarify all aspects of this term but may
provide a reasonable fit in the AML reporting system context. This particular aspect of
improvisation at least indicates that an unstable situation may arise so abruptly and be
one for which people may or may not have minimum warning or adequate preparation.
Sometimes, such a situation may occur at a rather slower pace with prior notice, yet
people’s inability to respond quickly to such situation with sufficient means may equate
it with sudden change. In brief, as mentioned in Stacey’s work on chaos theory:
[B]eyond a certain point, increased knowledge of complex, dynamic systems does
little to improve our ability to extend the horizon of predictability of those systems.
We can know, but we cannot predict. Hence, having the capacity to respond in a
spontaneous fashion is critical.559
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How this ‘capacity to respond’ is critical in AML reporting system, or what unstable
situation or negative changes may occur in the AML compliance context that may bring
AML professionals into a lateral thinking game —partly arose in Chapter Four.
Subsequent sections of this chapter will further explain the circumstances from a
general point of view. The analyst will discuss some features of improvisation in
different contexts so as to understand the core meaning of this term and how this thus
includes the activities of AML professionals.
5.2.1

Description of Improvisation

Alfonso Montuori gave a fairly simple example of improvisation. As he suddenly
decided to play game of football with some of his friends on a sandy seaside beach, they
realised that the sand had created very different conditions for them. This was not grass
or any kind of synthetic playing turf that they were used to. The ball reacted strangely
and unpredictably. Their balance was unsteady in the sand as the ground below their
feet would give away, and all their usual skills that worked perfectly on regular football
fields would just not work well on the sand. It was as if they were playing a different
game.560
As Montuori noted, ‘The conditions [led] us to modify our game, to deal with
unforeseen elements, with the complexity and uncertainty of a new and different
environment. We [began] to improvise’.561 They soon, however, discovered that the new
conditions came with both challenges and opportunities. They used their jackets as
goalposts and quickly agreed on a set of implicit rules to fit the situation, as they were
not 11 players on each side.562 He further stated:
These tell us when it is appropriate to shoot at goal, when we should pass the ball
to someone else, and what constitutes annoyingly hogging the ball as opposed to
simply clowning around. We improvise the way we handle the ball, we make up
new ways of playing within the context of the skills and rules we already know
through years of playing.563

560

Alfonso Montuori, ‘The Complexity of Improvisation and the Improvisation of Complexity: Social
Science, Art and Creativity’ (2003) 56(2) Human Relations 237, 240.
561
Ibid.
562
Ibid.
563
Ibid.

201

New conditions tempted them to employ their skills and go beyond the already known
options and explore the possibilities of the present. They knew all basic rules of the
game, and all they were doing was improvising their game to fit in new situation.564
5.2.2

Improvisation in Arts

While the above example was taken from a friendly game where both the game and the
improvisation were chosen to enjoy some time away from regular business of life, the
application of improvisation at an organisational level is actually a rather serious
professional activity, for example, in jazz music. In fact, ‘[t]he field of organizational
improvisation has drawn heavily from jazz music’,565 where improvisation is an integral
part of the form.
A popular and highly regarded encyclopaedia suggests that ‘[a]ny attempt to arrive at a
precise, all-encompassing definition of jazz is probably futile’,566 and yet, as it
maintains, jazz is a musical form rooted in the music of different continents which is
often characterised by varying degrees of improvisation including deliberate deviations
of pitch and the use of original tones.567
Paul Berliner, an ethnomusicologist best known for specialising in jazz and other
improvisational systems, stated that ‘jazz artists commonly perform without musical
scores and without a specialized conductor to coordinate their performances’.568 Yet,
due to its liveliness, consistent style and tremendous power to bring about emotion in
human mind, a listener might not believe that the artists performing on the stage may
never have practised the piece or even played together before569 but that they were
actually composing and performing ‘on the spot’.570
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As with music, people apply improvisation to virtually all forms of performance as well
as the visual arts in the twentieth century.571 This relationship between art and
improvisation is not hard to understand, however. Improvisation illustrates itself
through the natural capacity of the human being to generate creativity in many areas of
human effort.572 Carter argued that improvisation has the power to‘[suppress] historical
consciousness that is necessary to break the causal chain between existing conventions
and new developments in an artistic practice’,573 and this is one important reason why
improvisation is necessary in art. If improvisation has the power to invent new forms
spontaneously, it may be able to bring in unconventional elements in art by suspending
the familiar set structure for a practice.574
Carter identified a few important potentials of improvisation in the context of art. He
observed that improvisation had the ability to discover something that would be
normally unknown if rigid rules were employed. That is, the use of improvisation may
help by encouraging practitioners to study a situation from a number of alternative
viewpoints, and this thirst for discovery may ensure the continuous delivery of new
resources in the work and maintain a higher quality in creativity. 575 Carter highlighted
an interesting feature of improvisation when he said that it ‘provides new paradigms
while at the same time undermining the notion of a normative paradigm against which
to evaluate possible solutions’.576 He further added that ‘[t]hrough experimenting with
improvisational art practices, artists discover “fresh and significant relationships” that
“in some measure remake our world” and make “a genuine contribution to
knowledge”.’577
5.2.3

Other Forms of Organisational Improvisation

Beside music and other forms of art, improvisation plays a vital role in every walk of
life ‘with its focus on participation, solidarity, and responsibility for the individual in a
571
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collective’.578 In general administration, policy making or in a specific profession like
nursing in circumstances where there is a shortage of equipment, supplies or even
human resources, improvisation could be a viable solution.579 Hence, improvisation
could be truly desirable in the case of an emergency or a disaster situation when feelings
of such resource deficiency (for whatever reason) are most acute.
Karl Weick viewed capacity to improvise as a crucial strength in the disaster response
as he analysed the role that fire-fighters played when responding to the Mann Gulch
wildfire of 1949 in the United States. He indicated that people who are flexible in their
choices and can compromise with discretion are more helpful in response to a disaster
than those who do everything ‘by the book’. In cases of emergency when one
organisational order collapses, people with greater interest in and capacity for role
improvisation may help formulate an alternative order instantly. 580 However, an interest
in or access to role improvisation alone cannot guarantee success.
Weick further argued that sufficient knowledge and experience about the tasks and
adequate familiarity with the material to be used may enable someone to create order
out of chaos581 using whatever means were at hand. ‘Bricoleur’ — a term originally
used by Claude Lévi Strauss to mean ‘someone who works with his hands and uses
devious means compared to those of a craftsman’582 in the French version of The Savage
Mind was subsequently cited by Weick to mean someone skilled in using the
environment to accomplish their tasks or someone who is skilled in improvisation. 583
Karl maintains that:
Bricoleurs remain creative under pressure, precisely because they routinely act in
chaotic conditions and pull order out of them. Thus, when situations unravel, this is
simply normal natural trouble for bricoleurs, and they proceed with whatever
materials are at hand. Knowing these materials intimately, they then are able,
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usually in the company of other similarly skilled people, to form the materials or
insights into novel combinations.584

Another important area where personnel need to manage their affairs often under
constant pressure and in the face of multiple limitations is probably business
management. To build a management structure, as management expert Peter Drucker
suggests, two important queries need to be fulfilled — first ‘What are its typical stresses
and strains? and ‘What performance does it have to be capable of?’.585 These two
questions point to a basic fact that every organisation is normally expected to
accomplish its aims and objectives under constant pressure, 586 for example,
improvisation during new product development when a series of creative works — new
product definition, alterations to the prior work schedule, a new test schedule, the
development of an internal focus group and faster work process — need to be
developed.587
‘Improvisation’ as a word has its origin in the word ‘proviso’, which means to foresee
or make a condition in advance or to do something that is already planned. Using the
prefix ‘im’ (negative) makes it just the opposite — ‘unforeseen’.588 Thus, improvisation
deals with the unpredicted and the unexpected, and it works without a prior stipulation.
‘Italian has formed a verb improvisare — to do something without preparation, to solve
an unexpected situation’589 and, it is claimed that the noun ‘improvisation’ derived
directly from this verb.590
While the above meaning of the word ‘improvisation’ gained broad acceptance, its
definition changed in different contexts. Although dictionaries tend to provide rather
general definitions, such as a performance ‘according to the inventive whim of the
moment’591 or ‘performing’ ‘extempore, without preparation’592, or ‘a composition; a
584
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course pursued in accordance with no previously devised plan, policy, or
consideration’593 and the like, yet their association with art and music is readily
apparent. Those related to jazz defined it as a ‘lack of prior stipulation and lack of
planning as [in] composing extemporaneously, producing something on the spur of the
moment’.594 A fairly general definition — ‘carrying out of activities in non-routine,
atypical or unexpected ways’595 — is again incomplete due to its extremely broad
coverage that may include any activities which are not improvisations but still done
atypical ways.
A definition, which is rather general in expression, in that, it not only reasonably
explains improvisation in art but also allows improvisations that take place in other
contexts to be easily included, is:
Improvisation involves reworking precomposed material and designs in relation to
unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and transformed under the special
conditions of performance, thereby adding unique features to every creation.596

Descriptions and definitions of improvisation in different contexts, as mentioned above,
draw out certain general dimensions of improvisation. Although used primarily in the
context of jazz, Paul Berliner indicated that most definitions place an emphasis on the
‘spontaneous’ and ‘intuitive’ nature of improvisation,597 but Crossan and Sorrenti
identified ‘spontaneity’ and ‘intuition’ as two critical dimensions of improvisation in
business organisations too.598 This view is further strengthened by Weick who echoed
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Berliner and stressed that both terms require further unpacking to suitably fit the
organisational context.599
5.3

Improvisation in the AML Reporting System

In the previous chapter, the analyst showed that ‘improvisation’ was being used by
AML professionals mainly as responses — spontaneous actions based on intuition or
immediately available knowledge and resources — to overcome an information
deficiency, which was caused by a lack of interagency collaboration in general or a poor
interagency information sharing culture in particular. However, a strict emphasis on
‘spontaneity’ and ‘intuition’ keeps the description largely incomplete and make
improvisation look like ‘making of something out of nothing’.600 Therefore, the further
investigation of these two dimensions of improvisation is necessary.
Berliner said that to understand the process of improvisation properly, the term
‘intuition’ needed further elaboration.601 Otherwise, ‘[t]his simplistic understanding of
improvisation belies the discipline and experience on which improvisers depend, and it
obscures the actual practices and processes that engage them’. 602 Weick maintained the
same view and further added that the word ‘intuition’ should be broadly understood
because ‘it is the very nature of this process that makes improvisation possible’.603 That
is to say, what emerges when we analyse intuition is ‘experience’; and it is the level of
an improviser’s know-how or procedural knowledge that ‘separates good from bad
improvisation’.604
In the field of the AML reporting system of Bangladesh, as we observed in previous
chapter, the three major tasks — Collecting Crucial Information, Being Selective and
Keeping to the Code —were being simultaneously pursued by the AML professionals
through a number of improvised techniques. For example, during the collection of
information from public agencies, ‘being persistent’ was a common technique among
599
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the ACC investigators but not among the AML professionals of the reporting entities.
This was because using their sense-perception, which was backed by their prior
experience of working with other public agencies, the reporting entities (given their
position in the society) already knew if application of such a technique was going to
yield any successful result for them at all.
Similarly, when a customer suddenly placed an order to withdraw all their money in
cash and close the account immediately thereafter, this triggered an alarm. In response,
the AML professionals of reporting entities used techniques like ‘playing the victim
role’, ‘proposing alternatives’ or adopting the ‘awaiting method’ to buy time and
encourage the informal conversation to continue. They used their experiences (intuition)
and prior knowledge about similar customers and spontaneously applied improvised
techniques to discover why the customer was closing the account and requesting a
significant cash transaction when withdrawing money using other bank instruments
would be safer and more convenient. Here, identifying an activity as ‘unusual’ was a
matter of common sense but devising ways to explore why it was unusual was
improvisational.
Close observation of the use of improvising techniques in the AML context revealed
another important dimension of the emergency performance of AML professionals. In
most cases, the AML professionals of the REs had limited authority over their main
source of information — the customers. The REs had to improvise a great variety of
informal communications and information collection techniques, and apply them
promptly with enough precaution to avoid ‘tipping off’ the subject. ‘Being inquisitive’
during the account opening process, ‘conversing casually’ when a suspicion arose, or
using ‘playing the victim role’ to investigate a proposed sudden and significant cash
withdrawal — were designed to comply with the AML obligation while at the same
time preserving the interests of the business by keeping the valuable customers
undisturbed. On the other hand, the AML professionals of the FIU used
‘communicating informally’ — a less formal technique than ‘conversing casually’ —
and the ACC applied ‘collecting information from the witness’ for the same purpose.
Similarly, in order to accomplish two other tasks — ‘Being Selective’ and ‘Keeping to
the Code’ — the AML professionals of the different components of the AML reporting
system promptly applied various other improvised techniques.
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Although these spontaneous actions might appear unsystematic at some point in time, it
is not hard to notice their inherent discipline. Most of the improvising activities in the
context of a particular organisation (whether it was an RE, the FIU or the ACC) could
be grouped together under three sub categories, namely ‘Collecting Crucial
Information’, ‘Being Selective’ and ‘Keeping to the Code’, which suggested that those
actions were actually aimed at accomplishing specific objectives. This ordered style of
behaviours indicated a further explanation of the word ‘spontaneity’. Berliner observed
that a spontaneous well-disciplined performance of improvisation is basically a result of
long practice (of the skill of improvisation not the particular melody), 605 which means
persons who practice well are better prepared to confront a challenging situation.
After unpacking ‘intuition’ and ‘spontaneity’, what has actually been found to be an
extremely simple suggestion — experience and practice help someone perform better.
In the organisational context, improvisation, therefore, is a performance, which could
meet, in Crossan’s view, an organisation’s need for innovative solutions.606 That is to
say, improvisation is a ‘conscious choice people make rather than [a] random
behaviour’.607 Neither pure guesswork nor haphazard actions in the name of ‘intuition’
or ‘spontaneity’ (as the case may be) could bring success through improvisation in the
AML context. Therefore, the level of experience that an entity possessed in handling
similar situations along with their ability to focus on continuing practice would
determine the success that they could achieve through improvisation.
5.3.1

Effect of Improvisation in the Bangladesh AML Reporting System

While it is in no way possible to quantify the level of success improvisation can achieve
with any reasonable accuracy, it is, however, still possible to draw some specific
examples that might indicate the level of intuition and spontaneity that the AML
professionals possessed. The analyst presented one example from the literature review
and another from the empirical data. These examples are in no way conclusive, but still
they provide an interesting insight into some aspects of an information sharing
deficiency and the effect of improvisation in this particular context.
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As mentioned earlier, the empirical findings and the literature review indicated that
Bangladesh was a low achieving AML regime with an average rating below the level of
partially compliant jurisdictions for compliance with the global AML standard. The
APG Mutual Evaluation Report identified several general concerns that Bangladesh
needs to work on, and most importantly, many of those issues relate to poor interagency
collaboration and a lack of sufficient access to AML related information.608
Example One
While a number of innovative efforts had been in practice among the AML
professionals to reduce the information deficiency, they had apparently little effect on
the real problem that the reporting system was facing. The APG Mutual Evaluation
Report stated that Bangladesh had taken a significant step to develop the capacity of the
FIU to receive, analyse and disseminate STRs, CTRs and other forms of data, yet, due
to several political and legislative constraints, there has been a sharp decline in the
number of AML reports that the FIU received and finally disseminated in last few
years.609
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Figure 5: Double Line Graph Presentation of the STRs Received and Disseminated
by the FIU.
As shown in Figure 5, there was steady progress in both the receipt and dissemination
of STRs starting from the beginning of the AML regime in 2002 until the end of 2004.
After that, there was a sudden drop in the total number of STRs received and
disseminated. Interestingly, during 2006 and 2007, the change was sharp but the trend
was in the opposite direction. Although, the number of STRs received reached its
highest peak in 2006 and then declined compared to the initial three years, however,
number of dissemination slumped sharply during this period. By end of 2008, the total
number of STRs received had decreased to its second lowest level, and number of
reports disseminated dipped to its lowest ever level.
Example Two
In order to examine the above findings from a different perspective, interview
participants were asked to answer a simple question about the quality of the AML
reports (both STRs and CTRs) that they handled. It is often said that ‘[i]nformation
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quality (IQ) is an inexact science in terms of assessment and benchmarks’610 yet the
study of information quality is vital for organisations611 because this might have a
‘potential severe impact on organizational effectiveness’.612 It may also here be noted
that although an organisation’s effectiveness does not exclusively depend on the quality
of information, in the AML context quality may play an extremely vital role.
In this study, information quality has been used in a very simple sense. No specific
definition of ‘quality’ or ‘set of measures’ had been used to assess the quality of
information, because that would lead the discussion to a whole new area. In order to
give a general theoretical understanding of quality, participants were requested to give
their opinion based on the AML reports’ conformance to the relevant specifications, and
whether or not they meet consumer expectations or adequately serve the purposes of
their users.613
Those participants who work with reporting entities were randomly selected from the
group of reporting entities who had experience of filing STRs. It may be further noted
here that, according to one interviewee from the FIU, that one of the reasons behind the
very low number of reports was that many of the REs never filed an STR (section
4.2.1.D). Participants from the FIU and the ACC agreed to respond to this survey on
condition of anonymity. As a result, only about half of the total number of those two
groups was finally allowed to participate in this survey so that they remain unidentified
from rest of their colleagues.
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Figure 6: Presentation of Survey Data on the Quality of AML Reports
The result of this particular study was not surprising (Figure 6). The survey data shows
that 12 of the 14 AML professionals from REs believed that the quality of their STRs
was ‘good’; one said it was ‘bad’ and one remained indecisive. On the other hand,
except for one participant from the ACC who remained indecisive, all participants from
the FIU and the ACC disagreed with the majority of the representatives from the REs.
Analysis of Both Examples
Although a number of innovative actions had been taken to improve the situation of the
AML reporting system of Bangladesh, the outcome of those initiatives remained
uncertain. As far as the STRs were concerned, the decline in both the quantity and
quality indicated that there was a major gap between the AML professionals’
understanding about how a reporting system should function and the way the reporting
system in Bangladesh was actually performing.
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5.3.2

Signs of an Ineffective Reporting Regime

There could be several explanations as to why the AML reporting system in Bangladesh
appeared largely unproductive. Here the analyst would like to present the reasoning of
the persons who actually acted as appraisers of the system as mentioned above.
Although their analysis provides some reasonable insights into the reporting system’s
performance issues, they do not, however, lead to any dependable conclusion yet.
Therefore, a further explanation of their views is necessary in the context of the two key
dimensions of improvisation, namely, experience and practice or training.
Interpretation of the APG Assessors
The APG identified some specific reasons in their evaluation report as to why the AML
reporting system remained so ineffective. One major reason for rating ‘PC’ for
Recommendation 29614 (competent authorities, their powers and resources) was that the
FIU did not have free ‘access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial,
administrative and law enforcement information that it require to properly undertake its
functions, including the analysis of STRs’.615 This incapacity was further worsened by
the poor physical infrastructure of the FIU. This included a lack of proper IT equipment,
software, information storage facilities and an uninterrupted power supply, which
jointly resulted in a decreasing effectiveness of the AML Reporting system over the
years.616
Interpretation of the Participants
With regard to the study on the quality of the STRs, participants from the REs tried to
justify their position by saying that often they had insufficient or outdated information
about customers, because even careful Customer Due Diligence at times failed to collect
adequate information. Often, customers provided incomplete as well as unverifiable
information. Therefore, being able to send a report where all fields of an STR form had
614
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been completed with necessary information supplied should mean complete and good
reporting. They further argued that, if the reports were not good enough to serve the
users’ purpose, they should have led to negative criticism from the FIU.
On the contrary, participants from the FIU expressed their serious concerns about both
the quantity and quality of the reports they received. They indicated that many of the
REs did not report at all and some of them reported only when they had to report. This
was evident in the defensive reporting when there was a drive from the FIU or there was
newspaper exposure of serious fraud related to some business or person. They stressed
that the reports were generally erroneous and often lacked adequate information, which
prevented the creation of an audit trail for the potential money laundering offences.
Participants from the ACC reiterated the FIU’s sentiments and added that their enquiry
and investigation were heavily affected by the ‘poorly analysed’ reports that they
received from the FIU. They said that although they received only a few cases from the
FIU, those reports looked more like ‘mere STRs’ (the FIU officers categorically denied
this assertion) than ‘probable violation of money laundering law’. 617 What those reports
lacked among other things were a proper analysis with regard to ‘probable violations’ of
any specific provision of the anti money laundering laws, potential ‘sources of
evidence’ and details of witnesses.
Analysis
What appeared in the APG Mutual Evaluation Report about the decline in the the
number of STRs leaves hardly any room for debate. It was a mutual evaluation of an
AML regime where all participating delegations — the APG assessors and the
representatives of the jurisdiction under assessment — contributed and mutually agreed
on the report before it could be published. But then again, many could always oppose
accepting a lower number of STRs as conclusive proof of an ineffective AML reporting
system. In some jurisdictions, its supporters could view the relatively lower number of
STRs as a sign of the significant deterrent effect of an efficient AML system.
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David Chaikin indicated that annual statistics produced by national FIUs revealed huge
under-reporting by the Swiss AML reporting system. Nevertheless, advocates of the
Swiss system were barely ready to accept this as a sign of failure. They stressed that the
Swiss system in fact effectively deterred money launderers. They argued that
Switzerland had a powerful customer vetting and monitoring system even before they
had an AML regime, and under the AML regime, as international pressure continued to
grow, they had in place an extremely rigorous customer acceptance system and KYC
practice.618 Besides, in 1977, they introduced the requirement of collecting information
on the beneficial owners of funds, the first developed country to do so.619
Claims of the supporters of Bangladesh’s AML regime would not be completely
incorrect if they mentioned some of its achievements, for example, Bangladesh had
been actively pursuing AML since 2000, enacted AML legislation and become the first
SAARC nation to criminalise money laundering. However, when the focus is shifted
from the AML regime to the AML reporting system in particular, a desperate reliance
on improvised techniques to collect information would cast serious doubt on their claim.
Besides, it would be difficult to show good reasons (if any) that invalidate the APG’s
assessment for FATF Recommendation 10 — customer due diligence and record
keeping620 — where Bangladesh was rated ‘NC’.621
While the above analysis provides some useful hints with regard to the quantitative
aspect of effectiveness, the following discussion may reveal some of its qualitative
features. The question of quality clearly divided the AML professionals. Producers and
users of STRs viewed quality from different standpoints and had differing opinions. As
expected, representatives from the REs who were the primary producers of the STRs
stressed the ‘conformance to specifications’ meaning of information quality because it
was easy for them to measure.622 They measured the quality of their reports mainly on
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the basis of two simple variables — being able to fill out an STR form with required
information for each information field, and feedback from STR users.
When it comes to the first variable, REs could be blamed if they showed negligence in
filling out the form with adequate information. But the blame could be shifted to the
FIU if even a properly filled out STR form still resulted in a failure to report an ML
incident, because the FIU — the developer of the STR form — either asked irrelevant
questions or overlooked a relevant question, or both. For example, the STR form
circulated by the FIU asked for detailed information about the reporting officer’s name,
department/division and designation623 but did not make it mandatory to report either
attempted transactions or suspicious activity in regard to money laundering.624
With regard to second variable, it may not be unjust to say that the reporting entities’
argument had very little validity. The APG Mutual Evaluation Report indicated that the
FIU barely provided any case specific reaction apart from some general feedback on
STRs during a semi-annual workshop for AML professionals.625 Accepting the absence
of negative feedback as sign of good reports, therefore, was a false premise.
On the other hand, the STR users viewed conforming to specifications as a part of the
quality indicators only. They said that quality should mean an STR’s capacity to meet
its user’s expectation. That is to say, its preparation, mode and time of delivery and the
content must be useful for the analysis (by the FIU) and for the enquiry and
investigation (of the ACC).626 However, participants from both the FIU and the ACC
mentioned that they were seriously concerned about the quality of the STRs. At the
same time, the ACC representatives made a specific criticism of the FIU’s level of
analysis, and the FIU, while accepting their limitations, shifted a major part of the
responsibility to the negligent REs and other external factors.
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As mentioned earlier,627 many of the AML professionals were not properly aware of
their respective roles and the roles of their counterparts. For instance, the FIU is not an
investigative body in Bangladesh. Hence, labelling their failure — to identify what
particular provisions of the AML law might have been breached and where to go to
gather evidence — as a sign of a ‘poorly analysed’ STR (as mentioned by some of the
ACC investigators) — are thus ill-founded. Similarly, branding some customers as
‘good’ or ‘legitimate’ (as elaborated in section 4.4.1B) is also an indication of some
confusion with regard to the role that a reporting entity official is supposed to perform.
As noted by Chaikin, another way of assessing the qualitative output of the STRs could
‘include an examination of the number of investigations, prosecutions, convictions,
blockage and confiscation of funds generated by the STR system’. 628 The APG Mutual
Evaluation Report indicated that during their onsite visit in August 2008, a total 78 ML
cases were under investigation and most of those cases were initiated under the repealed
MLPA 2002. Under the MLPO 2008, three cases were under investigation. The APG’s
statistical analysis showed that there had been only two verdicts/convictions up until
August 2008 but no further detail could be obtained.629
When it comes to confiscation and seizures, the report said that in the four cases
initiated in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2006 under the MLPA 2002, a total of USD 1.4
million worth of property was seized before the APG mutual evaluation.630 Moreover, in
23 cases filed between 2004 and 2007 under the Criminal Prosecution Code, another
USD 670,000 worth of proceeds of crime were seized.631 Now, given the size of the
economy and the level of corruption in Bangladesh, how impressive these figures really
are could be an interesting query.
In 2009–2010, Transparency International (Bangladesh) had estimated that corruption
was costing 1.4 per cent of Bangladesh’s gross domestic product (GDP) each year.632
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That is, the total amount of corruption in terms of USD was near about 1.4 billion in
2010 alone when the size of GDP was over USD 100 billion.633 Comparing only one
financial year’s level of corruption with the total amount of the proceeds of crime seized
from 2002 to 2007 what we see is that only 0.1 per cent of one year’s total amount for
corruption was seized in 6 years of the AML regime.
5.4

Apparently Failed Improvisation

From the above discussion, it will not be premature to conclude that the improvisation
of the AML professionals apparently failed to achieve their ultimate objective. Even
after the application of so many innovative techniques, the AML professionals could not
ensure a continuing free flow of quality information from various sources, and as a
result, the actual state of information deficiency remained largely unchanged. Any
reflection of improvisation is hardly evident in either the quantitative or qualitative
features of STRs. However, whether or not this was a total failure or if such failure or
success suggests any new ideas — requires further discussion.
5.4.1

Why Improvisation Remained Largely Ineffective

Before we judge the level of success of improvisation in the current context, it is
important to decide on the type of improvisation it is that AML professionals were
dealing with. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the bureaucracy in Bangladesh has such
historic and cultural elements that actually prevent public agencies from being
cooperative, proactive and customer-oriented in most cases (as detailed in section 2.3).
For example, in 2010, a Transparency International (Bangladesh) survey found that
more than 80 per cent of the households surveyed reported experiencing corruption in
dealing with public agencies and services.634 This result indicates that, among other
issues, the level of cooperation between and customer-orientation of public agencies and
rest of the society (also between the public agencies themselves) are poor, which
resulted in costly and difficult to access public services for the people.
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On the other hand, the AML reporting system has some specific tasks to accomplish,
which requires more a favourable bureaucratic environment than that of Bangladesh.
This does not, however, mean the creation of an ideal problem-free jurisdiction, but
refers to a system which matches the ‘increasing international will and capacity to
identify, investigate and prosecute money laundering’.635 In order to demonstrate such
coherence with the international community, criminalisation of money laundering alone
is inadequate. A jurisdiction must have an effective criminal justice system to trace,
freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crimes and take the necessary measures to
enhance international intelligence sharing and cooperation.636
John Broome mentioned that the ‘investigation of money laundering almost always
starts with financial intelligence’637 and this intelligence is not just pieces of information
but an end product of information processed in a certain way to add more value in it.
This process begins with collection and ends with evaluation and the analysis of
information.638 What is more important to this discussion is that information gathering is
a huge exercise which includes ‘all available sources including public source material,
law enforcement agencies, other government agencies and non-governmental
organisations and individuals’.639
Judging the above issues, it can be said that the AML professionals in Bangladesh AML
reporting system were in a stressed and stressful situation. A lack of coordination
among public agencies, the existence of domestic information sharing deficiencies and
an inability to access cross-border intelligence and technical assistance through the
Egmont Group presented huge challenges to the AML reporting system. The AML
professionals were almost always unsure about the sources and methods of information
that they must collect to fulfil their AML obligations. The interagency information
sharing deficiency was, of course, an old problem but the AML professionals had to
continuingly resolve it in new and innovative ways since they did not possess the most
regular means to resolve the crisis in the usual fashion.640 What made the crisis even
more acute were the time constraints for each task. From first detection until reporting,
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and then once the case was disseminated to partner agencies for investigation, the AML
legislation set a specific time limit for each action to be completed. In a situation like
this, resorting to improvised solutions appeared to be a likely consequence.
In this particular context, one important reason why improvisation might have failed to
bring the expected result could be the cultural barriers. A too rigid bureaucratic
environment in Bangladesh could be part of the explanation as to why new anti-generic
ideas may not be welcome in resolving enduring problems. This is because ‘the very
concept of improvisation, as it is anchored in modern languages, is a product of cultures
that have valourized its opposite — composition — as a norm, even as a higher form’.641
The absence of this cultural accommodation in Bangladesh virtually held the level of
improvisation at the stage of unsupervised interim responses to a crisis and barred it
from growing as a reliable alternative answer to a social problem.
For successful improvisation another important requirement is predisposition and
practice, something Alterhaug described as talent and training. While talent is of course
important, the ability to improvise actually largely depends on practice.642 In this current
context, the AML professionals were neither chosen based on their inherent ability to
improvise nor had they been trained to manage situations like this, except for some
exceptions, however.
During the interviews, the analyst observed that a very small percentage of the AML
professionals, who were interviewed, mostly from the locally incorporated foreign
financial institutes, received limited in-house training on how to use various techniques
to collect information from suspect customers without tipping off the subject. However,
such training was not common for other AML professionals. Most AML professionals
acted alone and applied their own readily improvised techniques from their own
position when the situation demanded. There were similarities in their actions, as they
had common goals, challenges and almost the same amount of resources to utilise;
however, there was hardly any sharing of experiences in an organised fashion.
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Some literature suggests that improvisation actually occurs in phases, especially in art,
it is more like a gradual process than an isolated event. Citing Konitz, Berliner
mentioned that in the beginning it is just ‘interpretation’ of a theme when improvisers
take minor liberties to introduce creativity in melody.643 When musicians individualises
their work and introduce unique patterns of imagination, then they move along the scale
of ‘embellishment’.644 They enter into ‘variation’ when the melody has substantial
changes in it with greater personality, but its connection with original written piece is
still evident. Finally the ‘improvisation’ takes place when the highest level of intensity
is achieved.645 This means, ‘… [t]ransforming the melody into patterns bearing little or
no resemblance to the original model or using models altogether alternative to the
melody as the basis for inventing new phrases’.646
What we see here is a complex journey from almost mediocrity to excellence,
advancing in steps using experiences and training from the previous stage into the next.
In Bangladesh’s AML reporting system, this progressive nature of improvisation is
probably missing. Consequently, for the AML professionals who were constantly trying
to collect any relevant or closely relevant information in order to fulfil their AML
obligations, the whole exercise was actually a desperate effort to devise a makeshift
solution. Such temporary solutions to a permanent problem may always have a narrow
chance of succeeding. Weick observed that:
… [D]eliberate improvisation is much tougher, much more time consuming, and
places higher demands on resources, than does deliberate interpretation. If
deliberateness is a key requirement for something to qualify as organizational
improvisation, and if we construe improvisation in the sense used by Konitz, then
full-scale improvisation should be rare in time-pressured settings.647

That is to say, it was not ‘purer instances of improvisation’648 that we observed in the
AML context. Although there had been major improvements in the method of
collection, it apparently had little effect on quality. The STRs were poor in both worth
and number and there was hardly any sign of satisfaction among the users. Even neutral
analysis showed that their qualitative output was declining.
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In addition to all these reasons, there might be a general reason why improvisation
might have failed to achieve its ultimate goal. The AML professionals invested most of
their time in improvising methods of collection but not the quality of the information
they were going to collect. Sometimes the right method is necessary to collect the right
type of information, but focusing mainly on the method may undermine the real
objective of the application of such a method. This was partly because the reporting
entities hardly felt that there was a strong demand for quality STRs — the collection
and reporting of any quality of information would suffice their purposes as far as the
reactions of their users were concerned, and partly because there was general lack of
understanding about the AML reporting obligations.
5.4.2

Lack of Adequate AML Experiences and Training

The above discussion, which is based on some widely referenced literature on
organisational improvisation frequently pointed to ‘experience’ and ‘practice’ as two
key variables of improvisation. These variables are not only relevant in the context of
resolving an information sharing deficiency but also in understanding the general AML
obligations for all three components of the reporting system.
The outcome of the empirical data analysis and the literature search revealed that the
reporting entities did not know what to report, and sometimes they even did not know
what suspicious transactions actually were. They were reporting what they had to report
but actually they did not have great confidence in their own process. Therefore, the FIU
was receiving reports which were less relevant and less useful than they might be. This
is partly because they had not articulated what they wanted and why.
In the interviews, participants from reporting entities claimed that their reporting quality
was ‘good’. There was even a correlation between their words and number recorded for
similar responses as most of the reporting entities’ AML professionals that were
interviewed had the same opinion about quality; however, their claim did not match the
overall picture. If they were reporting correctly, it was because of the poor performance
of others for which the AML reporting system remained largely unproductive, then this
was basically a reflection of their own situation. They were also part of this
underperforming system and, thus, part of the problem.
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The REs’ personnel were happy with the quality of reports they produced based on the
false hypothesis that there was no negative criticism received on their reports. However,
the real explanation as to why there was no case specific regular feedback could be very
simple. The FIU did not itself know what it was seeking and why it was seeking it in the
name of STRs. They could not provide regular feedback because attempting to provide
feedback would mean trying to respond to a question to which they did not have the
answer. They did not want to admit that they were unable to explain what they wanted
the reporting entities to provide. That is, accepting the responsibility to provide
feedback would only make the FIU’s task harder, and it was already overburdened by
the interagency information sharing deficiency. Therefore, the FIU received any reports
and abstained from providing feedback. This is the part of the complications that have
been observed.
What this demonstrated was that the FIU apparently did not have a much clearer idea
about what they were trying to collect and for what purposes. Nevertheless, getting the
right quality of information is fundamentally important to be able to have effective
analysis. If the wrong kinds of transactions are being reported as suspicious and the
actually truly suspicious ones are overlooked, then it does not matter what analysis the
FIU conducts, it is not going to yield any useful result.
The reporting entities cannot provide what the FIU requires if they do not know what
they should report. Often the reporting entities ended up becoming more focused on
‘numbers’ than on quality, creating a completely qualitative problem. If the reporting
entities knew what they should look for, they would have a better chance of formulating
reports that would lead to much more effective analysis and much better products for
the ACC or other partner agencies.
It is expected that the FIU should receive what they need and the reporting entities
should report more effectively. Although the law imposed reporting obligations on the
reporting entities, it is not enough simply to enact legislation and impose reporting
obligations, without implementing further education on the matter. If the FIU does not
help the REs understand what they need to report and train them to enhance their
reporting skills, the disconnection between the FIU’s requirement and the reporting
entities’ perceptions will remain as it had always been. In fact, that is the reality in
Bangladesh.
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As Reuter and Truman noted, ‘Money laundering is complex and often difficult to
follow for anyone without [a] highly specialized knowledge of finance, and relatively
few agents and prosecutors are in a position to acquire the skills necessary to pursue
such cases.’649 In most developing economies, the AML professionals just do not have
enough knowledge, skill, training and background to deal the AML problems. 650 In this
situation, it is more logical for the FIU to assume a more responsible role and take the
largest part of the responsibility on their shoulders instead of putting it on the REs for
the underperforming reporting regime. This enhanced role of the FIU must not stop
within the borders of the AML reporting system, but reach out to their indirect AML
partners, that is, to every possible source of information that they might need to explore
to keep the AML reporting system running.
5.5

Has Improvisation Really Failed?

Although improvisation remained apparently unsuccessful in resolving the interagency
information sharing deficiency, this is only one way of looking at the entire exercise. It
has made several notable contributions in the AML context of Bangladesh that could be
seen to be highly useful in analysing the gap between compliance and non-compliance
and how this gap could be addressed.
Improvisation has helped establish an informal professional network among various
public, private and autonomous agencies. This network could be useful in complying
with AML obligations when the regular system is unable to provide appropriate
guidance. Even within a formal arrangement, this network is useful, because informal
interaction is ‘the social glue of the workplace’651 and it helps establish a common
ground.652
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Beside this networking, another important contribution of improvisation was the
identification of potential information sources. The application of various improvised
techniques of communication enabled the AML professionals to gather first-hand
experience about where to search for what information and what quality they might
offer. In any situation, this could be a costly task to accomplish.
Nevertheless, the most important thing improvisation revealed, as mentioned in Chapter
Three, was a basic social process, which means a core problem in a substantive area and
how that problem is continuingly being resolved.
The core problem as it was observed emerging was a combination of multiple issues
that resulted in an interagency information sharing deficiency. Sometimes the reasons
for such a deficiency are abstract issues like bureaucratic impediments, cultural
limitations, or an unwillingness to share information as sharing information was often
viewed as sharing power in the bureaucracy. Sometimes, however, the reasons are
rather concrete, for example, the absence of a memorandum of understanding, technical
limitations, lack of resources or just the unavailability of the information itself.
The AML professionals’ response to this core problem was unique. They improvised
several techniques to overcome their respective information deficiencies and often
assisted each other in pursuing the common goal of the reporting regime. An analysis of
their efforts to resolve issues further identified that the reporting system had its own set
of limitations independent of the external factors identified earlier. Finally, the
empirical data analysis and literature review revealed how all those external and internal
factors affect the AML reporting system and determine its productivity in the AML
context.
The reporting exercise began with the reporting entities sending poor quality STRs,
which resulted in ineffective analysis at the hands of the FIU and almost fruitless
investigation when the material was forwarded to the ACC. The primary reason for this
poor reporting was, as mentioned earlier, the inexperience of both the FIU and the
reporting entities who clearly did not know what to look for and why. A weaker KYC
regime was also partially responsible for this problem. Secondly, during this reporting
process, neither the REs, nor the FIU or the ACC was able to enhance the quality of
reports due to external factors such as interagency non-cooperation and limited access to
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public databases. This also included the REs’ inability to benefit from a constructive
feedback regime. Consequently, we see poor quantitative output of the reporting system
with very low or no social impact by the AML regime. As Charles Babbage asked, ‘[I]f
you put into the machine wrong figures, “will the right answers come out?”.’653 In the
simplest terms what this means is — ‘garbage in, garbage out’.
5.6

The Hypothesis

In the AML context, the crisis of information deficiency occurred and put the
organisations and persons in this knowledge intensive business under tremendous
pressure. The basic reason for this crisis situation in the context of AML reporting
system was the interagency information sharing deficiency, as we have already
mentioned. Crisis improvisation applies in the AML reporting system in that a
‘judicious combination of formal structure and improvisation can be a useful mode of
response in situations where resources are in short supply, circumstances are rapidly
changing and communication is difficult’.654
As observed, the gap between information requirements and information availability
could be reduced, at least temporarily, through improvisation. In the AML reporting
system context the AML professionals used improvisation for the same purpose. The
continuing invention of techniques and their employment in ideal situations helped the
AML professionals to reduce the pressure of information deficiency and thereby
allowed them to fulfil their legal obligations. Sometimes, improvisation was successful,
and sometimes it was not, but it usually helped them to remain compliant in terms of the
domestic AML standard.
While improvisation succeeded to some extent at the domestic level, its eventual output
could not bring a satisfactory rating in the eyes of the international standard setter.
Nevertheless, ultimately improvisation succeeded in identifying the core problem of the
AML reporting system, the gap between compliance and non-compliance and some
useful indication of resources which could be used to reduce this gap.
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The analyst argues that the phenomenon of a general shortage of useful information —
which could be used to improve government operations and services — could be
comparable to the problem of capital formation in developing countries. The apparent
reason, as it appeared, behind this information deficiency was a ‘vicious circle’ effect.
Ragnar Nurkse, in the Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries,
described some basic challenges that developing nations face to form capital — a very
necessary condition for economic development.655 He noted that a poor nation remains
poor because it is trapped in a vicious circle of poverty, which implies ‘a circular
constellation of forces tending to act and react upon one another in such a way as to
keep a poor country in a state of poverty’.656
In economically backward nations, this circular relationship badly affects cthe apitalgathering process in that it influences both the supply and demand of capital in an
economy. The supply of capital is affected by people’s ability to save, and demand is
affected by their motivation to invest.657 In the words of Nurkse:
A circular relationship exists on both sides of the problem of capital formation in
the poverty-ridden areas of the world.
On the supply side, there is the small capacity to save, resulting from the low level
of real income. The low real income is a reflection of low productivity, which in its
turn is due largely to the lack of capital. The lack of capital is a result of the small
capacity to save, and so the circle is complete.
On the demand side, the inducement to invest may be low because of the small
buying power of the people, which is due to their small real income, which again is
due to low productivity. The low level of productivity, however, is a result of the
small amount of capital used in production, which in its turn may be caused at least
partly by the small inducement to invest.658

Information deficiency in the context of the AML reporting system could be compared
with the above situation in that information or knowledge is comparable with physical
capital659 and therefore, it may play active role in production.660 The analyst argues that
for any AML regime, information may play the same role as capital plays in economy.
Keeping this in mind, Ragnar Nurkse’s description of a vicious circle could be
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rephrased to fit the context of information deficiency. In the current context, this could
be described as the ‘Problem of information capital formation in poorly regulated AML
regime’. Now, the vicious circle that has been observed in this context is:
A circular relationship exists on both sides of the problem of … [information
capital] formation in the … [poorly regulated AML regime] ….
On the supply side, there is small capacity to … [share information], resulting from
the … [limited availability of relevant information]. The … [limited availability of
relevant information] is a reflection of low … [level of information sharing among
agencies], which in its turn is due largely to the lack of … [general availability of
information and related resources]. The lack of … [general availability of
information and related resources] is a result of the small capacity to … [share
information], and so the circle is complete.
On the demand side, the inducement to … [maintaining a culture of sharing
information] may be low because of the … [users’ limited ability and opportunity
to effectively use information], which is due to … [limited availability of relevant
information], which again is due to low level of … [information sharing among
agencies]. The low level of … [information sharing among agencies], however, is a
result of the … [lack of general availability of information and related resources]
…, which in its turn may be caused at least partly by the small inducement to …
[maintaining a culture of sharing information].661

One thing that is common in both circles and shown here as the functional equivalent of
‘low level of real income’ is the ‘limited availability of relevant information’.662 Just
like ‘real income’ in economics, the ‘availability of relevant information’ could be
considered a more useful indicator of the soundness of a bureaucratic environment
where an AML reporting system operates. Here the analyst used ‘relevant’ instead of
‘useful’, because ‘usefulness’ indicates a rather broader aspect of information quality,
while ‘relevance’ normally refers only to one of its many features, especially when
information quality is ‘considered within the context of the task at hand …’.663 In this
discussion, the ‘limited availability of relevant information’ would, therefore, mean
scarcity of information that is relevant in the AML reporting system context.
Nurkse mentioned that usually problems on the supply side attract most attention due to
their serious nature and the degree of difficulty encountered to remove them; however,
obstructions on the demand side are also crucial.664 The literature review and empirical
research identified several problems as to why there was a deficiency in the information
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supply and why the number of STRs was low. The subsequent analysis then revealed
that the FIU’s disinclination to providing feedback on poor STRs could signal of a
problem on demand side of the circle too.
5.6.1

Challenges on the Demand Side

This might sound a little surprising at first that information deficiency could be a
consequence of some problems on the demand side of the circle of information capital
formation. When an AML regime is suffering from a desperate shortage of information,
then apparently there should not be any shortage of demand; but interestingly, there
is.665
Adam Smith’s renowned thesis was that ‘the division of labour depends upon the extent
of the market’.666 Nurkse further noted that ‘the inducement to invest is limited by the
size of the market’.667 He argued that the size of the market or people’s capacity to
purchase in real terms determines the level of capital equipment to be used in the
production of goods or services. In other words, in poorer countries this inducement is
somewhat subdued due to their small market size or lower domestic purchasing
capacity.668
If we go back to our old example of a lack of feedback on STRs, what we see is a smallmarket effect in the AML context. If the reporting entities had no option but to report all
possible suspicious transactions and activities,669 the number of STRs would be far
higher. At the same time, if the FIU provided regular case specific feedback and also
put the REs under constant fear of regulatory intervention for poor reporting, the REs
would recruit more personnel, train them, procure new IT equipment and then dedicate
these resources to ensure quality reporting.670
Nevertheless, if the lower number of STRs does not lead to any significant regulatory
risk, and their poor quality does not raise any questions, it will not be meaningful for
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them to invest to ensure better reporting. Analysing their situation under the traditional
Becker model, the REs may logically see that the benefits of noncompliance671 outweigh
the cost of other business or reputational risks, which may or may not occur. They will
just make use of existing resources (in addition to those resources’ regular business
involvement) to comply with their AML obligations. In most cases, this would be a
temporary and sketchy solution of a lower standard;672 but it would be uneconomic,
given the existing level of risk, to invest in capital equipment and resources just to
handle a few occasional reports.673
The above situation actually exists in the AML regime of Bangladesh. The FIU’s
limited ability and opportunity to effectively use information (including the ability to
provide constructive feedback) work as a disincentive for the REs (and maybe for other
sources of information as well). The FIU’s capacity to handle quality virtually
determines whether REs would invest more on quality. When the FIU knows that their
own officers do not have the necessary expert knowledge and technical support to
analyse good STRs, and the professional freedom to use financial intelligence to
contribute to the fight against money laundering, then hardly any good reason remains
left as to why they should insist on quality.
When the above conditions are applied in an AML regime, then size of the market of
information will not mainly be determined by the total number of reporting entities or
geographic area of a jurisdiction. Size should be determined by the volume of
production, that is to say, the flow of useful information produced and used.674
In the AML regime context, placing the FIU in the position of a potential customer of
AML related information and rest of the bureaucracy and individuals as the supplier
gave us some suggestion as to why the information market could be portrayed as small.
In fact, substituting the entire AML reporting system for the FIU would hardly make
any difference in the size of the ‘market’.
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What appeared during the empirical data collection, as the participants from the ACC
and the FIU indicated, was that they seek more than what they could possibly share if
requested. This is partly because, both the FIU and the ACC work with highly classified
information relating to law enforcement issues, which cannot be shared with most other
agencies. In other words, only a handful number of agencies working in the law
enforcement area might have a real interest in what the FIU or the ACC could share.
This is another reason why the information market, at least in the AML context, remains
small.
Is there any way to enlarge the size of the market and break this circle? It has been
observed that some countries were economically backward in the beginning but then
something happened that turned the vicious circle into a beneficent one.675 Nurkse
suggested that:
The difficulty caused by the small size of the market relates to individual
investment incentives in any single line of production taken by itself. At least in
principle, the difficulty vanishes in the case of a more or less synchronized
application of capital to a wide range of different industries. Here is an escape from
the deadlock; here the result is an over-all enlargement of market. People working
with more and better tools in a number of complementary projects become each
others’ customers. Most industries catering for mass consumption are
complementary in the sense that they provide a market for, and thus support, each
other. … The case for ‘balanced growth’ rests on the need for a “balanced diet”.676

How could it be possible to achieve a ‘synchronised application of capital’ in multiple
supplementary projects and expand the size of market for information? The answer to
this question could be given in two parts. First, in many cases, irrespective of their area
of works, most agencies (public or private) actually collect essentially the same type of
data and information about individuals and organisations. Later, they process this data
or information and add new value to make it fit to their specific business needs.
Secondly, ‘[c]omparing and augmenting internal agency data with external information
can improve the accuracy and validity of the data in each agency’s own programs’. 677
To be exact, agencies could mutually benefit through collaboration.
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Now, if a policy is implemented to assess different types of information needs across
bureaucracy and industries, this could be a starting point to break free of the obstacles
on the demand side. An initiative may then follow to identify who could produce what
types of information goods or services and who might be the target market. As Nurkse
observed, ‘An increase in production over a wide range of consumables, so
proportioned as to correspond with the pattern of consumers’ preferences, does create
its own demand.’678
Another thing that could help enlarge the market is cross-border intelligence sharing
initiatives. International collaboration in the form of membership of an intelligence
sharing network and adherence to international standards may open the door for a new
investment of capital in the information service sector. This will benefit the local market
because, ‘[t]he size of the market is a basic determinant’ 679 not only for local
employment of capital but also for international collaboration.680
5.6.2

Challenge in the Supply Side

Nurkse suggested that in the context of economics, the circular relationship on the
supply side could be broken by ensuring a clever use of both domestic hidden
resources681 and foreign aid.682 What he suggested is ‘re-allocation of labour in favour of
capital construction’.683 He argued that, irrespective of the density of population in a
country, waste of labour in the form of disguised unemployment 684 or employment in
relatively unproductive occupations685 is common.
If Nurkse’s assumption is true, then this may not be hard to find workers across the
bureaucracy and industries of Bangladesh ‘who could be dispensed with, who
contribute nothing to output’.686 If this surplus labour could be used in a self-financing
mode, this could contribute greatly to more capital supply. 687 Nurkse stressed that in
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some of the poorer countries there is large-scale disguised unemployment in agriculture
in that ‘a large part of the population engaged in agriculture could be removed without
reducing agricultural output’.688 Then again, the transfer of labour from where they are
abundant to where they are desperately needed does not guarantee automatic solution to
our current problem.689
In order to resolve the issue of the short supply of information capital, an important task
would be to identify the area equivalent to agriculture to draw surplus labour. To begin
with, all three components of the AML reporting system may start by identifying this
additional labour within their respective organisations. Same initiatives could be taken
by public agencies, especially those who collect citizen and business information as part
of their regular work. For example, the Election Commission, tax authority, driver’s
licence issuing authority, immigration and citizenship authority, City Corporation,
telecommunication regulatory authorities and the like.
In the context of economics, Nurkse suggested that this surplus labour be employed in
the formation of new capital — factories, houses, roads, irrigations and the like, and
finance them from their own productive performance.690 In our current context, this
surplus labour could be employed to contribute in the creation of similarly productive
capital, for example, information technology facilities, business specific information
standards, database, identity check system, and risk analysis tool as offered by
information service companies or credit reporting agencies. Some of these ideas have
already been applied in many countries decades ago. For example, the credit-reporting
agencies in Australia as defined in the Privacy Act 1988.691
There are some other conditions that need to be fulfilled to make the initiatives on the
supply side successful. These initiatives could take the form of some projects especially
designed to facilitate the use of surplus labour and tools.692 The necessary tools could be
collected locally in the beginning, if foreign cooperation does not exist, but assistance
from ‘advanced [jurisdictions] where capital goods were being produced more
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efficiently by means of capital goods’693 could be taken when such aid is available. In
that case, the risk remains that some of the tools used in theoretically advanced
developed country may not be suitable for a developing country where there is an
abundant supply of labour that normally does not use highly capital-intensive equipment
or means of production.694
‘We should not expect that the new investment workers at once to work on capital
formation at a much higher level of efficiency’,695 observes Nurkse, but this could be a
beginning where people have started ‘working, producing, contributing to the expansion
of their [jurisdiction’s] productive capacity’.696
5.7

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Suggestion

The description presented in the previous few sections as proposed hypothesis is
‘unavoidably sketchy, and no way conclusive’.697 Although the suggestions are
motivated by the empirical findings and literature review, they are purely hypothetical
and incomplete as far as information capital formation is concerned. Most importantly,
‘capital is not everything’698 and reducing information deficiency alone does not
promise a robust AML reporting system. It is ‘a necessary but not sufficient condition
of progress’,699 because, just like economic underdevelopment, information deficiency
would also require a change in ‘human endowments, social attitudes, political
conditions’700 among other things to overcome its challenges.
The proposed hypothesis on the supply side refers mainly to sources of surplus labour
that could be employed in capital construction. Descriptions on the technical aspects of
the various methods of utilising those resources, which will vary widely in different
contexts, are almost absent.701 Therefore, further research and verification would be
necessary to establish the relationship, if any, between information sufficiency and the
notion of capital formation in economics.
693
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One important aspect of Nurkse’s theory is the use of surplus labour in a self-financing
mode through the mobilisation of domestic resources702 or ‘hidden source of saving’,703
which would require entrepreneurial vision and political aid in the form of noninterference, or in the form of a ‘facilitation effect’.704 Would it be possible to achieve
such a goal in the bureaucratic and political framework of Bangladesh where the
penetration of corruption is so widespread? The answer will remain unknown until such
changes are actually attempted and we have adequate data about their rate of success;
however, there are some examples that show that there exists some ‘light at the end of
the tunnel’. It may be noted that these examples are not about a pure economic solution
but only about positive administrative responses to challenges.
Case One
In 1983, the Sonali Bank, the largest nationalised bank in Bangladesh (one headed by a
writer and career civil servant) introduced a university employment creation project,
providing financial loans to university graduates to start a transportation business. The
official goal of this project was to create self-employment among fresh university
graduates. The proviso was that the university students would use the loan to buy minibuses and then operate their business under the direct supervision of the bank officials.
The project achieved huge momentum, received support from different segments of the
society, but finally failed.
The project was the brainchild of the Managing Director of the Sonali Bank who was
also a writer. Critics said that he introduced this project from his social conviction as a
writer and not as a responsible civil servant. Using his discretionary power, the
Managing Director allowed the loans to be sanctioned without proper risk analysis
having been undertaken. The Managing Director and the Board of Directors were civil
servants who had no financial interest, unlike shareholders in private enterprises. Most
of the loans went to student leaders of political parties and non-student third parties who
were operating the businesses. Due to a lack of personnel, the bank failed to monitor
these irregularities and soon the social commitment of the project disappeared. At the
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same time, some of the vehicles fell out of commission due to accidents and poor
maintenance. Neither the bank nor the borrowers came forward to invest more to bring
them back on the road and into productive capacity for the business again. Ultimately,
both the bank and its borrowers simply abandoned the project. It was alleged that the
project failed mainly because the authority disobeyed the rules and regulations
prescribed for government agencies, which resulted in various legal, bureaucratic and
ethical problems.705
Case Two
In a similar proactive entrepreneurial initiative taken by a member of the Planning
Commission of Bangladesh, a new telecommunication project for adding half a million
new fixed telephone connections was prepared in 1993. Normally, such large projects
are implemented under the Annual Development Program (ADP) with assistance from
foreign loans, for instance, from the World Bank. Such a project does not start until a
formal project proposal has been submitted and a foreign loan has been approved
through a series of negotiations and assessment over a period. At that time the demand
for telephone connections was high. The initiator of this project decided to implement
the project swiftly without any assistance from a foreign donor. A member of the
Planning Commission shared this idea with the Telecommunication Secretary. The
Telecommunication Secretary then started a dialogue with the Finance Ministry. Later,
the Finance Ministry agreed to issue debentures in the capital market and collect the
funds for this project.706
The project was a remarkable success. The ‘[p]ublic purpose was achieved by …
entrepreneurial, and customer-oriented administrative leaders who abided by [the]
existing rules’.707 Although here we have described this success story very briefly, it is
understandable that the project’s success was brought about by an excellent
understanding among the ministries, quick approval for funds, a smooth procurement
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process and successful communications among public agencies and private
stakeholders.708
Case Three
A reliable voter list is an important pre-condition for holding free and fair elections in a
democratic country. It was often believed that due to the bureaucratic dilemma, political
instability, the prevalence of corruption, and many other similar socio-political
constraints, such a voter list would be almost impossible to achieve in Bangladesh.
However, a recent research concluded that it is possible to implement such a project
successfully if the resources are used under a well-defined management system.709
When democracy was restored in 1991 after almost a decade marred by military coups,
repeated periods of martial law, voting irregularities when elections were held, and the
repeated calls for voter non-participation by opposition parties, the major political
parties of Bangladesh then engaged in a series of confrontations between 1991 and 2006
on several issues, including electoral reform and the non-party caretaker government710
headed by a ‘neutral’ head of the government. The situation that resulted from these
confrontations was that a military-backed non-party (civil) caretaker government came
into power. One of the many vital reform challenges this government faced was the
preparation of an accurate and authentic electoral roll. For years, fraudulent entries in
the paper-based voters’ list, the high level of inaccuracies in the list, duplication of
records and occurrences of vote theft had been some of the unique electoral problems in
Bangladesh. The process that was followed to create and upgrade the existing voter list
by political governments especially spurred serious debate and controversy. Therefore,
there was a consensus among the political alliance and other civil society groups that
the new electoral roll should be prepared with biometric data using modern Information
Technology.711
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However, this initiative was not entirely new to Bangladesh. Previously, the Bangladesh
Election Commission created a number of similar projects. One of the most notable of
these initiatives was the introduction of voter ID Cards under a pilot project for two
local elections in 1995. Although the pilot project which was implemented as a
preparation for the upcoming 6th Parliamentary Election of 1995/96 was apparently
successful, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) highlighted a
number of serious challenges that the Election Commission was facing. In a pre-election
assessment, the IFES warned that there was ‘legitimate concern’ as to whether such a
project could ever be implemented on a scale sufficient for a nationwide general
election. They indicated that a lack of resources, the inefficiency of the personnel
involved, the slow data collection process, poor data management and overall poor
management of voter ID Card distribution were some of the serious shortcomings of the
pilot project712 which could have made it very difficult to implement the project
nationwide. Ultimately, the prediction of the IFES appeared correct as the project
remained incomplete due to a number of strategic and technological constraints, after
wasting a huge budget as well as national resources.713
Therefore, in 2008 when a general consensus was reached that a new electoral roll
should be prepared with biometric data, the Election Commission had already learned a
number of valuable lessons from the previous failure. This time they also had the
support of all political groups and other groups in the civil society who extended all
possible cooperation to make the project a success. The new project was named the
‘Preparation of Electoral Roll with Photographs’ (PERP).714
The PERP project was jointly conducted by the Election Commission of Bangladesh,
the Bangladesh Army, and the UNDP.715 This project aimed to issue biometric ID cards
which incorporated the most commonly used biometric data — for instance, the photos
of face and eyes and handwritten signatures/finger prints — to all eligible voters of
Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Army, which has extensive experience in managing many
complex UN peace keeping missions across Asia and Africa, was called on to provide
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managerial, technical and administrative support to prepare the world’s largest
biometric electoral roll of over 80 million voters in an extremely limited time of only 11
months.716
Although the project faced a number of challenges in the initial stage, it was ultimately
assessed as a successful one.717 As Islam and Grönlund noted: ‘This success has initially
and generally been defined by holding the most credible and fair election in the history
of Bangladesh on December 29, 2008. [The] UNDP describes this outcome as a
“groundbreaking exercise in both scale and scope”.’718 Besides the Bangladesh Election
Commission, a number of international agencies including the IFES independently
audited the outcome of the project. The IFES assessment noted that the biometric data
was captured with a very high degree of accuracy and quality, and the list included only
the legitimate voters.719
Scholars stated that the project authority effectively handled the critical project success
factors, which included setting a realistic goal, time-bound strategic planning, acquiring
management support, efficient leadership, successful involvement of stakeholders,
resource mobilisation, progress review, positive power and politics, congenial
bureaucracy, donor support and a drive for modernisation, among other factors. Most
importantly, the project successfully created ‘trust’ in the mind of the general public
about the Government’s good will. They believed that the Government had initiated the
project to improve government services to the citizens of Bangladesh.720
5.8

Conclusion

Under a stressful situation when regular means are unavailable to respond to a growing
concern, people often start to improvise new ways of resolving their problems. A
general information deficiency caused by numerous bureaucratic impediments presented
such a situation of stress for the components of the Anti Money Laundering reporting
system of Bangladesh. Their legal obligation to ensure a successful Anti Money
Laundering reporting regime was fiercely challenged by the practical challenge of a
716
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general information sharing deficiency, which induced them to produce improvised
techniques of informal communications and data collection. While this initiative tended
to have some promise in relation to the goal of information sufficiency, it became
obvious that the AML professionals had achieved only partial success.
Organisational improvisation requires adequate experience and training to achieve the
expected result. In addition, successful improvisers must have sufficient expertise in the
substantive area and a clear understanding of the nature of the underlying issues that
initially prompted them to improvise. The AML professionals’ inexperience and lack of
training in both areas resulted in a situation that indicated that although apparently each
of the components in the reporting system employed their best efforts, ultimate success
remained largely unattained. The evidence showed that the Anti Money Laundering
reporting system failed to produce enough output to establish itself as a properly
functional system. The number of Suspicious Transaction Reports and their qualitative
inadequacies indicates that the AML professionals’ improvised techniques worked only
as makeshift solution to a permanent problem.
What this apparent failure of improvisation indicated could be a useful learning. The
core concern of the Anti Money Laundering reporting regime — that is, a general
information deficiency — was an ongoing problem, deeply rooted in the basic structure
of the society, and which may not be resolved through such makeshift attempts. It also
indicated that reduced quality and quantity of Suspicious Transaction Reports were not
only the consequence of inexperience or negligence on the part of the reporting system;
in fact, in many cases none of the reporting system components had the opportunity to
enhance the quality of the information that they had collected or received. This was
because they had extremely limited access to useful information that could be helpful in
analysis and/or investigation. Consequently, the poor Suspicious Transaction Reports
reporting entities filed with the Financial Intelligence Unit had not changed much in
quality by the time they had finally reached the investigation, evidence collection and
prosecution stage through the Anti Corruption Commission.
This phenomenon of a general shortage of useful information could be comparable with
the problem of capital formation in developing countries. There was a shortage of both
supply of and demand for good quality information in the market. This argument
indicates a general problem among all information users. The abundance of irrelevant
241

information and scarcity of quality information both support the argument that the
demand for quality information in the market was low.
Therefore, the proposed hypothesis could be useful to study this phenomenon more
deeply. Understanding why the demand for good information was low could help policy
makers devise some plan that could help bring up the demand for quality information.
At the same time, it might also be an interesting study as how to best ensure the supply
of adequate relevant information that meets specific business needs of various
information users.
Agencies — both public and private — may have something to share in exchange for
something they want. Using existing resources the agencies concerned may produce
enough information goods and services to meet each other’s demand. It is expected that
this will enlarge the market for information, create demand, and ensure supply.
What is most important for the success of this proposition is the strong commitment of
bureaucracy, something often short in supply in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, there are
examples that indicate that success is possible.
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION
(Note for Ethics Committee: This is an English translation for the Participant
Information Sheet. This will be translated in Bengali (local language of Bangladesh) if
the participants are not comfortable with English.
Research project title
Assessing the anti-money laundering reporting system in Bangladesh

The investigators of this study
Supervisor: Prof. John Broome, Faculty of Law/ Centre for Transnational Crime
Prevention, [contact information is deleted for privacy reasons]
Student: Md. Zahurul Haq, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law/ Centre for Transnational
Crime Prevention, [contact information is deleted for privacy reasons]
What is the Research aim?
This research project will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the Anti Money
Laundering (AML) reporting system of Bangladesh. It aims to identify, and critically
evaluate, the factors that impact upon quality of the AML reports. It also aims to
understand how the perceptions of different components of the AML reporting system
(reporting entities, the FIU and the ACC) affect reporting quality.
Why have I been invited to participate?
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are a representative of a
reporting entity/FIU/AML Law enforcement agency who is directly connected with the
AML reporting system of Bangladesh.
What will I be asked to do?


You will be asked to participate in a one on one interview with the researcher that
will go for approximately 60-80 minutes.



You will be asked a series of questions on Bangladesh’s anti-money laundering
reporting system. Please see the questionnaire attached herewith.



The answers you give will be recorded using a tape recorder.



A transcript will be sent to you to check. If you have any changes you will be
requested to mark them on the transcript, and return them to the researcher within
two weeks by E-mail.

What kind of questions shall I be asked?
Here is a set of sample question for your understanding1.

How do you verify customer identity?
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2.

How do you determine ‘complete’ and ‘correct’ identity of an account holder as
mentioned under Section 25 (a) of the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009
(MLPA 2009)?

3.

What makes a transaction ‘suspicious’ to you, as mentioned in Section 23 (a) of
the MLPA 2009?

4.

How important is it to ensure that all reporting entities follow a standard
baseline/method when identifying ‘suspicious activity/transaction’?

5.

What kind of operational independence does a law enforcing agency need in order
to ensure its proper functioning?

6.

Do you think the current reporting system is an efficient system? If yes, then why
do you think it is efficient?

Will my answers be kept confidential?
All information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The
information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention,
University of Wollongong. The information gained from you during the interview will
be analysed along with that of the other participants in this study and used in the
preparation of a thesis and other academic publications. No personal or identifying data
will be included.
Confidentiality and privacy of the participants will be protected in every stage of the
research, i.e.
Collection stage: The research activity will be conducted after normal office hours at a
neutral venue (chosen as per the convenience of the interviewee) so that participants’
involvement remains undisclosed. Information will be recorded by the researcher
himself using an audiotape without any intervention from third party.
Processing stage: Transcribed information will be completely de-identified so that they
can no way be linked to any specific person. Participants will be cited with code
numbers only.
Use stage: No identifiable data will be used in the PhD thesis and or in any future
publications whatsoever.
Storage: Tangible sources of information (questionnaires, participation information
sheet, consent form, audiotape etc) will be stored in a protected locker at the office of
the researcher’s supervisor, and processed information will be stored in digital format
using standard encryption system (used in MS word and or in Adobe acrobat) on a
password protected computer. Only the researcher and his Supervisor(s) will have
access to this information.
How do I consent to participate?
A consent form is attached. By completing this form with your handwritten signature
and bringing it on the day of the interview with the researcher and complying with the
interview process, consent will be officially given.
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What if I change my mind about participation?
At any time during the study you have the right to withdraw your consent by contacting
the researcher.
How will I benefit from participating in this study?
This study will not benefit you personally. However, through participating in this
research, you may be providing benefit to your institution and other components of the
anti money laundering reporting system of Bangladesh.
Will participating in this study be harmful to me in anyway, is there any risk
involved?
The information provided will be fully de-identified before publication and it is not
anticipated that this study will cause you harm in any way. However, some questions
may result in revealing an indication of lack of compliance by your or other
organizations. In that case, you are at liberty to decide if you would like to answer to
those questions or not.
What will happen if information about corruption and or other kinds of serious
irregularity is disclosed during interview?
Questionnaire is designed to collect some basic information on the current anti money
laundering reporting system of Bangladesh. Thus, you are requested to reveal only what
is relevant. All other information which is irrelevant to the main research question of the
PhD research shall be discarded by the researcher.
Who can I ask any questions I have about this study?
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Prof. John Broome on
[contact information is deleted for privacy reasons]. You will also have the opportunity
to ask questions before and during the interview.
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Social
Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. If you
have any concerns or complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted,
you can contact the UOW Ethics Officer on (02) 4221 4457.
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APPENDIX C: CONSENT FORM
(Note for Ethics Committee: This is an English translation for the consent form and it
will be in Bengali, where the participant does not understand English)
Consent Form for Reporting Entities/FIU/Law Enforcing Agency
Research Title:
Assessing the Anti-Money Laundering Reporting System in Bangladesh
Researcher’s Name: Md. Zahurul Haq
I have been given information about the project, ‘Assessing the Anti-Money Laundering
Reporting System in Bangladesh’ by Mr. Md. Zahurul Haq who is conducting this
research as part of his PhD, supervised by Professor John Broome in the Faculty of Law
at the University of Wollongong in Australia.
I understand that the only burden associated with my participation in this research is the
time involved in the interview and some questions will be related to my work place
(name of the financial entity/FIU/law enforcing agency). These questions may reveal
some challenges my workplace is currently facing. I have been informed that anonymity
of all data will be ensured all through this research. Also neither my name nor any job
related information will be used to identify me or my comments in the publications
resulting from this study. Since Mr. Zahurul Haq is obtaining approval from the
management, so my co-workers or supervisors will know that some of us are
participating in this interview. But, they will not know exactly who is participating and
who is sharing what information.
I have been informed about the objectives and ultimate benefits of this research. I have
read the Participation Information Sheet and have had an opportunity of asking Mr. Haq
any questions I may have about the research and my participation. I understand that my
participation in this research is voluntary and I am not bound to answer questions which
I am not comfortable with. I am free to refuse to participate and I am free to withdraw
from the research before it is published. My refusal to participate or withdrawal of
consent will not affect my treatment in any way.
If I have any enquires about the research, I can contact Mr. Zahurul Haq [contact
information is deleted for privacy reasons] and/or Professor John Broome [contact
information is deleted for privacy reasons]. If I have any concerns or complaints
regarding the way the research is or has been conducted, I can contact the Ethics
Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, University of Wollongong on +61 2 4221
4457, email: research_services@uow.edu.au.
By signing below I am indicating my consent to
•
Participate in the research through an interview
•
Answer all questions related to this research, except where I indicate I do not agree
to answer a particular question.
•
The data collected from me being used for Md. Zahurul Haq’s PhD Thesis, and
related publications.
•
Check the transcript of the interview and notify the researcher of any changes I
would like to be made within two weeks.
Signed
Date
.......................................................................
......./....../......
Name (please print) .......................................................................
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